Multiple axes of morality

I have, in the not too distant past, engaged in a long rambling discussion with a theist on the topic of William Lane Craig’s argument from morality.  Much of this argument has centred (in fuzzy sort of way) on the nature of morality – specifically on the question of moral objectivity.

For the atheists engaged in this discussion, the core problem we encountered is an inability or unwillingness on the part of the theist (LNC) to comprehensively define what “objective” means and then stick to that definition.  As a consequence of wrestling with this issue, it occurred to me that there is more than one “axis of morality”.  I’ll try to explain.

LNC insisted on discussing “objective morality” as if it lay on one axis, as illustrated below:

I'm being a little inaccurate here.  Let me try again.  LNC's axis of morality looks a bit more like this:

Occasionally LNC would resort to some bizarre grammatical version of moral nomenclature, claiming that if you make a moral statement concerning the subject of a clause, then you are being a subjectivist but from the vast bulk of his communication it is quite clear that he’s comparing moral objectivism with moral relativism.  In The Problem with Sam, I touched on why some are loathe to be labelled as moral relativists, and it appears that LNC is similarly loathe to be labelled as a moral absolutist, despite the fact that his discussions certainly indicate that he is in fact a moral absolutist.

The thing is, the opposite of “objective” is not “relative” but rather “subjective”.  And the opposite of “relative” is “absolute”.  This gives us two axes:

I’m going to allow for the possibility that there is a sliding scale on the axes, rather than just the two extremes.  I’m not claiming that moral values with respect to an issue can actually be a little bit absolute, although I’m not rejecting the notion out of hand.  What is more possible is that a moral system could comprise of some elements that are absolute and some elements that are relative and that an individual’s mix would thus be graduated.

Once we accept the idea of multiple moral axes, the question is then “how many and what might they be?”

Here is my suggestion:

I’ll briefly sketch out what I mean by each axis.

Objective-Subjective

An objective position is such that no matter who makes the determination, the result will be the same.  An example is the measurement of a weight using a standard set of scales.  Fifty kilograms on the scales will be measured as 50kg no matter who is doing the measuring.  A subjective position is based on personal circumstances or opinions.  A strong person when bench pressing 50kg may consider that a light weight, while light weights such as myself will think it is far too heavy to deal with for more than a few minutes (if we can manage that).

An objective moral judgment could be made on the basis of how much harm is caused by alternative options (smacking a child does more harm than good, based on the levels of pain experienced by the child, therefore smacking a child is morally wrong).

A subjective moral judgment could be based on no more than opinion (illegal immigrants are parasites on civilised society, therefore shooting them when they try to cross the border is morally right).

Absolute-Relative

An absolute determination is invariant whereas a relative determination varies with context.  Say we were wondering around with a lux meter measuring the light levels on an airplane.  We find that the lighting from a globe in the galley and from an indicator light in the cockpit is 60 lux.  This is an absolute measurement (I know, it’s only absolute-ish, but I’m trying to give an analogy here).  However, in the galley the globe is too dim (since the rest of the plane would be at about 250-400 lux) and the indicator in the cockpit is too bright (since it cannot be blinding at night when something like 2-5 lux would be appropriate).

Absolute moral judgments are based on obedience to some moral law or “moral fact” which does not vary (the Bible says not to lie, therefore lying is always morally wrong).

Relative moral judgments are made in a context and can vary (exposing one’s midriff in Australia was morally unacceptable in the 1940s but is fine today, but it is still morally unacceptable in Saudi Arabia).

Real-Imaginary

By the real-imaginary axis, I mean as in the difference between Balto (the Siberian husky that was the lead dog on the team that brought diphtheria antitoxin to Nome, Alaska in 1925) and Boris the talking Snow Goose in the film Balto (in which the eponymous character is transformed into a talking hybrid Siberian husky/white wolf).  One of the two is made up.

Real in terms of morality relates to the idea of Platonically real moral values, being moral values that are somehow integral to the universe.  Such moral values would not necessarily be absolute, even though I suspect that if they existed they would.  It is possible that our interaction with “Platonically real moral values” would be contextual and thus relative.

