WLC7: When an Ontological Argument Simply Isn't

In earlier articles, I looked at William Lane Craig’s debating style (in Debatable Theism) and the logic in his “logical” arguments (in The Logic of an Apologist). In the latter, I said that I would address the content of Craig’s arguments, please check that article if you are not already familiar with the logical forms.  This article addresses what I have numbered as Craig’s Seventh Argument (although it is really Alvin Plantinga’s argument reworded) – note that it wasn’t claimed by Craig as being a knock-down argument but as “providing some prima facie warrant for thinking that it is possible that (God) exists”.  First a quick recap:

 

Craig’s Seventh Argument – Plantinga’s Ontological Argument (Reworded)

(defended during a Book Fair starting at 07:57 and on Craig's website)

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists.
2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.
3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.
6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.

This is a straightforward polysyllogism:

1. Premise 1 - If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.
2. Premise 2 - If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
3. Premise 3 - If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
4. Premise 4 - If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.
5. Assertion – It is possible that a maximally great being exists.
6. Conclusion – Therefore, a maximally great being exists.

The major problem with this argument is highlighted by simply placing the Assertion directly above the Conclusion.  This should not affect the argument, for example:

1. Premise 1 - If an animal is a standard cat, then that animal is a mammal.
2. Premise 2 - If an animal is a mammal, then that animal has a brain.
3. Premise 3 - If an animal has a brain, then that animal has neurons.
4. Premise 4 - If an animal has neurons, then that animal (while alive) has electrical activity in its body.
5. Assertion – Tiddles is a standard cat.
6. Conclusion – Therefore, Tiddles (while alive) has electrical activity in his body.

You can put the Assertion wherever you like.  Another problem with the argument is that its structure can be used, with only relatively minor changes to prove the non-existence of a maximally great being:

1. It is possible that a maximally great being does not exist.
2. If it is possible that a maximally great being does not exist, then there exists a possible world in which a maximally great being does not exist.
3. If there is a possible world in which a maximally great being does not exist, then it does not exist in every possible world.
4. If a maximally great being does not exist in every possible world, then it is not a maximally great being.
5. Therefore, there are no maximally great beings.

Note that this argument is a bit shorter, because the negative argument only needs one example of sub-maximal greatness, whereas the positive argument needs to go from some possible world, to every possible world, then to the actual world.  The ramification, however, is that the negative argument does permit a sub-maximally great being.  This leads us to:

1. It is possible that a sub-maximally great being exists.
2. If it is possible that a sub-maximally great being exists, then (by virtue of being sub-maximally great) the sub-maximally great being doesn’t have to exist in every possible world.
3. If a sub-maximally great being doesn’t have to exist in every possible world, then it doesn’t have to exist in the actual world.
4. If a sub-maximally great being doesn’t have to exist in the actual world, then a sub-maximally great being doesn’t have to exist.
5. Therefore, a sub-maximally great being doesn’t have to exist.

On first reading, premise 2 seems to be a bit of a leap, despite the clarification that I inserted.  My reasoning is analogous to premise 4 of the previous argument regarding a maximally great being: if a maximally great being exists, it must exist in every possible world, because otherwise there is potential for a greater being which is equally great across more worlds (ie in every possible world).  However, if a being is sub-maximally great, then this requirement is removed - even if a sub-maximally great being exists, it (unlike a maximally great being) doesn't have to exist in every possible world.

So, if we accept this form of argumentation, we are left with a sub-maximally great being which doesn’t need to exist.  OK, if you want to believe in something like that, fine.  Note that Craig actually argues against a sub-maximally great being (here, although he calls it a quasi-maximally great being):

 

Any intuition for thinking a quasi-maximally great being to be possible also warrants belief in the possibility of a maximally great being; indeed, the way we came to form the idea of the former was by diminution of the idea of the latter. But our intuition of the possibility of a maximally great being, once we understand its implications, tends to undermine our intuition of the possibility of a quasi-maximally great being. We begin to suspect that despite appearances, it’s not really possible after all.

 

I prefer another version of the ontological argument which I call the “Argument for the Existence of William Lane Craig from Maximal Stupidity” argument:

1. It is possible that a maximally stupid being called William Lane Craig exists.
   (This is just a premise; I’m not saying it’s true that there is a maximally stupid being called William Lane Craig, merely that it is possible.  However, now that I have raised this possibility, the onus is on a-”WLC-is-stupid”-ists to prove that it is not possible that there is a maximally stupid being called William Lane Craig.)
2. If it is possible that a maximally stupid being called William Lane Craig exists, then he exists in some possible world.
   (You can’t be maximally stupid if you don’t exist.)
3. If a maximally stupid being called William Lane Craig exists in some possible world, then he exists in every possible world.
   (You can’t be maximally stupid if you only exist in one world, since someone else might be slightly less stupid but existent in two worlds thus reaching a higher level of cumulative stupidity.)
4. If a maximally stupid being called William Lane Craig exists in every possible world, then he exists in the actual world.
   (Well, yeah, so long as the actual world is possible, which seems pretty plausible to me.)
5. If a maximally stupid being called William Lane Craig exists in the actual world, then a maximally stupid being called William Lane Craig exists.
   (I’m not sure that this line is strictly necessary, but it helps confuse the issue, especially for the monumentally stupid.)
6. Therefore, a maximally stupid being called William Lane Craig exists.

Some might wish to argue that this proves that the argument merely shows that Plantinga’s ontological argument (reworded) is of a valid form (so long as we were all able to agree that William Lane Craig exists and is monumentally stupid).  These people should try replacing “stupid being” with “beautiful transvestite”.  Not even atheists believe that William Lane Craig is a beautiful transvestite, let alone maximally beautiful.  This argument would just provide some prima facie warrant for thinking that it is possible that William Lane Craig is maximally stupid. 

