---------------------------------
Prasopgarn
and Sukhum are in a rather difficult situation.
In the ‘game’ they are being forced to play there is only one other
player. They have no reason to play
against the Emperor because the Emperor’s outcomes are equal across the
board. They could decide to play to win,
but the most likely outcome of that is that they both die. They do, however, have a better alternative
than to play to win.
The
Lords could decide to play in such a way so as to not lose.
Consider
the likelihood of winning. Of the four
outcomes, only one is a clear ‘win’, where the rival is liquidated and his
entire birthright passes to the victor.
Two outcomes are losses in which the rival either prevails or joins the
other in death. The final outcome is not
a win; then again it is not a loss either, but rather a draw.
Now
consider the likelihood of not losing.
Only two outcomes are losses. If
the decision to co-operate or defect was made randomly, each of the Lords would
have a twenty-five percent chance of winning but a fifty percent chance of losing. As has been discussed, a non-negotiated,
non-random outcome may be even more likely to result in a loss to both parties.
While
a win may be preferred, there is a significant factor common to both non-losing
outcomes – on-going survival. This fact
is salient because it gives the Lords motivation for negotiating towards peace
and a draw.
Neither
Lord would be able to negotiate openly to a win, since neither Lord is
suicidal; neither of them will accept a negotiated settlement which requires
their death. However, they could both
justify negotiating towards not losing.
And both have a very good reason for attempting to convince the other
that he will honour a peace treaty.
Their very survival depends on how successfully they can cultivate trust
in the other.
As a
rational actor, Prasopgarn knows that Sukhum will only honour a peace treaty if
he believes that Prasopgarn will do the same.
Therefore, Prasopgarn must convince Sukhum that he will not act
treacherously. He could appeal to
reason, but that seems fraught with danger as such an argument must be based on
a lie. Prasopgarn cannot argue that
maintaining a peace treaty is in his personal best interests. Prasopgarn can only win if Sukhum honours the
treaty, so while it is certainly true that Prasopgarn’s best interest are
served by establishing a peace
treaty, honouring a peace treaty is
not in Prasopgarn’s best interest.
An
additional problem is that the history between the two Lords indicates that
they have been in competition with each other for some time and this implies
that each would wish to prevail over the other rather than settling for a draw
– a draw could have been arranged without the intervention of the Emperor. So what basis do the Lords have for trusting
each other, especially when honouring a peace pact seems so irrational?
The
answer lies in a lie. And that lie is
the basis of a very useful moral structure that the Lords can call upon in
order to either:
buy themselves time in which they can liquidate their rival in safety (thereby winning by defection), or;
provide themselves with a basis for trusting each other in the long term (thereby avoiding a loss by co-operation).
By
doing this, if they do later liquidate their rival then they will no longer be
merely responsible for the death of another human being – they will have also
broken their word. Being considered
trustworthy, by keeping one’s word, can be considered to be of lasting value
and being treacherous, by betraying a trust, may have serious ramifications in
the victor’s future dealings with other Lords.
It is upon the basis of this understanding that even bitter rivals such
as Prasopgarn and Sukhum may enter into negotiations.
But
why is this understanding a lie? As
nobles, Prasopgarn and Sukhum will have cultivated reputations of either
ruthlessness or trustworthiness. If
either is considered ruthless, there is little point in negotiating. Both will die and neither will benefit. If they are both considered sufficiently
trustworthy though, then this reputation could now pay off handsomely.
Once
a peace pact is reached, based on his reputation for trustworthiness, all
Prasopgarn need do is betray Sukhum, thereby breaking his word and
winning. The lie is in Prasopgarn’s
conceit that maintaining his honour by keeping his word is more important to
him than prevailing over Sukhum. In
fact, by entering into a peace pact, he is implying that keeping his word and
maintaining his honour is more important to him than his life and dynastic
succession because if he were to keep his word, Prasopgarn would be permitting
Sukhum to live long enough in order to be a successful betrayer, who could
break the pact with impunity thereby prevailing over his longstanding rival.
-----------------------------------
Our
fickle morality
The
Siamese Emperor scenario is extreme in many senses. The players are hostile to each other, there
is little basis for trust between them, the penalties for losing are extreme
while the benefits of co-operation are minor and there is no third player to
compete against (see Ethical Farmers and Zero-Sum Games). Most importantly
however, the ‘game’ they are playing is an ‘end game’. The game could continue for the rest of their
lives but would end as soon as one liquidated the other.
Let
us consider an earlier ‘game’ that Prasopgarn and Sukhum would have
played. On the battlefields only weeks
before, Prasopgarn and Sukhum met under truce – as they had at around the same
time of year each year for the preceding decade. Each Lord had a sufficient number of elite
guards in his retinue to ensure that neither Lord would survive any act of
treachery.
