What FUGE does not explain

I acknowledge that the FUGE concept does not explain two things that contribute to the complexity of the standard cosmological model – the homogeneity/isotropy of the cosmic microwave background (at least not explicitly) and cosmic acceleration (at all).

 

The first is explained in the standard cosmological model by inflation, but there are other explanations other than inflation.  One of the authors of a Scientific American article on inflation together with Alan Guth, Paul Steinhardt, now disowns the theory, going so far as to suggest that inflationary theory “makes no testable predictions”.  The point here is not that Steinhardt’s theory (a cyclic theory of the universe) is necessarily correct either, merely that there are other ways of explaining what inflation set out to explain.

 

While it should be noted that I am not a cosmologist, I am somewhat more sanguine about homogeneity and isotropy.  If physics works the same everywhere in the universe, which seems a reasonable assumption, then if all locations began with the same conditions, in a very much localised area (relative to now), then it should not be surprising that our observations of the cosmic microwave background reveal that all parts of it have evolved over the period of 370,000 years to be pretty similar.

 

That might need a little bit of explanation.  At the beginning, for about 370,000 years, the universe was so hot that it was effectively opaque to photons.  This is known as recombination during the photon epoch – which is to say that none of the photons generated got very far before being absorbed by matter.  The cosmic microwave background is only what we can see from the time that the universe became transparent – we cannot see the Big Bang, we cannot see anything from an inflationary period, and we cannot see anything from a period of about 370,000 years after either of those.

 

Note that during those 370,000 years, the universe was a “hot dense plasma of nuclei, electrons and photons”.  It is pretty difficult to comprehend how a period of inflation of about 10^-32s that occurred 370,000 years previously would be instrumental in ensuring the level of homogeneity and isotropy that we can observe in the cosmic microwave background.  The argument already seems to incorporate the notion that physics would have operated the same way everywhere for the entirety of 370,000 years, leading the universe to evolve into a homogeneous and isotropic state.

 

Note this statement from the wikipedia entry on the photon epoch: “370,000 years after the Big Bang, the temperature of the universe fell to the point where nuclei could combine with electrons to create neutral atoms. As a result, photons no longer interacted frequently with matter, the universe became transparent and the cosmic microwave background radiation was created and then structure formation took place.”  If this is correct, and I have no reason to suspect otherwise, then once the temperature hit a certain point (apparently in the order of 10³K), neutral atoms were created and the universe became transparent.  So we should expect the entirety of the cosmic microwave background to be that temperature divided by the extent of expansion, even if the temperatures were reached at slightly different times.

 

Putting that in figures, the current cosmic microwave background temperature is 2.725K with a variation of 0.0002K between the “hot” and the “cold” regions.  Over the past 13.77 billion years (ish), the temperature has reduced by a factor of about 10³ due to the expansion of the universe (which has expanded by a factor of about 10⁴-10⁵).  The question then is: if different regions cooled down to the temperature required for neutral atoms to form at slightly different times, what effect would that have on temperature observed today?  Using the FUGE values, the universe has expanded by a factor of 3.7×10⁵ since the surface of last scattering when the cosmic microwave background was formed, assuming that it happened at precisely year 370,000 and that this is precisely year 13,770,000,000 (don’t get distracted by all the 3s and 7s, they are just an artefact of using the year as our temporal unit).

 

The standard model describes the CMB as originating from a hydrogen-helium plasma, condensing at a temperature of about 3,000K.  So, assuming this temperature to be precise, together with the 2.7250K value for the “cold” regions, the universe needed to expand by a factor of 3.76162162×10⁵ to reduce the temperature by a factor of 1.10091743×10³.  Assuming that the “hot” regions are precisely 2.7252K, how much later would they have been at 3,000K than the "cool" regions were?  It would require reduction by a factor of 1.100836636×10³, implying expansion of the universe by a factor of 3.721348495×10⁵, indicating that “hot” regions in the cosmic microwave background may have cooled down to 3,000K in the year 370,027.  So … the dappling on the cosmic radiation background that we can see could just be due to variations in the timing of the cooling of the universe by a factor of just under 30 years (or a bit under 0.01%).

 

There’s an additional assumption that can be added to the FUGE model, if one wants to explain homogeneity and isotropy, and that is that mass-energy entering the universe does so in a homogenous and isotropic manner.  This is a direct consequence of the cosmological principle (nowhere in the universe is special), so if energy is entering into or being created by the universe, then this will be happening to the same extent everywhere – similar to the notion of dark energy which involves a consistent density which implies the introduction of (mass-)energy across the universe at a rate equal to the increase in volume.