Craig argues against some parodies of this argument (here again), since they refer to “concoctions (which) are impossible, contrast to the apparently coherent idea of a maximally great being”.  I agree, “a necessarily existent lion” or “an unsurpassingly great island” are impossible.  However, a maximally stupid being is a coherent idea.  We can imagine a being whose thoughts and actions are generally informed and driven by stupidity.  Then we can imagine another being that is slightly more consistently driven by stupidity, and so on until we reach a being whose every thought and action is informed by stupidity.  If we are thinking of an infinite number of worlds (which could be taken to be an unstated assumption in Plantinga’s ontological argument, it's not though, Plantinga uses a different trick - see below), then there is no reason to think that there should not be an infinite number of these beings, whose every thought and action is informed by stupidity.  If there is an infinite number of these beings, they will take an infinite array of names, such that any name you could think of would be applicable to at least one, or an infinite number of them.  Therefore, at least one of them will exist, in some possible world.  Therefore, it is an absolutely coherent idea that it is possible that there is a maximally stupid being called William Lane Craig.  We then just run the argument, as above, and find that there is such a being and that being exists in our world.

 

William Lane Craig may be comforted by the fact that the argument is not temporally limited.  That means that the argument works now, tomorrow, yesterday, one million years ago, one million years in the future, in fact, from the beginning to the end of time – and beyond, if necessary.  Accordingly, we will always have and always have had some sort of being called William Lane Craig.

 

The problem with Craig’s argument against parodies is that he compares things (impossible concoctions) to ideas (the apparently coherent idea of a maximally great being).  By doing so he conflates Plantinga’s ontological argument with Anselm’s.  Anselm’s argument centres on the assertion that a being which exists only as a concept in the mind is less great than a being which exists in reality: “And assuredly that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, cannot exist in the understanding alone.”  Plantinga’s argument says nothing about ideas, or concepts or things which exist in the mind.

We can all acknowledge the existence of the idea of the existence of a maximally great being (or at least a God), irrespectively of whether we agree that it is a “coherent idea”, or even an “apparently coherent idea”.  If we believe in the idea of the existence of a maximally great being, then that belief will entail a secondary belief that that idea of the existence refers to an actual existence of the maximally great being, rather than the existence of the concept of the maximally great being.  This is just another statement about belief, a totally non-controversial, tautological one.  If one believes in the existence of God, then one believes that God actually exists.

 

So we come to the crux of the argument.  Anselm is basically arguing that if one has extreme beliefs then they must be true.  Plantinga (as reworded) seems to be arguing that if something is possible then it must be true.  He argues this explicitly in line 2: “if it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world”.  In his actual argument, Plantinga relies on some fancy footwork while deploying Axiom S5.  This axiom states that, in modal logic, ◊p→◊□p meaning “if it is possible that p is true, then it is necessary that it is possible that p is true” (modal operators are underlined as one chunk where possible – the single, but split operator “if … then” is shown in bold).  The meaning of this axiom is: if something is possibly true, then that something is possibly true in all worlds.  Plantinga’s sleight of hand involves invoking a dual to claim that ◊□p→□p which, in strong logic terms, means “if it is possible that it is necessary that p is true, then it is necessary that p is true”.  Compare these in consecutive lines:

 

if it is possible that p is true, then it is necessary that it is possible that p is true (◊p→◊□p)

if it is possible that it is necessary that p is true, then it is necessary that p is true (◊□p→□p)

 

You can easily hide this sleight of hand by using modal logic operators (explained below), but in plain text and in the strong sense, ◊□p→□p is clearly not true in any real sense.  You can make it sound true by slightly rewording it using the following chain:

 

(◊□p→□p)

if it is possible that it is necessary that p is true, then it is necessary that p is true

If it is possible that something is true in all worlds, then it is true in some world

If it is possible that something maximal is true across all worlds, then it must be true in some world

If it is possible that something maximal is true across all worlds, then it must be true in some possible world

If it is possible that something maximal exists across all worlds, then it must exist in some possible world

If it is possible that something maximal exists, then it must exist in some possible world

If it is possible that something maximally great exists, then it must exist in some possible world

If it is possible some being that is maximally great exists, then it must exist in some possible world

If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world (which is premise 2 of Craig's version of the ontological argument)

So where is precisely Plantinga’s sleight of hand?  He doesn’t use the chain described above, he goes via the weak (Kripke) semantic logic meaning of ◊□p→□p, where the meaning of ◊ changes from it is possible that to in some possible world it is true that and □ changes from it is necessary that to in all possible worlds it is true that.  Then he takes advantage of the ambiguity, illustrated thus:

weak logic – if in some possible world it is true that in all possible worlds it is true that p is true, then in all possible worlds it is true that p is true (This is valid)

undefined logic – (◊□p→□p)

strong logic – if it is possible that it is necessary that p is true, then it is necessary that p is true (This is not valid)

But that’s not all.  Plantinga, together with Craig, uses ambiguity again, by conflating the interpretation of “some possible world” in weak semantic logic, as used to investigate the validity of a logical argument, with a mundane interpretation of “some possible world” that could considered to be actual rather than figurative.  This second sleight of hand is what Craig uses.  So this is where the two tricks are hidden:

1. Premise 1 - If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.
   (a statement which can be derived through a chain of thought as above, or possibly by just not understanding Kripke semantic logic – involves a figurative possible world)
   
   
2. Premise 2 - If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
   (replaces a figurative possible world with a possible actual world)
   
   
3. Premise 3 - If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
4. Premise 4 - If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.
5. Assertion – It is possible that a maximally great being exists.
6. Conclusion – Therefore, a maximally great being exists.