The
two Lords convene at the end of the dry season with the intent of negotiating a
peace treaty which is necessary to ensure an orderly retreat from the
battlefield, thus allowing all surviving conscripts to return to their rice
paddies. Such a meeting does not
constitute an ‘end game’, but rather should be considered to be one of a
continuing series of ‘recurring games’.
At
these negotiations both Lords understand that they might need to enter into
negotiations the following year, if the war is not brought to a
conclusion. Therefore, honouring the
treaty during any year’s retreat could be beneficial, because it would
contribute towards ensuring an orderly retreat in following years.
Let
us look at Prosopgarn’s considerations with respect to honouring a treaty for
an orderly retreat, using our now familiar structure:
Prasopgarn -
ostensibly honours treaty |
|
Sukhum -
honours treaty |
Orderly
retreat
|
Sukhum
-
violates treaty |
Disorderly
retreat
(to
Sukhum’s advantage)
|
Disorderly
retreat
(to
Prasopgarn’s disadvantage)
|
|
Prasopgarn -
openly violates treaty |
|
Sukhum
-
honours treaty |
Disorderly
retreat
(to
Sukhum’s disadvantage)
|
Disorderly
retreat
(to
Prasopgarn’s advantage)
|
|
Sukhum
-
violates treaty |
Disorderly
retreat
(to
neither’s advantage)
|
Identifying
the preferred outcomes in this situation is a little more complex than in previous
examples. Is an orderly retreat a
win? It would seem so, because that was
the reason behind the negotiations in the first case. However, a disorderly retreat is little more
than a different phase of the battle in which one can be in a superior position
or an inferior position, and the two Lords are where they are because they
wanted to or felt they needed to wage war against each other. If they are waging war anyway and can gain an
advantage in that year’s final battle, then that could be considered a win.
One
thing is clear: a disorderly retreat which favours neither and destroys trust
such that negotiations are impossible the following year can be considered a
mutual loss. A disorderly retreat which
favours the other is also a loss.
When
looking at this situation two things become clear. First, ostensibly honouring the peace treaty
to allow orderly withdrawal is not only ‘moral’ but also rational. By openly violating the treaty a Lord may
gain a short term advantage but risk losing if the other also violates the
treaty. By honouring the treaty, a Lord
may forego a short term advantage and risk a short term disadvantage but knows
that the best outcome for both is continued trust because they know that this
‘game’ will likely be played again the following year.
Note
however, that it is ‘ostensibly honouring the peace treaty’ that
matters. This means that what is most
important for each Lord is that the other Lord believes him to be trustworthy
and honourable. For this to be possible,
each Lord must be seen to honour the treaty – not necessarily actually
honour the treaty.
As
each wishes to win in the longer term, if an opportunity presents itself to
violate the peace treaty, with no chance of being caught out, it is entirely
rational for a Lord to take that opportunity.
If a sizeable detachment of Sukhum’s men is met by an overwhelming
number of Prasopgarn’s men, and there is no chance of any witnesses escaping to
alert Sukhum of treachery, then as a rational actor Prasopgarn should order their
elimination. After all, those men may
make the difference between victory and defeat on the battlefield the following
year.
While
such an action is clearly rational, it would almost universally be considered
‘immoral’. Some may argue that this
means that this scenario has little to say about ethics and morality,
especially as it occurs in the context of war.
I beg to differ, but I’ll do that differing in later articles.
----------------------------------------------
At reddit, Glass_Underfoot made an interesting suggestion in response to the previous article:
(The Lords) ought to jointly (and immediately) hire an assassin's guild to kill the survivor should the other not die in his dotage. That way defection guarantees loss.
This brings to mind the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction, which lay behind the Cold War principle of launching nuclear weapons to destroy the Soviet Union if a nuclear attack were to be launched on the US.
However, this version just creates two new trust relationships, between each Lord and the assassin's guild and this raises the question: if the Lords can't trust each other, why would they trust the assassins to carry out a contract after their death? Would it not be more logical for the assassins to break such contract, since one client is dead and the surviving Lord will be more powerful and, if placated by the mercy of the guild, is likely to be inclined to be a generous benefactor?
Any argument for a Lord trusting the assassin's guild could also be applied to trusting the other Lord. The assassin's guild relies on its reputation, in much the same way as a Lord relies on his reputation. Once you introduce reputation as a consideration, you can't ignore the reputation of the Lords.
This point is returned to in the next article.
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This article is one of a series. It was preceded by The Siamese Emperor - Part 1 and will be followed by Ethics as Winning Games.