 

At year 370,000, in the FUGE model, the amount of mass-energy in the universe was equivalent to 2.356×10⁴⁸kg whereas, at 10^-36s, there was only 0.2018kg (noting that the radius at that time was 3.000×10^-28m).  This means that the vast majority of mass-energy in the universe at year 370,000 had entered after the time that, in the standard model, inflation would have commenced.  The only reason why one would consider the distribution of mass-energy at the notional time of inflationary period is that, in the standard model, there would already be 8.08×10⁵³kg of mass-energy in existence at that time.  That is simply not a factor in the FUGE model.  In other words, inflation is a solution to a problem created by the standard model.

 

Note that in the FUGE model there is, today, 8.77×10⁵²kg in the universe (so a density of 9.47×10^-27kg/m³).  The standard model has it that there is 1.5×10⁵³kg of ordinary matter, plus six times that of dark matter and more than twice that again in dark energy – in the observable universe.  This is based on the observable universe being 46.5 billion light years in radius, due to inflation.  The total amount of mass-energy in the Hubble sphere (about 14 billion light years), would be 9.17×10⁵²kg based on a density of 9.9×10^-27kg/m³.  Note that the critical density is related to the Hubble parameter which is not yet nailed down, so there is a range between 8.3×10^-27kg/m³ (Planck Collaboration) and 10.2×10^-27kg/m³ (SHOES) that my calculation comfortably falls into.

 

The standard model has the amount of ordinary matter in a Hubble sphere as 3.9×10⁵¹kg (1.5×10⁵³kg multiplied by the volume of a Hubble sphere, divided by the calculated observable universe volume [so about 2.5%]).  With the assumption that this is 4.8% of the total mass-energy, this is equivalent to 8.12×10⁵²kg in total (within the ballpark of the FUGE model estimate).  However, as the FUGE model does not distinguish between types of mass-energy, it’s worth looking at how much ordinary matter we can see using all the tools available to us (as opposed to how much can be calculated using other assumptions).

 

The observable universe contains about 10²⁴ stars (as is likely “a gross underestimation” and presumably based on an assumption of a density of galaxies and constituent stars applied to a universe of 46.5 light years radius).  According to Kroupa, the average stellar mass sits between 0.20 and 0.38 solar masses.  A solar mass is 1.989×10³⁰kg, so that’s between 3.98×10⁵³kg and 7.56×10⁵³kg in the observable universe, as a gross underestimate.  Given that the Hubble sphere is about 2.5% the volume of an observable universe that is purported to be 46.5 light years in radius, this equates to between 1.0×10⁵²kg and 1.9×10⁵²kg.

 

But this is just stars.  What about cosmic dust?  The intergalactic medium contains about one atom per cubic metre, presumably hydrogen.  The vast majority of space is intergalactic medium, so I am going to use the whole volume of a Hubble sphere for the estimate.

 

A hydrogen atom has a mass of 1.673557×10^-27kg.  So that equates to a total mass for the intergalactic medium of 1.54987×10⁵²kg (in a Hubble sphere), for a total of identified ordinary matter between 2.55×10⁵²kg and 3.45×10⁵²kg.

 

Within a galaxy there is the interstellar medium, and astronomers estimate that, in our galaxy, the mass of that medium is equal to about 15% of the mass contained in stars.  If our galaxy is average, then this is an additional 0.15×10⁵²kg to 0.28×10⁵²kg (for a new total between 2.8×10⁵²kg and 3.7×10⁵²kg).

 

There is also a question about nebulae.  I would not count concentrations of dust (etc) such as the Horsehead Nebula as contributing to the interstellar medium, but perhaps astronomers do.  Nebulae vary greatly in size, for example the Carina Nebula has about 4,300 solar masses while the Cat’s Eye nebula is a planetary nebula and has less than one solar mass.  What the average mass of a nebula is and what is the number of them in each of the galaxies are questions to which I cannot find the answer.

 

Given that we can see only a small proportion of the Milky Way by eye (see image below, from Pablo Carlos Budassi’s image at Wikipedia), and that we can see a number of nebula from where are, my gut feeling is that there is a significant even though relatively small proportion of mass of the galaxy that resides in them.  I suspect that we can safely ignore them.

 

 

Finally, there is the supermassive black hole at the centre of galaxies (assuming that ours is typical).  We have a black hole of about 4 million solar masses.  This is about one to four parts in a hundred thousand and presumably the same could be said for other galaxies, so again, it is in the noise and can be safely ignored.

 

Nevertheless, the identified mass is in the order of half that calculated in the FUGE model.  The comment above, that the number of stars is a gross underestimate, indicates that entirety of mass in the universe could be accounted for by normal matter (stars, planets, dust), or, perhaps, there is scope for a smaller quantity of “dark matter”, in approximately the same order as ordinary matter.  If the former, then an alternative to dark matter would need to be identified.