It seems that we have proved, once and for all, that two wrongs do not necessarily make a right.  (← For the more obtuse among us, this is a joke.)

--------------------------

If there is anyone out there who remains unconvinced that the Ontological Argument is faulty, then the following proof is especially for you:

Let’s say that G means "an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibeneficent God exists" and g means "a sub-maximally great being exists".

◊g
This means: It is possible that a sub-maximally great being exists

◊g→◊◊~G
This means: If it is possible that a sub-maximally great being exists, then it is possible that in some possible world there is not an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibeneficent God (if there were such a god in all worlds, this God would be a maximally great being)

◊◊P↔◊P
This means: If it is possible that something is possible, it’s possible, so

◊g→◊~G
This means: If it is possible that a sub-maximally great being exists, then it is possible that there is not an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibeneficent God

◊P↔~□~P
This means: If it is possible that something is true, it cannot be necessary that it is not true, so

◊g→~□~~G
This means: If it is possible that a sub-maximally great being exists, then it is not necessary that there is not not an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibeneficent God

P↔~~P
This means: Something being true is equivalent to something being not false (or not not true), so

◊g→~□G
This means: If it is possible that a sub-maximally great being exists, then in no possible world it is true that there is an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibeneficent God.

We now finish off Craig-style:

The Christian God is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibeneficent.  But we have shown above that in no possible world it is true that there is an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibeneficent God.

If in no possible world is it true that there is an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibeneficent God, then there is no omnipotent, omniscient, omnibeneficent God in any world.

If there is no omnipotent, omniscient, omnibeneficent God in any world, then there is no omnipotent, omniscient, omnibeneficent God in this world.

If there is no omnipotent, omniscient, omnibeneficent God in this world, then there is no omnipotent, omniscient, omnibeneficent God.

Therefore, the Christian God does not exist.

WLC6: Addressing A Futile Argument

In earlier articles, I looked at William Lane Craig’s debating style (in Debatable Theism) and the logic in his “logical” arguments (in The Logic of an Apologist).  In the latter, I said that I would address the content of Craig’s arguments, please check that article if you are not already familiar with the logical forms.  This article addresses what I have numbered as Craig’s Sixth Argument – note that I’ve not come across an example where Craig uses this argument during a formal debate phase.  Shortly after 100 minutes into the audio version of the debate with Lewis Wolpert, Craig claims that the lack of objective rights and wrongs implicit in the evolutionary account is morally abhorrent.  This is essentially the same argument with absurd being replaced by abhorrent.  First a quick recap:

Craig’s Sixth Argument – Argument from Absurdity (alternatively Argument from Futility)
(from one of Craig’s books – the specific chapter is here)

1. If God does not exist, then life is futile.
2. If the God of the Bible does exist, then life is meaningful.
3. We may only live happily and consistently if life if meaningful.
4. If the evidence for these two options (non-existence and existence of God) were absolutely equal, a rational person ought to choose biblical Christianity.

Unlike some of Craig’s other arguments, this one doesn’t even seem logical.  I sort of tried to put it into some sort of logical format:

1. Premise 1 – The words “does exist” (All M) are interchangeable with the words “is believed in by a person” (P).
2. Premise 2 – If God does not exist (not A), then life is futile in general (not B).
3. Corollary 1 – If God is not believed in by a person (from not A1 and P), then life for that person is futile (not B1).
4. Premise 3 – If life for a person is futile (not B1) then that person cannot live happily and consistently (not C).
5. Premise 4 – If the God of the Bible exists (A), then life is meaningful in general (B).
6. Corollary 2 – If the God of the Bible is believed in by a person (A1 from A and P), then that person may live happily and consistently (B1).
7. Premise 5 – If life is meaningful for a person (B1) then that person will live happily and consistently (C).
8. Premise 6 – If a person so chooses (D), they can believe whatever they want (E)
9. Premise 7 – If a person is rational (F), they will choose to live happily and consistently (G).
10. Random Assertion – People are more interested in living happily through belief than dealing with what is true (H, I think).
11. Premise 8 – If the evidence for these two options (non-existence and existence of God) were absolutely equal (I), a rational person ought to choose biblical Christianity (J).
12. Assertion – The evidence for these two options (non-existence and existence of God) were absolutely equal, or possibly (in the mind of William Lane Craig) leaning towards Biblical Christianity (I)
13. Conclusion – A rational person ought to choose Biblical Christianity (J).

I accept that this formulation is a mess.  For that reason, we’ll have to just look Craig’s original statements.

If God does not exist, life is futile

What does futile mean? A quick visit to an on-line dictionary gives us:

Futile: 1. incapable of producing any result; ineffective; useless; not successful: 2. trifling; frivolous; unimportant

In chapter 2 of Craig’s “Reasonable Faith”, he uses the word “futile” twice without definition.  The first is in reference to a character in Steppenwolf by Hermann Hesse:

One of the most devastating novels I’ve ever read was Steppenwolf, by Hermann Hesse. At the novel’s end, Harry Haller stands looking at himself in a mirror. During the course of his life he had experienced all the world offers. And now he stands looking at himself, and he mutters, “Ah, the bitter taste of life!” He spits at himself in the looking-glass, and then he kicks it to pieces. His life has been futile and meaningless.

The second is in the conclusion (from which the wording of the whole argument is taken):

Now I want to make it clear that I have not yet shown biblical Christianity to be true. But what I have done is clearly spell out the alternatives. If God does not exist, then life is futile. If the God of the Bible does exist, then life is meaningful. Only the second of these two alternatives enables us to live happily and consistently. Therefore, it seems to me that even if the evidence for these two options were absolutely equal, a rational person ought to choose biblical Christianity. It seems to me positively irrational to prefer death, futility, and destruction to life, meaningfulness, and happiness. As Pascal said, we have nothing to lose and infinity to gain.