Imaginary, on the other hand, refers to the idea that some people think that “Platonically real moral values” exist, and others of us don’t.  We think that the idea of “Platonically real moral values” is made up – although we might not think that moral values themselves are made up …

Natural-Artificial

The natural-artificial axis could also be considered as a real-artificial axis, since the word “real” confusingly has more than one meaning.  I am referring here to the idea that morality could have evolved naturally, or it could have been imposed artificially.  For example, a man in a tent could have sat down and wrote a long list of moral rules off the top of his head.  These would be “artificial”.  On the other hand, you could have the natural moral rules that emerge out of an imperative to survive.

Rational-Irrational

This is getting a bit more esoteric and could be covered by other axes, but with this axis I am trying to point out that the man in the tent mentioned above could have just written down “ a bunch of crazy shit” or he could have thought it all through carefully.  Take a look at Deuteronomy some time to see which approach Moses took.

Consistent-Inconsistent

This one is especially for LNC.  He seems convinced that consistency is essential in morality.  I think we all agree about that.  What we don’t agree about is who is being consistent and who is being inconsistent.

Consistency in morality would mean that, for example, if being raped in the city is wrong then being raped in the country would be equally wrong.  Inconsistency would mean treating the two cases differently and stoning to death different people depending on where the rape occurred (good old Deuteronomy).

Simplex-Complex

With this axis I am making reference to the idea that there are people who see things in terms of black and white (see the second image above) and there are others who perceive a vivid spectrum – or at least distinguish shades of grey.  If when asked “is lying wrong?” you respond with “Yes!” then you are a simplex sort of person.  The rest of us will likely say something beginning with “Well, it depends …”

Implacable-Flexible

This is another one included for the benefit of people like LNC and it’s very much about the practical application of morality.  There are two extremes when it comes to moralists, those who are implacable in the application of their morality (think of Inspector Javert in Les Misérables ) and those who are more flexible (think of the Bishop of Digne who absolves Jean Valjean and “buys” his soul for god).  If you can put aside your petty morality in order to strive towards a “higher goal” of some sort, you are a flexible type.  If you think that you can’t (perhaps because you mistake your petty morality for some higher morality), then you are an implacable type.

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I’m completely open to the idea of adding more axes or combining some.  Any thoughts?

Chili Flavoured Ice Cream

This is another in what could be called a series of articles on the raging debate over objectivity and subjectivity.  I’ll try to make this particular article freestanding, but those who want context could look at:

my critique of William Lane Craig’s morality argument;

a report of my adventures at the Reasonable Faith forums; and

the article “The Objectionable Rape of Subjectivity”.

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One might be forgiven for thinking that a popular argument for the existence of god, or at least the Christian God, is that based on the claim that objective moral values and duties do exist.  A simple Google search on the string “objective moral values” appears to return just under half a million hits.  However, we’ve experienced the vagaries of Google before.  Suffice to say, these are the figures after repeated clicking on the last o in Goooooooooogle, without looking at “similar results” (I did something similar with Bing as well):

·         “objective moral values” – 472 (Bing 543)

o   as above without “Craig” – 450 (Bing 622)

o   as above without “god” – 463 (Bing 248)

o   as above with neither “Craig” nor “god” – 460 (Bing 240)

o   as above with neither “theism” nor “theist” – 473 (Bing 569)

§  as above without “Craig” – 442 (Bing 564)

§  as above without “god” – 441 (Bing 242)

§  as above with neither “Craig” nor “god” – 417 (Bing 235)

The figures are a little screwy, but the conclusion that there isn’t really that much interest in “objective moral values” seems to be reasonably well founded.

Nevertheless, let us soldier on.

During my interchange with a chap with the handle LNC over at the Reasonable Faith forums (link above), he was if not evasive at least inconsistent in his definition of “objective”.  I just want to focus in on one particular aspect of the debate; centred on the idea that objective is the opposite of subjective.  I don’t want to use LNC’s grammar-based definitions here because, to be frank, they are ludicrous.  Instead I’ll try to explain what I think people generally mean by subjective and objective in these types of debates.

A common example used involves ice cream.  The argument might be something like this (thanks to LNC for the example):

Really, you are saying that right and wrong do exist, but they are subjective?  That’s your argument?  Do you know the difference between what are called moral realism and moral non-realism?  How do you take personal preferences and apply them beyond yourself?  For example, I like coconut ice cream.  That is my personal preference.  That doesn’t make coconut ice cream the “right” ice cream and all others “wrong.”  I have expressed my subjective preference.  Just because I like it, doesn’t make it right for everyone.  The same can be said for subjective morality.  You may prefer not murdering people while James Holmes prefers shooting people, even killing them.  If morality is subjective, then both of you are right and both of you are wrong.  Your morality is right for you and Holmes’ morality is wrong for you and vice versa.  If there is no objective standard, then there is not legitimate way for you to say that he is wrong and you are right.