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The other feature of the standard cosmological model that is not explained by the FUGE model is cosmic acceleration.  I have mentioned this a few times already but the evidence for cosmic acceleration is contentious.  Jacques Colin, Roya Mohayaee, Mohamed Rameez and Subir Sarkar argue that the evidence for cosmic acceleration is lacking.  The explanation, as given a little more clearly by Sabine Hossenfelder, is that the original analysis by Reiss et al. assumed that the cosmological principle applied at the scale at which they were observing supernovae – but that scale is below that at which the concordance model indicates that the cosmological principle applies.  Fundamentally, if you look closely enough, the universe is lumpy (with stellar systems, galaxies, clusters and so on), but if you zoom out and look at averages at the 200-300 megaparsec scale, then the universe is expected to be smooth.  Once you look at the evidence at the appropriate scale, the apparent acceleration goes away.

 

Remember here that cosmic acceleration only exists because of that observation of supernovae.  It doesn’t exist to bring density or Hubble parameter values into alignment with what are currently measured.  So if there were no acceleration and no dark energy, the standard cosmological model would have to be rejigged to result in the values that are reached naturally via the FUGE model (shortened periods of deceleration, redistributed periods of deceleration, reduced rates of deceleration, less inflation, and/or a new period of “standard” expansion with H=1/t).  Consider then the utility of the standard cosmological model if it can be rejigged to get any result we need.  Pretty much zero.  And if it can’t be rejigged to get the result we need.  Precisely zero.

 

It is true that the FUGE model does not explain the observations that lead to dark matter either, but if there are problems with dark matter (and there are) then we already need to look for an alternative solution.  Note that there is no problem in the FUGE model if there is a solution that, under certain circumstances, looks like there is some sort of “dark matter”, but this appearance should not necessarily be taken as meaning that there is literally an additional category of mass-energy.

 

The FUGE model explains only what you need and what you see.  There is no need for an inflaton field (which theoretically drives inflation and for which there is no experimental evidence – so we don’t see it), dark matter (the phenomenon that led to the theory of dark matter was observed in 1993, but as for actual dark matter … there is no experimental evidence – so we don’t see it) or dark energy (for which there is no experimental evidence – note that a phenomenon that leads to a proposed explanation is not evidence of the explanation being real and note also that in the link it is stated that “Currently, the only experimental evidence for dark energy is the accelerating expansion of the universe”.  So, that is not evidence – it is just the phenomenon that dark energy was proposed to explain – and if it is the only experimental evidence, then there is no experimental evidence.  Also see NASA’s comment about the complete mystery involving yet another thing that we don’t see).

 

I should note here that declarations about the balance of mass-energy in the universe (so much ordinary matter, this much dark matter and that much dark energy) are based on assumptions.  According to CERN: “researchers have been able to infer the existence of dark matter only from the gravitational effect it seems to have on visible matter”.  If there’s another mechanism, then dark matter disappears.  According to NASA: “We know how much dark energy there is because we know how it affects the universe's expansion”.  If there’s another mechanism or there is in fact no acceleration, then dark energy disappears.  And then we have just ordinary matter, at a quantity that the FUGE model produces.

Problems with the FUGE cosmological model

After having written much about the problems that I see with the standard cosmological model, I thought it would be fair to talk about the problems with the FUGE (flat uniform granular expansion) model.

Fundamentally, all the FUGE model is saying is that:

• for every unit of Planck time, the radius of the universe increases by one unit of Planck length, and
• for every unit of Planck time, the mass-energy in the universe increases by half a unit of Planck mass.

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First off, why the units of Planck time and Planck length and half a unit of Planck mass?  In Half a Problem Solved?, I discuss how our universe could be one of a matched pair.  In the update, I refer to a paper in the Annals of Physics (reported at Live Science) which details a theory involving a mirror universe which runs “backwards in time”.  Each of these mirror universes would receive (or generate) half a unit of Planck mass per delta unit of Planck time (even if these delta units are in opposite directions), summing to a total of one unit of Planck mass per delta unit of Planck time.

And secondly, given that l_P=c.t_P=G.m_P/c², and r_s=2GM/c², which indicates a linear relationship between all the key elements, there is no particular issue if the implied granularity is at the Planck scale, or smaller, or even larger.  I prefer the Planck scale, but I am not irrevocably wedded to it.

Thirdly, in the original meaning of FUGE, it had "universal" in the middle of the definition, which wasn't great.  I actually started with flat, granular and expansion, which suggested FUGE, so the insertion of "universal" is actually somewhat akin to what happens with a backronym.  Recently I realised that FUGE is better rendered as "flat uniform granular expansion", applying when talking about "a FUGE universe" or "the FUGE cosmological model" (as per the title of this post) or something similar.  Note that the uniformity that we are talking about only applies at a sufficiently large scale, as per discussions of homogeneity and isotropy.

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There will be some who will point out issues additional to those that I go through below, of that I am certain, but the major problem that I see is that I have no good explanation for why mass-energy enters the universe.