From this we can gather that Craig is using “futile” to mean “meaningless”, thus “trifling; frivolous; unimportant”.  This is supported by earlier text.  Craig then establishes the following during the chapter:

• Dostoyevsky wrote about the problem of evil and concluded that, in Craig’s words, “atheism is destructive of life and ends logically in suicide” because of problems associated with moral relativism.
• Kierkegaard indicated that the “self-centered, aesthetic man finds no ultimate meaning in life and no true satisfaction. Thus, the aesthetic life leads finally to despair, a sort of sickness with life” and the life of the moral man “ends in unhappiness. For the more one tries sincerely to bring one’s life into conformity with the objective standards of the good, the more painfully aware one is that one cannot do it. Thus, the ethical life, when earnestly pursued, leads ultimately to guilt and despair”.
• Schaeffer wrote (in Craig’s words) that “denial of absolutes has gradually made its way through Western culture. In each case, it results in despair, because without absolutes man’s endeavors degenerate into absurdity. Schaeffer believes that the Theater of the Absurd, abstract modern art, and modern music such as is composed by John Cage are all indications of what happens below the line of despair. Only by reaffirming belief in the absolute God of Christianity can man and his culture avoid inevitable degeneracy, meaninglessness, and despair.”

Craig also had some interesting things to say about Pascal. What I noted with interest was that Pascal produced one of the earliest examples of Christian apology, in Pensées - a document which he published after his death! (I vaguely recall that some other chap is famous for doing his best work after death.) In certain circles I am known for a dislike of relying on the words of the dead to support an argument, but this is ridiculous. Not only is Pascal dead, but he was already dead when the notes he had written were massaged into something publishable.

Even if Pascal fully intended to publish something along the lines of what was produced, his wager can hardly be taken seriously. Do Christians honestly think that believing simply for the potential reward would be adequate for their god?

Getting back on topic, it should be noted that Pascal's apparent strategy in Pensées was "to bring the unbeliever to such despair and confusion that he would embrace God".

So ... it seems that “futile” according to Craig means not only meaningless, but that which leads to despair.  And apparently atheism is something that leads directly to despair, at least according these writers - who, rather unsurprisingly, were all writing as Christians (although Dostoyevsky seems to have been a bit unorthodox, or at least confused, in his faith).

Craig then continues to expand on the theme, establishing that:

• People die
• Dying is scary
• Not existing is a scary thought (at least to Craig, but I think it's fair to assume that this fear is not unique)

It is possibly better to let Craig speak here:

Look at it from another perspective: Scientists say that the universe originated in an explosion called the “Big Bang” about 15 billion years ago. Suppose the Big Bang had never occurred. Suppose the universe had never existed. What ultimate difference would it make? The universe is doomed to die anyway. In the end it makes no difference whether the universe ever existed or not. Therefore, it is without ultimate significance.

The same is true of the human race. Mankind is a doomed race in a dying universe. Because the human race will eventually cease to exist, it makes no ultimate difference whether it ever did exist. Mankind is thus no more significant than a swarm of mosquitos or a barnyard of pigs, for their end is all the same. The same blind cosmic process that coughed them up in the first place will eventually swallow them all again.

And the same is true of each individual person. The contributions of the scientist to the advance of human knowledge, the researches of the doctor to alleviate pain and suffering, the efforts of the diplomat to secure peace in the world, the sacrifices of good men everywhere to better the lot of the human race—all these come to nothing. In the end they don’t make one bit of difference, not one bit. Each person’s life is therefore without ultimate significance. And because our lives are ultimately meaningless, the activities we fill our lives with are also meaningless. The long hours spent in study at the university, our jobs, our interests, our friendships—all these are, in the final analysis, utterly meaningless. This is the horror of modern man: because he ends in nothing, he is nothing.

This is a common argument, but a curious one all the same.  If God does not exist, then Craig’s parody of an analysis is not too far from the mark.  We aren’t important in the grand scheme of things.  We live for but a short time, on a planet which has only been around a few billions years and will be gone in a few billion more, in a solar system which exists in a universe that is probably headed for some sort of figurative death after who knows how many billions of years.  That’s all true enough.

As far as the universe is concerned, the importance of our existence - as a species - is on a par with the importance we place on individual bacteria within our digestive systems.  We don’t have any idea about whether individual bacteria live or die, we don’t even identify them, we are completely oblivious to them but cumulatively, if all bacteria in our gut died, we’d suffer.  The universe, on the other hand, is not only oblivious to us, but it would not suffer one iota if all of us died.  That’s true not just literally, but also metaphorically – the workings of the universe as a whole is totally unaffected by what we all individually consider to be “me”.   The universe is modified (infinitesimally) by the fact that we move things around, but so far, we have not moved anything significant out of our local area.  (We have sent spacecraft (for example the Voyager space probes) and electromagnetic energy transmissions, but the vast majority of our efforts have amounted to moving stuff around on one rock among the many circling one star out of many billions.)  There is absolutely no effect on the universe resulting from our mental processes per se.  If our composite material gets converted into worm food (or directly into water, carbon dioxide, nitrogen, nitrous oxides and some other minor bits and pieces), the universe literally could not care less.

If we were to measure the importance of our lives in terms of the universe, how important we are to the universe and how long our stay in it is, then yes - our lives could be considered meaningless, or "futile". The thing is that we don’t measure the importance of our lives in terms of the universe as a whole.  We don’t consider our existence in terms of billions of years.  We live our lives within a much smaller context.

For each of us individually, our short existence in an obscure corner of a massive universe is important. For each of us individually, the existence of other people is important.