Okay.  Let’s address the realism/non-realism thing first.  By “coconut ice cream”, I am assuming that LNC means “coconut flavoured ice cream”, which is ice cream that might be flavoured naturally with real bits of coconut.  I am not assuming that he means some sort of ice confection made of nothing but coconut.  So it’s the flavour that matters – an ice confection made almost entirely from coconut but with flavorants added would not be “coconut ice cream” for the purposes of the discussion.  If, for example, the right combination of flavorants to achieve a chocolate flavour were added, it would more accurately be described as “chocolate flavoured coconut-based ice confection”.

If one were a realist with respect to “coconut ice cream”, one would argue that there is in fact a real coconut flavour.  Such a realist would not be referring to a combination of flavours that are not coconut in themselves and which, under certain circumstances can result in a coconut flavour, but an actual, real, unitary thing – “coconut flavour” that conceptually could be distilled from a coconut and added by the spoonful to whatever food product you wanted.  There is no such thing, of course, and I don’t even think LNC (or indeed WLC) would argue that there was. 

With respect to “coconut flavour”, we are all non-realists.  We know that this flavour is just something that emerges from the combination of certain chemicals interacting with our senses of taste and smell.  The impression of “coconut-ness” of the ice cream occurs in our head, along with the impression that leads one to state “this coconut ice cream is more delicious than the chocolate”.

If we considered chili flavoured ice cream instead, we could identify a single compound that we know has a specific impact on the human mouth – capsaicin.  We can say, with some level of confidence, that if capsaicin was in your ice cream in greater than trace quantities, you’d be soon aware of it (unless your TRPV1 receptors were defective, desensitised or destroyed).

With chili flavoured ice cream we can make both subjective and objective assessments.

I could hand out samples of chili flavoured ice cream to unsuspecting punters and afterwards ask if it was “hot”.  The responses from my victims would be subjective, and possibly even violent.  They (when not hitting me) would be saying that the chili flavoured ice cream was “too hot for me” or “not too hot for me” or “funny tasting to me” or “delicious to me, can I have some more”.

Alternatively, I could send a sample off to a laboratory.  The boffins could analyse the sample and provide a report on how much capsaicin was in it.  If I sent them a range of samples, from different batches of ice cream for example, they could even tell me which has more or less capsaicin than the others.  This response would be objective.  The report that there is 0.28mg/g of capsaicin in the ice cream is not the result of a subjective assessment.

What the boffins could not detect is the objective level of deliciousness associated with the chili flavoured ice cream, in much the same way as they cannot detect the objective level of deliciousness associated with coconut ice cream.  Deliciousness is not real.

The boffins might, after some research, be able to assess just which combination of chemicals reliably results in an impression of “coconut-ness” – but to argue that we can quantify the chemical combination that we associate with “coconut” is to miss the point.  In other words, while the “coconut flavour” is not real, it is nevertheless more real than the “deliciousness” of the coconut ice cream.

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Now we are in a position to say something about “objective” and “subjective”.

Objective implies that an assessment may be made based on something real, like the volatile aromatics that we associate with flavour, or the capsaicin that we associate with a hot chili.  An objective assessment can be repeated reliably: one kilo of chili flavoured ice cream containing almost three grams of capsaicin always contains almost three grams of capsaicin – it’s not half a gram for me and twelve for you.

When an assessment is subjective, however, it is based on something which cannot be measured or quantified, or on a perception which particular to a person or a situation.  A subjective assessment cannot be repeated reliably: even the most avid fan of chili flavoured ice cream today would have probably hated it as a child, and while I think it sounds perfectly delicious it would be irrational of me to assume that it would necessarily be delicious for you also.

So, the question we are left with is:

What are “objective moral values” tied to that would justify a claim, by theists, that they exist?

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Anyone who identifies something real that could be argued to justify the “objective moral values” claim, for instance “the minimisation of suffering and the maximisation of well-being”, may be interested in a reading a book called “The Moral Landscape”.  Theists might not like it though.