I have previously suggested that it could be because there was a black hole in a precursor universe, and all the mass-energy from there is entering our universe, but that just kicks the problem down the road – where did the mass-energy from that universe come from?  From an earlier precursor universe perhaps, but that results in an endless regression.  Additionally, an inherent feature of that model is that there are two mirrored universes each going off in different temporal directions (negative and positive) each of which gets half the mass-energy, as mentioned above.  So this sequence of universes implies that they would be halving in mass-energy each time a new universe branches out of an old one.  Do that a few dozen times and you start getting sparsely populated universes (2⁴⁸≈10³⁵).  With the quantity of mass-energy in our universe, there’s a hint that either there was a tremendous amount available at the very beginning or we are one of the very earliest iterations of universes.  Unless, of course, there’s some mechanism by which the mass-energy in both the positive and negative temporal directions recombine when a new pair of universes is generated, in which case a new complication is added because we don’t have anything close to a mechanism for explaining that.

A better explanation, albeit one lacking in key detail, is that expansion itself results in the creation of mass-energy, if the universe is flat.  The tiny detail missing is … what causes the expansion?  The positive aspect here, however, is that we merely have an absence of explanation.  What cannot be denied, at least not reasonably*, is that we observe expansion, even if we may not be able to explain its origin.  The creation of mass-energy is a fundamental requirement of the standard cosmological model even if it is rarely (if ever) stated as such.  The notion of dark energy includes an assumption that there is a background of invariant energy density in the universe, indicating that a universe with increasing mass-energy is not inherently impossible (because, if so, that should have been raised an objection to this explanation for dark energy).

Another problem is that it is not immediately obvious that the universe ought to be flat.  Once we have expansion and the notion that the universe is flat, and therefore has critical density, the quantity of mass-energy entering into, or being created by the expansion of the universe follows naturally.  But why would the universe be flat?

I think it is useful to consider the notion that there are reasons that mitigate against the universe not being flat.

There are only two non-flat options – either the universe could have greater than the critical density, or less than it.

In the first option, the density would be greater than that of a black hole with the radius of the universe.  The densest type of black hole is a non-rotating black hole (like a Schwarzschild black hole) and, if our universe were ever denser than that, then … well, what I would expect to see would be similar to the notion of inflation, massively rapid expansion, until such time as the density was no longer greater than that of a black hole, becoming flat or overshooting into sub-critical density.  While this might sound like an explanation for inflation, we would still have a question as to why the initial density was greater than critical.  And it would also mean that, today, we would only see either a sub-critical or critical density.

Which leaves only the second alternative, the universe having a density that is less than that of a black hole of similar dimensions – or sub-critical density.

The universe as a whole is entirely composed of gravitationally uncoupled systems (uncoupled from each other, or at least only coupled to such a relatively negligible extent that the systems do not collapse into each other).  Each of these systems are less dense than a black hole.  The solar system is an example, or just the Sun itself, or the galaxy, or galaxy cluster (or superclusters).  It is certainly possible to imagine a universe that is less dense than a black hole.

However, remember that we are trying to understand why mass-energy is entering the universe – this is associated with a universe that is flat and we are now considering a universe that would not be flat, so there is no reason to assume that mass-energy would enter it over time.  We have only three options in this sub-critically dense universe:

• there is an invariant quantity of mass-energy in the universe,
• mass-energy is leaving the universe due to some unexplained mechanism,
• or mass-energy is entering the universe at some reduced rate than for a FUGE universe due some other unexplained mechanism.

In the first option, we would have a situation in which – until right now, due to expansion – the density was higher than a Schwarzschild black hole with a radius of 13.77 billion light years, and it will later have a density that is lower.  Nothing is denser than a non-rotating black hole, so we can eliminate this option.

The second option is worse, since in the past the universe would have been even denser, and it too can be eliminated as an option.

The third gets us nowhere, since we still have mass energy entering the universe, we just have a situation in which rate no longer makes any sense.

There is a possible fourth option, being a combination of two or three of the options rejected above, in phases, perhaps also incorporating a flat phase, and a super-critical phase.  Such an option would have the same problems as the Standard Cosmological Model (and indeed could be equivalent to the Standard Model).  

At the risk of sounding Zen, the universe itself seems to be telling us that it is not possible to have less than critical density.

Then there is the fact that the FUGE model deviates from standard cosmology.  I have discussed this in The Problem with the Standard Cosmological Model.  To the extent that there are problems with standard cosmology, the fact that the FUGE model deviates from standard cosmology is not really a problem.  If the FUGE model were shown to not reflect the facts of the universe, then that would be a problem.  But it does not, so far as I can tell, it just results in the universe as it is today, with a lot less faffing about.