Even if we did live our lives in universal terms, it is worth noting that Craig simply glides over the fact that all of us spent the vast majority of the universe's first 13.7 billion years not existing.  (Craig is at pains to tell people that he is not a Young Earth Creationist and he claims to be pro-science/pro-reason.  Another of his arguments rests on the initial conditions associated with the Big Bang, so he is not someone who denies the timescales involved with the standard cosmological model.) 

It seems quite clear that not existing wasn’t really all that bad.  If we don’t exist after we die, then it won't be that bad then either.  The only time at which we can despair at not existing is during the ephemerally brief period in which we do exist.  We should not be spending that time in despair, but rather glorying in the fact that against all the apparent odds, we are here, completely by chance, for a limited time only, and we should be making the absolute best use of that opportunity – rather than going around pretending that there will be another, rather vaguely defined existence once we die.

I have examined the absurdity of this sort of argument via the medium of a mock play in which I compare the metaphorical "gift" of a life to the literal possession of a block of chocolate.  See "Despair, A Play in One Act".

God makes life meaningful

Even if we agree with Craig’s argument that not-existing after death is bad, there remains the problem that living forever would be simply awful.  Craig accepts this, but attempts to solve the problem by via God, who is now not only the root cause of immortality, but also the justification for wanting immortality:

(I)t is important to see that it is not just immortality that man needs if life is to be meaningful. Mere duration of existence does not make that existence meaningful. If man and the universe could exist forever, but if there were no God, their existence would still have no ultimate significance. To illustrate: I once read a science-fiction story in which an astronaut was marooned on a barren chunk of rock lost in outer space. He had with him two vials: one containing poison and the other a potion that would make him live forever. Realizing his predicament, he gulped down the poison. But then to his horror, he discovered he had swallowed the wrong vial—he had drunk the potion for immortality. And that meant that he was cursed to exist forever—a meaningless, unending life. Now if God does not exist, our lives are just like that. They could go on and on and still be utterly without meaning. We could still ask of life, “So what?” So it is not just immortality man needs if life is to be ultimately significant; he needs God and immortality. And if God does not exist, then he has neither.

So, without God, not only could you not live forever, but you wouldn’t want to. This pretty much negates the whole wanting to live forever thing, making a relatively short existence in the universe the optimal solution after all. Which means God is no longer necessary. Even worse, God becomes an imposition, some do-gooder giving us something we don’t actually want and telling us it’s OK, because we get to spend eternity with him.  It seems like we might not get a choice about that either since some theists believe that if we live sufficiently good lives, we might get into heaven away (Cardinal Pell vs Richard Dawkins).

Meaning is required for consistent, happy lives

In order to support this premise negatively, Craig finally takes a swipe at atheism, which he paints as the presence of a specific mind-set rather than the absence of a theistic mind-set.

About the only solution the atheist can offer is that we face the absurdity of life and live bravely. Bertrand Russell, for example, wrote that we must build our lives upon “the firm foundation of unyielding despair.” Only by recognizing that the world really is a terrible place can we successfully come to terms with life. Camus said that we should honestly recognize life’s absurdity and then live in love for one another.

The fundamental problem with this solution, however, is that it is impossible to live consistently and happily within such a world view. If one lives consistently, he will not be happy; if one lives happily, it is only because he is not consistent.

Craig never explains why being consistent is a requirement (let alone consistent with his misrepresentations).  Even if he did convince us that being consistent is necessary, all he’s done is quote a couple of writers, and assumed that their views represent the only possible options without a theistic delusion: despair and accepting absurdity.  Camus was an absurdist, meaning that he has a very specific meaning in mind when he talks of life being absurd.  Craig is therefore conflating again if he thinks that “absurd” and “futile” mean the same in this context.  Camus most definitely did not think that life was futile.  Equally, someone as prolific and socially involved as Bertrand Russell cannot seriously be considered to think of life being “futile”.  If neither of them considered life to be futile, then they could quite easily live their lives happily and consistently.  Similarly we lesser atheists can live our lives consistently and happily.

Seeking more justification for God

Craig’s remaining argument, as we look through the rest of the chapter, is that we need objective meaning, objective value, absolute rights and wrongs, post-mortem judgment and punishment for bad people, and externally directed purpose.  Then, at the end, he claims victory for Biblical Christianity because if offers all of them via God and immortality.

The problem is that this would work, sort of, but only if God existed.  In the absence of God, as Craig argues, no rational person with any foresight would want to live forever.  We don’t really seem to need objective value or externally directed purpose.  God, even if he existed, would be a poor source for objective morality. 

As for post-mortem judgment and punishment, life can be terribly unfair.  People get away with doing things we don’t like.  People get punished for doing things we assess as good.  Biblical Christianity doesn’t do away with that, since within its world-view Mengele (Craig’s example, not mine) could have avoided punishment altogether by having a last minute revelation about the truth of the New Testament and accepting Jesus as his saviour.  That’s hardly fair and unlike what would happen in a godless universe: Mengele could be living the high life in heaven while the women he vivisected were suffering in hell for being unreformed Jews (No-one can see the kingdom of God unless he is born again – John 3:3 … No-one can come to the Father except me – John 14:6).  At least for an atheist, the wicked go unrewarded.

Craig has a swipe at atheists when discussing self-sacrifice:

A number of years ago, a terrible mid-winter air disaster occurred in which a plane leaving the Washington, D.C. airport smashed into a bridge spanning the Potomac River, plunging its passengers into the icy waters. As the rescue helicopters came, attention was focused on one man who again and again pushed the dangling rope ladder to other passengers rather than be pulled to safety himself. Six times he passed the ladder by. When they came again, he was gone. He had freely given his life that others might live. The whole nation turned its eyes to this man in respect and admiration for the selfless and good act he had performed. And yet, if the atheist is right, that man was not noble—he did the stupidest thing possible. He should have gone for the ladder first, pushed others away if necessary in order to survive. But to die for others he did not even know, to give up all the brief existence he would ever have—what for? For the atheist there can be no reason. And yet the atheist, like the rest of us, instinctively reacts with praise for this man’s selfless action.