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* Maybe there is reasonable denial after all - as reported by Live Science.  However, this paper does not deny the appearance of expansion (per red shift).  Note also that it removes dark matter (as a form of mass-energy) and also dark energy.  I suspect that Lombriser's model introduces gravitational and cosmogenesis-related issues, but given the complexity of the theoretical underpinnings, it's entirely possible that it doesn't and I just cannot see it. 

The Problem(s) with the Standard Cosmological Model - Charts Unmodified

I presented four charts in The Problem(s) with the Standard Cosmological Model, each with a modification for clarity and emphasis.  Some might think that this was unfair, so here are those charts without the clarifying modification.

Again each chart had log values in both axes.

Radius:

The (relatively) strange activity of the universe under the Standard Cosmological Model is still visible, although not as a clearly.

Mass-energy:

In this chart, the only massive oddity that is obvious (pun intended) is the kick upwards at the end, and the lack of correlation which could be expected because the curves relate to different models.

Density:

The bizarre flopping around of values in the Standard Cosmological Model can still be seen.

Hubble Parameter:

In this chart, the use of the logarithmic scale hides the difference in values, except during the funky action at the beginning and the end.  If we zoom in to see the most recent section, and use a linear scale, we see (recalling that we have the age of the universe in seconds):

Of course, all we see here is that there’s a difference between two sets of figures for recent times, which doesn’t in itself tell us which set is correct.  But this is just one of four charts.

Is QED Wrong, or Just Wikipedia?

There seems to be an error either with quantum electrodynamics (QED) and stochastic electrodynamics (SED) or Wikipedia.

 This is the section in question (archived):

 

Note the critical density of the universe is in the order of 10^-26 kg/m³ which means that the critical energy density of the universe (given that E=mc²) is in the order of 10^-9 J/m³.

Note also for a universe with a radius of one Planck length, at an age of once Planck time and a corresponding Hubble parameter value of one inverse Planck time, the critical density would be in the order of 10⁹⁶ kg/m³ which corresponds with a critical energy density in the order of 10¹¹³ J/m³.

A vacuum energy of 10¹¹³ J/m³ beyond the spacetime origin of our universe is ridiculous.  As an example, the Earth has an average density of 5515 kg/m³, which is equivalent to an energy density of 5x10²⁰ J/m³ – meaning that if the vacuum had a density of 10¹¹³ J/m³, it would swamp us.  We’d not even be a rounding error.

Whether QED/SED is wrong, or Wikipedia contains a misinterpretation of the writings of Peter Milonni and/or de la Pena and Cetto, I don’t actually know.  But anyone suggesting such a huge magnitude of vacuum energy density should really go back and check their figures.

I am certainly not going to stay awake at night worrying about the cosmological constant problem (or whether I need to worry about it being a slam dunk for Fine Tuners).

A Doctor a Day - A Response

I recently saw an invitation, by someone with the moniker faithwithreason, to read an article by Luke A. Barnes (The Fine-Tuning of the Universe for Intelligent Life).  Note that this article is located at arxiv.org, which means it has been “endorsed” by someone but it hasn’t gone through the full peer review process (note Luke's comment below in which he provides a link to a journal article in which the article also appears, indicating that it has since gone through a peer review process).  Victor Stenger, the author of the book that Barnes uses as his “antagonist”, has responded to Barnes’ paper (also located at arxiv.org).  Stenger did not however address Barnes’ motivations.  It’s entirely likely that Barnes’ motivations align very closely with faithwithreason’s motivations because, interestingly enough, faithwithreason is also completed a PhD in Astrophysics, “not too long ago”, just like Barnes.  For those not familiar with the difference between astrophysics and astronomy, it is worth noting that astrophysics is the branch of astronomy that deals with the physics of the universe – like “the absorption properties of damped Lyman Alpha systems” (Barnes’ refereed articles 1, 2 and 3) or “expanding space” (Barnes’ refereed articles 4, 6 and 7) or “evolving dark energy” (Barnes’ refereed articles 8).

The link to Barnes’ article was provided with the claim that it had no religious bias, a claim which I doubt, given that Barnes has also provided arguments against evolution.  However, even if there is a bias in the Barnes’ intent, the result of that bias is already adequately addressed in his response by Stenger, someone who has many years of experience in particle physics.

Barnes, on the other hand, presents his argument after a much shorter involvement in astrophysics from a position that appears to be largely motivated by a creationist agenda.  If there was, in the field of particle physics, such obvious evidence for the fine-tuning of universe for life (or for intelligent life as Barnes argues) then there would be more physicists who would have noticed it – but figures show that significantly less than 10% of physicists are believers.  Physicists simply don’t see the evidence that Barnes believes to exist and Stenger is one of the very few who have seen it as important enough to even bother devoting time to discussing something that has not been found, as opposed to the more fruitful discussions of what has been found.