How shallow are we supposed to be?  Every thinking person, irrespective of their world view, will have a self-image.  We act to protect that self-image and avoid doing things that affect that self-image negatively.  That man had a self-image which did not let him shoulder others out of the way to save himself.  While he was American and thus more likely to be religious than would be the case in other western countries, there is no certainty that he was a Christian, but for the sake of the argument, let’s say he was a committed believer.

As a committed Christian, that man would be utterly convinced that he was doing a good thing, and dying while doing a good thing after having accepted Jesus as your personal saviour is a sure-fire way to get to heaven.  He wasn’t going to “die”, he was going to be “taken up into the bosom of the Lord”.  As a devout Christian, you are not allowed to commit suicide, but giving up your life to save another is another thing altogether.

So, as a Christian, why be so amazed by this guy?   He’s just being consistent with his beliefs and, if you believe in God, you believe that he benefited from the deal.  Thinking as an atheist, on the other hand, he died, he really truly died.  He transitioned from a brave, albeit deluded, and probably frightened human being into … nothing.  That was a true sacrifice, and something that is worthy of true respect and admiration, the true respect and admiration that only an atheist can offer him.

Imagine for a moment then that he was not a committed Christian, but rather a humanist atheist.  What does the Christian think about such a person?  Firstly, a Christian can’t understand it, because of the sorts of arguments that Craig raised above – it seems that with the theist mindset, you don’t do things unless there is a substantial reward for doing them (like eternal salvation) or (eternal) punishment if you don't.

But if the Christian can get past that inherent prejudice, then she can understand that the brave humanist atheist died doing a good thing, sacrificing not only his life but also the opportunity to repent.  He’s either on his way to eternal damnation or oblivion.  Was that an amazing sacrifice or an act of abject stupidity?  For the atheist thinking about it, the situation hasn’t changed.  For the atheist, the fact the guy sacrificed himself is the point, the fact that (as an atheist) he was not delusional is inconsequential.

The Premise – If evidence for the non-existence and existence of God were absolutely equal, a rational person ought to choose biblical Christianity

Well, actually, no.

If there were a quarter as much evidence for the existence of the Christian God as there is for the identified processes which don’t require the existence of that God, then a rational person should plump for biblical Christianity.  Hell, if there were a hundredth of the evidence, I’d say go for it. 

The trouble is when you lay out all the evidence, evidence for God and evidence that God is not necessary, it doesn't work out close to equal.

You end up with statements like “There’s this book about God and in it, it says stuff that could not be true if God did not exist and people who believe in God believe that it’s all true” as “evidence for God” being lined up against huge quantities of experimentally tested facts which consistently show that the God hypothesis is unnecessary.

You get, as evidence from the theists, “no-one knows how this works, therefore God probably does it” against painstaking research which reveals the mechanisms necessary to close each of the "gaps" claimed by theists.  (Young Earth Creationists are renowned for using the "God of the Gaps" argument: simply ignoring reams of evidence, ignoring museums full of evidence, and claiming the apparent absence of evidence proves that God did it).

If Craig really means: “if your belief in a) the non-existence and b) the existence of the Official WLC-Approved Godlike Entity are absolutely equal, you should choose to believe in the Official WLC-Approved Godlike Entity”, then I’d have to agree.  If your brain is wired such that you truly believe that the evidence stacks up in favour of the OWLCAGE rather than for its non-existence, then there's really very little that can be done for you.

My message to such people, genetically predisposed and/or brainwashed theists, is they should feel free to believe what they want to believe.  Furthermore, they should feel free to only ever talk with people who believe what they want to believe.  But as soon as they start claiming that there is even the tiniest scrap of evidence in support of their patent nonsense, they should expect to be visited by the righteous fury of the those who base their lives on proper evidence (also known as atheists).

They'll also invoke our righteous fury when they try to restrict access to education simply because the evidence that does exist is incompatible with their beliefs.  They should be aware that this applies even to their own children.  Child abuse is never acceptable, be it physical, emotional, psychological, sexual or educational.

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I did a little research into whether there are people out there who are psychologically scarred by the experience of not existing for 13.7 billion years.  I didn't find any.  I'm pretty confident that not existing after I die will be equally benign.

WLC5: Fine-Tuning Towards Ignorance

In earlier articles, I looked at William Lane Craig’s debating style (in Debatable Theism) and the logic in his “logical” arguments (in The Logic of an Apologist). In the latter, I said that I would address the content of Craig’s arguments, please check that article if you are not already familiar with the logical forms. This article addresses what I have numbered as Craig’s Fifth Argument. First a quick recap:


Craig’s Fifth Argument – Argument from Fine-Tuning for Intelligent Life
(argued during Craig-Smith – wording taken from Craig-Krauss)

1. The fine-tuning of the universe is due to either (sic) physical necessity, chance, or design.
2. It is not due to physical necessity or chance.
3. Therefore, it is due to design.