I expect to see more efforts in the future from people like Barnes, and faithwithreason, I have no doubt, to argue that some things that we as a species don’t currently fully understand is somehow evidence for their god.  As a consequence you will start to see more serious researchers react against the theistic corruption of their discipline – in the future we might even see a cosmologist become the new Dawkins due to the feeling of outrage that Barnes’ sort of shenanigans engenders in people who have devoted their life to a proper search for understanding.

The problem, however, is that the whole argument is an effort at misdirection.

Fine-Tuning centres on a counterfactual, something that even Barnes admits, although he tries to make light of it.  He starts off saying that “FT can be understood as a counterfactual claim, that is, a claim about what would have been” and then goes on to talk about playing tennis against Roger Federer, which he has never done.

I’m assuming that Barnes means that we should imagine that there has been a game in which he played against Federer and lost, as he would undoubtedly do, and then imagine all the other possible game outcomes that didn’t happen, but which could have.  There are some major issues with the analogy: the rules of tennis are fixed; the implements are predetermined along with the arena; and so on.  The implied choice of game however, being tennis, means that the competition is heavily stacked against Barnes.  If given a clean sheet we would not be limited to tennis, so we could have chosen tiddlywinks or scrabble or any number of games in which the outcome would not have been nearly so predictable.

Instead of using a limited and entirely hypothetical scenario, I suggest that we should use a real, existent scenario, but something that could be equated to the amazing fact that I am here and able to ponder on the amazing fact that I am here and able to ponder on the amazing fact I am are here and able to ponder on the amazing fact that I am here and able to ponder on the amazing fact that I am here ... I think I have made my point, but here is a graphical representation:

In order to create such a scenario, I’m going to use a cat, who we shall call “Tiddles” (the star of The Logic of an Apologist, When an Ontological Argument Simply Isn’t and Fine-Tuning Towards Ignorance).

Tiddles (or a being very similar to Tiddles) lives in my house and this is an amazing fact.  If a single event out of a multitude of events had been slightly different, Tiddles would live in another house, would be dead or would never have existed.  I’ll just take half a dozen:

·         Tiddles’ mother could have been desexed – result = no Tiddles

·         Tiddles’ breed could never have caught on – result = no Tiddles

·         Tiddles could have escaped and been run over – result = dead Tiddles

·         Tiddles could have eaten a poisoned rat – result = dead Tiddles

·         I could have not visited the breeder the day I did – result = no Tiddles in my house

·         I could have decided to get a different type of cat – result = no Tiddles in my house

Now if I had the inclination (and the time), I could develop thousands of variations of my life, and the life of Tiddles, in which we never came to enjoy the relationship we currently enjoy or in which that relationship would have come to a distressing end.

It’s absolutely, gobsmackingly amazing, if one looks at it that way, that Tiddles lives in my house.

However, it’s not really that amazing.  I’ve had other cats and on the sad day that I become Tiddlesless, I shall certainly grieve but not too long afterwards, I will be looking for a replacement.

However, my life with the specific feline called Tiddles is a given.  It’s a fact and no matter how many other counterfactuals I might want to construct in which Tiddles is not a part of my life, they (neither singularly nor in combination) do not lead to a conclusion that some immensely powerful, transcendent, timeless, spaceless, personal Being guided Tiddles to me.

Similarly, once we are in the position to ponder how amazing it is that we are here – we are here.  All the other options that excluded us might have been possible, but if it weren’t possible for us to be here, then we wouldn’t be here to be amazed.  And it doesn’t matter how unlikely it is, because once an event has taken place, the likelihood of that event having taken place is 100%.

So, really, the universe could be “finely tuned” in the sense that if it were different then life could not have arisen and this would provide no proof of Barnes’ god.  In some ways, Stenger is doing the theists a favour, if they were only bright enough to realise it.

The Fine-Tuning “Argument” suggests that god was limited in how he built the universe in order to make life.  This is a rather weak god, one that has to follow imposed laws.  If that is the case, then why don’t we just refer to the laws and leave out the middle man?  If, however, there is a range of options from which god could choose to build a universe, then god is not so constrained.  God could make any sort of universe it wanted with life in it, but chose this one using its enormous powers.

Of course, that leaves the creationist apologists without any proof of god, but that’s what faith is for, isn’t it?

The Method of WLC's Madness

In his debates, William Lane Craig repeatedly claimed that one of the strengths of his arguments for god is their “explanatory power” – the explanatory power of a creator who initiated the Big Bang, the explanatory power of a creator who finely tuned the universe, the explanatory power of god resurrecting Jesus and so on.

His Argument from Contingency:

1.    Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence (either in its own nature or in an external cause).

2.    If the universe has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is God.

3.    The universe exists.

4.    Therefore, the explanation of the universe is God.

And his Argument from First Cause:

We can also formulate this reasoning in the form of a deductive argument:

1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.

From which it follows logically that

Therefore, the universe has a cause

Again, as we have seen, the best candidate for such a transcendent cause is God.

And his Argument from Resurrection:

1.    There are three established facts about Jesus: his empty tomb, his post-mortem appearances, and the origin of the disciples’ belief in his resurrection.

2.    The hypothesis “God raised Jesus from the dead” is the best explanation of these facts.

3.    The hypothesis “God raised Jesus from the dead” entails that God exists.

4.    Therefore, God exists.

I did touch on this before, in Explaining Evidence, but I stumbled on a useful page on Wikipedia which expands on the historical method.  This is where Craig gets his “explanatory principle” from.

This methodology works, to a limited extent for the resurrection argument and only the resurrection argument, merely because some people claim that the Bible is history.  None of his other arguments are related to history, they are more in the domain of science (or rather of pseudoscience the way he handles them).  Scientific discussions should heed the scientific method, not the historical method.  Nobody was around at the time of the Big Bang, so there was no history to synthesise!

The reason why the methodology doesn’t work (not even for the resurrection argument) is that within the historical method, when done by real historians rather than theologians, a hypothesis is supposed to answer more questions than it raises – it is supposed to be less ad hoc than other explanations.

The major problem with a god solution is that the god solution raises questions that are more difficult than those it answers.  That’s negative explanatory power.

Explaining Evidence

In On Evidence, I mentioned an exchange between Humble Don and the Shaved Chimp:

Humble Don (HD): It’s theoretically possible that you could be presented with enough evidence to argue you to a different position …

The Shaved Chimp (SC): Oh, sure.

(HD): At which point, you would begin to intellectually doubt Christianity …

(SC): Well, yes, what, wh-what, what those arguments would have to do is explain the evidence better …

(HD): Right.

(SC): … than the Christian claim.

I only briefly touched on it, but this “explain the evidence” seems to be a recurring theme, so I thought I might look more closely at it.

Note closely the shift in focus away from evidence to argument and then to explanation of the evidence.

What the Shaved Chimp seems to be alluding to is a comparison between one claim (the Christian claim) and an opposing claim.  This is fair enough given that they were talking about a newspaper piece by an atheist.  So Humble Don was suggesting that it is theoretically possible to be presented with enough evidence to argue the Shaved Chimp into assuming an atheist position.

Imagine that archaeologists open a cave to find a treasure trove of documentation including early versions of the gospel according to Mark that deviate significantly from the published version, with copious notes indicating that the story is based not only on the “messiah phenomenon” that is common in Judea but also elements of the mythology of India, Egypt, Mesopotamia and Assyria together with some Greek storytelling techniques.  The documentation, dated to before 50CE (via a comprehensively documented event that led to the sealing of the cave), makes absolutely clear that the author considered the story to be fiction and there is no scientific reason to doubt the validity of the documentation.

Can this evidence be explained by the “atheist claim”?

Well, not really.  Why were the documents written?  Unless there’s a documented explanation we simply don’t know why the author wrote them.  We do know that various authors throughout history have written fiction for entertainment or to make some point.  Someone with an atheist inclination might posit that the author had wondered what would happen if the child of a god were to be born into the world of the day (there are plenty of people who believe that if a Jesus like figure was around today, he’d be eliminated rather swiftly).  Such a theory, however, is not an explanation rooted in the “atheist claim”.

Can this evidence be explained by the Christian claim?

Sure, no problem.  The Holy Spirit moved in the world then as it does now.  While the author known as Mark might not have thought that the story was true, the fact that the Holy Spirit selected someone who did not believe the story is immaterial.  The intent of the Holy Spirit in selecting Mark was to ensure the best possible rendition of the Gospel, to express a higher truth than that perceived by Mark himself.

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If your focus is entirely on explaining evidence as it arises, then the Christian claim can always suffice.

The sorts of people who actively seek out evidence (atheists, legitimate scientists and materialists) aren’t looking to explain evidence.  They also have a higher standard when it comes to what constitutes evidence.

The idea that the scientifically inclined don’t try to explain evidence might have Christian apologists snorting into their beards so I had better explain.

In the scientific method, one tries to explain observations, not evidence.  Science, as a method, attempts to integrate our knowledge into a seamless whole.  What science does not do is simply list the observations and then attempt to explain them individually.  As Sean Carroll says in The Great Debate – Has Science Refuted Religion? – “the dumbest, but most accurate, scientific theory would just be a list of everything that ever happened, everywhere in the universe”.  Science sacrifices this level of stupid accuracy in favour of a theoretical framework that is testable and that has predictive power.

(Science is not alone in this.  Not even humans are alone in this.  Any creature that can learn to use tools will use a variation of the scientific method to develop an understanding of a tool in order to use it successfully.)