While analysing the logic, I split the argument into two stages because there is an implicit presumption regarding fine-tuning, in other words, Craig makes three assertions: that the universe is “fine-tuned”, that this fine-tuning has only three possible explanations and that two of those possible explanations are false.  By fine-tuning, Craig specifically means “fine-tuning for intelligent life” (as claimed in Craig-Krauss) and maybe even more specifically “fine-tuning for human beings” (consistent with standard theological anthropocentricism):

In recent decades scientists have been stunned by the discovery that the initial conditions of our universe were fine-tuned for the existence of intelligent agents with a precision and delicacy that literally defy human comprehension. This fine-tuning is of two sorts. First, when the laws of nature are given mathematical expression, you find appearing in them certain constants, like the gravitational constant. These constants are not determined by the laws of nature. Second, in addition to these constants there are certain arbitrary quantities which are just put in as initial conditions on which the laws of nature operate, for example, the amount of entropy in the very early universe.

Now all of these constants and quantities fall into an extraordinarily narrow range of life-permitting values. Were these constants or quantities to be altered by even a hair’s breadth, the life-permitting balance would be destroyed and life would not exist. We now know that life-prohibiting universes are incomprehensibly more probable than any life-permitting universe.

A leap in reasoning can be identified in Craig’s words here.  Even if one were to accept his argument, he doesn’t argue for “intelligent life”, he argues for “life”.  One could, however, accept that “life” is a necessary prerequisite for “intelligent life”.  Perhaps Craig should add to his argument:

Part 1

1. Premise – If life does not exist (not B), then intelligent life does not exist (not A)
2. Assertion – Intelligent life exists (A)
3. Conclusion – Therefore, life exists (B)

Part 2

1. Premise – If the universe is not fine-tuned for life (not C), then life cannot exist (not B)
2. Assertion – Life exists (B)
3. Conclusion – Therefore, the universe is fine-tuned for life (C)

Part 3

1. Premise – If the universe is fine-tuned for life (C1) then this fine-tuning is due to physical necessity, chance or design (D1)
2. Assertion – The universe is fine-tuned for life (C1)
3. Conclusion – Therefore, the fine-tuning of the universe is due to physical necessity, chance or design (D1)

Part 4

1. Premise – If the fine-tuning of the universe for life is due to physical necessity, chance or design (from D1) but is not due to physical necessity or chance (C2) then the fine-tuning of the universe for life is due to design (D2)
2. Assertion – The fine-tuning of the universe for life is not due to physical necessity or chance (C2)
3. Conclusion – Therefore, the fine-tuning of the universe is due to design (D2)

Some people will notice that this argument provides an explanation as to why the universe must necessarily be fine-tuned for life (A -> C, ie there is intelligent life, therefore the universe must be fine-tuned) and then goes on to assert that another explanation is the real one.  This is equivalent to the following argument:

Part 1

1. Premise – If “dormouse getting through a crevice”-ability does not exist (not B), then “fat dormouse getting through a crevice”-ability does not exist (not A)
2. Assertion – “Fat dormouse getting into a crevice”-ability exists (A)
3. Conclusion – Therefore, “dormouse getting into a crevice”-ability exists (B)

Part 2

1. Premise – If a barn wall crack is not fine-tuned for “dormouse getting through a crevice”-ability (not C), then “dormouse getting through a crevice”-ability cannot exist (not B)
2. Assertion – “Dormouse getting through a crevice”-ability exists (B)
3. Conclusion – Therefore, the barn wall crack is fine-tuned for “dormouse getting through a crevice”-ability (C)

Part 3                                                         

1. Premise – If a barn wall crack is fine-tuned for “dormouse getting through a crevice”-ability (C1) then this fine-tuning is due to something magical, something random or something physical (D1)
2. Assertion – The barn wall crack is fine-tuned for “dormouse getting through a crevice”-ability (C1)
3. Conclusion – Therefore, fine-tuning of the barn wall crack is due to something magical, something random or something physical (D1)

Part 4

1. Premise – If fine-tuning of the barn wall crack is due to something magical, something random or something physical (from D1) but is not due to something random or something physical (C2) then fine-tuning of the barn wall crack is due to something magical (D2)
2. Assertion – Fine-tuning of the barn wall crack is not due to something random or something physical (C2)
3. Conclusion – Therefore, fine-tuning of the barn wall crack is due to something magical (D2)

This might not be completely clear, especially for readers who are unfamiliar with fat dormice.

Part 1 is completely true, a fat dormouse is less likely to get through a crevice than a standard dormouse – but if a fat dormouse can get through, then some sort of dormouse can get through.

Part 2 is not necessarily true.  Barn walls are not “tuned”, let alone “finely-tuned” with dormouse entry requirements in mind.  Now we humans do make barn walls, this is true, but we don’t design the cracks with any intention at all – they just appear.  A fat dormouse, Chubby Loir, who passes through a barn wall crack to escape the attentions of Tiddles could pause a moment and ponder about the munificence of the being that had made that crack, perhaps reflecting on the fact that the crack appears to have been created just for him, indeed it appears "finely-tuned".

If the crack were smaller, then Chubby Loir would not have been able to squeeze his fat little dormouse body through. If the crack were larger, then Tiddles would have been able to squeeze through.  At this point, the rational among us realise that despite appearances, the crack was not designed to permit Chubby Loir's narrow escape (nor was it designed by an evil barn builder for the express purpose of frustrating Tiddles).  The existence of the crack was just a happy coincidence.  Note however, that if the crack did not exist, then Chubby Loir would not have been able to pause and consider, he’d be too busy pondering the whole being eaten experience.

The same applies to us: we could not be here, pondering how great it is that the universe seems to be finely-tuned for life, if it weren’t at least sufficiently well-tuned.  The fine-tuning of the universe (such as it is) is a prerequisite for us to be here pondering.  Even if there might be staggeringly huge odds against us being here (assessed well before life begins to develop), those odds no longer apply once we are here.  The probability of me having won the lottery, once I have won the lottery, is 100%.  The probability of Tiddles having being named Tiddles is 100%.  Similarly, the probability of the universe having been sufficiently well-tuned to produce me (given that am sitting here typing these words) is 100%.