The steps of the scientific method, put roughly, are:

·         Informal observation

o   An apple falls to the ground

·         Systematic observation

o   Various fruit in the garden fall to the ground, as do leaves and twigs

·         Formulation of a generalised, falsifiable hypothesis

o   “Unless otherwise supported, an object will when released always approach the ground” – if we drop an object and it hangs in the air or rises, then this will prove the hypothesis to be incorrect

·         Testing of hypothesis

o   Systematic release of a variety of items

o   Each test constitutes evidence for or against the hypothesis

·         Falsification of hypothesis

o   A helium balloon when released floats up

o   If a falsifiable hypothesis cannot be shown to be false, it will eventually become a Theory

·         Modification of hypothesis

o   Based on the results of experimentation (evidence) the hypothesis may be either rejected as false or, if appropriate, modified

o   “Unless otherwise supported, an object that is heavier than air will when released always approach the ground”

Theories can serve as the basis for new hypotheses, with the example above, we could posit that objects with mass will accelerate towards each other in proportion to their combined mass divided by their separation.  This new hypothesis would be tested and refined until a Theory remains which is not falsified.  Any new Theory which has more predictive power and which explains a greater range of phenomena will replace lower level theories – as neopolitan’s basic theory of stuff dropping is replaced by Newton’s theory of gravitation which is then replaced by Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity.

This explanation of phenomena and the predictive power of a hypothesis are what are meant when scientists refer to “explanatory power”.

William Lane Craig continually refers to the explanatory power of the God Hypothesis – his whole “Cosmological Argument from Contingency” is predicated on the idea.  Here’s the argument again (from his debate with Lawrence Krauss):

1. Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence (either in its own nature or in an external cause).
2. If the universe has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is God.
3. The universe exists.
4. Therefore, the explanation of the universe is God.

Later in the debate, while summarising, Craig says:

… I explained that contingent beings are more probable given God’s existence than on atheism. Dr. Krauss will have to say that the existence of contingent beings is just as probable on atheism as it is on theism. But that seems incorrect because atheism has no explanation for the existence of contingent beings.

Note that by “contingent beings” here Craig means things that did not have to exist, but do.

Take a moment for Craig’s words to sink in.  If his words don’t seem silly to you, try reading them again.  Usually, a summarisation papers over the gaping holes in an argument but in this case, the summarisation make absolutely clear that Craig’s argument is incoherent.

First we need to decode the term “probable on” in reference to hypotheses.  If you do a Google search on this term, you will reach two types of uses:

·         a statement is evidence for an hypothesis if and only if the hypothesis is more probable on the statement than before (Florida Philosophical Review)

·         What about the first point of evidence that the existence of contingent beings is more probable on God’s existence than on atheism? (William Lane Craig)

The first usage here is the form you’ll be more likely to see, unless you restrict your search to apologetics sites (and sites critiquing apologetics sites).  It refers to the probability of a hypothesis being affected by the presentation of evidence.  Presumably, a statement is evidence against a hypothesis if and only if the hypothesis is less probable on (the basis of) the statement than before.

The second usage is the sort of misuse of logic that we’ve come to expect from Craig.  Let me rephrase him a little to take out the deceptions:

·         What about the first (point of evidence) argument that the evidence (existence of contingent beings) is more probable on the hypothesis H (God’s existence) than on the hypothesis H’ (atheism)

Can you see it?

I’ll tidy them both up and let you compare them on more even footing:

·         the hypothesis is more probable on the evidence (than another hypothesis) (FPR)

·         the evidence is more probable on the hypothesis (than another hypothesis) (WLC)

Okay, so Craig has it back to front.  No surprise there because he’s trying to defend a hypothesis rather than find a truth.

Looking at his statement again:

… I explained that contingent beings are more probable given God’s existence than on atheism. Dr. Krauss will have to say that the existence of contingent beings is just as probable on atheism as it is on theism. But that seems incorrect because atheism has no explanation for the existence of contingent beings.

and rewording:

·         X argued that:

o   the evidence is more probable on hypothesis H than on hypothesis H’

·         X states that Y must argue that:

o   the evidence is just as probable on hypothesis H’ as on hypothesis H

·         X believes that the argument that (according to X) Y must present is incorrect because

o    hypothesis H’ provides no explanation for the evidence

In other words, Craig is arguing that the probability of evidence is affected by the ability of a hypothesis to explain that evidence.

If you have ever been amazed by the way some theists simply dismiss good evidence against their position and unquestioningly accept any evidence in support, no matter how flimsy it may be, this might give you some clue as to why. 

I cannot explain this good evidence in light of my hypothesis that God exists, therefore I reject this good evidence. (There are no fossils!  Have you looked in a museum? … There are no fossils and no museums!) 

In the light of my hypothesis that God exists, this flimsy evidence is probable because even an idiot can explain it in terms of God, therefore I accept this flimsy evidence. (The Earth is perfectly designed for human habitation - so long as we ignore storms, earthquakes, droughts, solar radiation, disease, large infertile regions, depleted fish stocks, etc etc)