Parts 3 and 4 are where Craig comes into his own, which is no surprise since together these constitute his explicit argument.  Let’s recap again, Craig’s argument here is (abbreviating it a little):

1. The fine-tuning of the universe is due to either something that isn’t design - or design
2. It is not due to something that isn’t design
3. Therefore, it is due to design

Honestly, that’s his argument.

He barely touches this argument in Craig-Smith and while he gives it a bit more attention in Craig-Krauss (see above), he doesn’t provide much in the way of support.  Oh well, I’ll just have to do his work for him (yet again).  Craig argues that there are two fine-tuning aspects: constants and initial conditions.

The first shall be last and the last shall be first, so let us look at initial conditions first.  Craig argues that “there are certain arbitrary quantities which are just put in as initial conditions on which the laws of nature operate, for example, the amount of entropy in the very early universe”.  This is just false.  The “quantities” aren’t arbitrary, they are the “quantities” that current theories suggest.  Since the question is not completely resolved yet, the quantities, arbitrary or otherwise, could be completely wrong.

The standard cosmological model could be wrong.  We keep finding that the models are not quite right, which is why things like dark matter, dark energy and dark flow keep getting added.  Pointing to a particular model that is in use today and saying “This might not be completely true” isn’t saying anything new.  We all know that current models are almost certainly wrong in some way.  Nobody really knows what the initial conditions were so Craig has nothing on which to base his argument.  It’s a complete non-starter (unlike the Big Bang).

And now … constants.  Craig picks on the gravitational constant.  I know, it's embarrassing.  This choice just highlights his ignorance.  The fine-tuning argument to the extent that it works, works with dimensionless fundamental constants, such as the fine structure constant α (note that this is linked explicitly to the elementary charge e, via α=e²/q_P², where q_P is the Planck charge).  It doesn't work with physical constants, all of which have dimensions, and which tend to resolve to a value of 1 when expressed in terms of natural units (for example Planck units).

In terms of Planck units, the gravitational constant is 1, the speed of light is 1, vacuum permeability is 1, vacuum permittivity is 1 and (perhaps unsurprisingly) Planck’s constant is 1.  The apparent values of these constants are merely the consequence of having unnatural units, they are the results of exchange mechanisms similar to the exchange rate between two currencies (see also Constants that Resolve to Unity).  So, perhaps we should just pretend that Craig didn't ignorantly choose the gravitational constant as an example.

Maybe we could grant him the fundamental dimensionless constant required by the standard cosmological model: the cosmological constant – which is currently accepted as the simplest solution to a problem with the model.  The problem here, again, is that this is a simple solution to the problem, but might not actually be the actual solution.  It's entirely possible that this constant will not be necessary once the theory is developed further, making it another bad choice.  We won't force poor choices on Craig.

Perhaps we could use one of the 23 fundamental dimensionless constants required by the complete standard model of particle physics.  However, yet again, if the standard model of particle physics is wrong (or rather incomplete) and replaced by string theory, or something else, then the requirement for some of the constants disappears and the remainder are merely consequences of something else.  These would also be poor choices.

Leaving aside theoretical physics and cosmology which could quite possibly be wrong and therefore can’t be used in a fine-tuning argument, or at least not with any validity, we have (at least) two constants remaining.

The best known dimensionless constant is the fine structure constant.  This is an exciting one for “fine-tunists” because firstly, it is close enough to 1/137 to get numerologists into a bit of a dither (Eddington argued that it was precisely 1/136, then precisely 1/137 once a better value of the constant was calculated), and secondly, if this value was different by 4%, then stellar fusion would not produce carbon.  The problems are as follows:

•  The fine structure constant might not actually be constant (I suspect that it probably is, because otherwise the elementary charge would vary as well).
•  The fine structure constant is close to 1/137, but not actually 1/137.
•  A permissible variation of 4% is not “fine-tuning”, it could be argued to be “coarse-tuning” but even that is dependent on the range of possible values available to you if you are constructing a universe from scratch, a range about which we have absolutely no information.

The fine structure constant is related to the electric charge carried by a proton, which is a fundamental physical constant – α = e² / (4πε₀ħc).  In natural units, the divisor term (4πε₀ħc) resolves to unity (that is a value of 1) as it consists of three elements that resolve to unity: 4πε₀, ħ and c.  In other words, the fine structure constant is just a reflection of how much charge a electron/proton can carry (e).   Sure, there are consequences if it were different, but it’s just the nature of an electron and a proton that they carry that much charge.

Even if Craig’s arguments worked and he could support the idea that the universe looks like it could, possibly, have been designed, he still has failed to show why chance and physical necessity aren’t options.  His assertion is completely unsupported and should be watered down accordingly.

At bottom, Craig has here another variation of the Cosmological Argument from “God Did It”, which is fundamentally a variation of the Cosmological Argument from First Cause, both of which we can safely dismiss.  The fine-tuning argument certainly sounds more impressive and dimensionless constants are sufficiently poorly understood to provide enough space to hide a small to medium god, but the lack of knowledge and understanding is far better addressed by saying “We simply don’t know why certain characteristics of the universe are just the way they are, but that they are the way they are is obviously the case because … well, they are the way they are!”

I almost forgot to reword Craig’s argument!

1. The coarse-tuning of the universe is due to either (sic) physical necessity, chance, or design, or something that we haven’t thought about yet.
2. It might not be due to physical necessity or chance.
3. Therefore, coarse-tuning of the universe might be due to design, or something that we haven’t thought about yet – or, alternatively, it might be due to physical necessity or chance.

The upshot of this seems to be that via Craig’s argument we arrive at a point where we know less than when we started.