Showing posts with label world view. Show all posts
Showing posts with label world view. Show all posts

Thursday, 5 October 2017

Where a World View Leads

There are far too many people labouring under the misapprehension that either atheism is a world view (it isn't) or that atheists derive their world view from their atheism (which I don't think they do, but I guess I can be convinced that some might, if any atheists can argue that case from personal experience).

Here's my position.  I'm generally a sceptical and evidential type of person.  The first means that I don't immediately accept anything as true, whether that be what someone tells me (irrespective of the medium: voice, writing, video ... I might be a little unsettled by telepathy, given that is something I consider to not exist).  I have evidence to support such scepticism given that I know people to hold false beliefs, to misunderstand situations, to be susceptible to illusions and delusions and to misrepresent the truth (whatever "the truth" may be).  The second merely means that I go where the (compelling) evidence leads, and if there is no evidence, I don't go anywhere.  If evidence points towards a number of options, then I might move towards those options, but I don't choose one of them and go all the way with it (at least not based on that one point of evidence).

This scepticism and evidentialism is what lies behind my world view: that people are often deluded, that claims without compelling evidence are almost always erroneous (and even more so when there have been thousands of years in which compelling evidence could have been collated if it in fact existed) and that good intentions are not sufficient.  (That's not the entirety of my world view, but the currently relevant elements are there.)  Out of that falls my overt and explicit atheism, as opposed to the neutral atheism that I had from birth.

Do other atheists recognise something of their position in this?


Do any theists comprehend the difference between this position and the concept that an atheist's world view might be driven by their atheism?

Thursday, 13 September 2012

The Logic of a Mystic


I have, more than once, had the unmitigated pleasure of debating with a theistic mystic.  But what, I hear you ask is a “theistic mystic”?

Put it this way, if I were a theistic mystic, I would ask you what you thought a theistic mystic was.  Fortunately I am not a theistic mystic (TM).

What I mean by the term is a theist who tends to argue by putting out statements that appear deep and then when asked to clarify a term asks what the questioner thinks the term means.  If the person seeking clarification falls into the trap of presenting a definition of the term, the TM then says no, you clearly don’t comprehend and you need to do some more research.

The TM will usually then make a new statement related to either the original, still as yet unclarified statement or the attempted definition.  Sometimes, the TM will attack his/her opponent based on the attempted definition, as the opponent had made a statement of position rather than trying to get clarification.  This can, for the unwary, trigger a defensive reaction leading to an apparent defeat since few people can successfully defend a position that they don’t really hold (and the TM will claim that the opponent is retreating).

What a skilled TM will never, ever do is properly clarify.

neopolitan (in a discussion with someone else) – … the right thing to do really depends on the circumstances of the situation.

dyster (the theistic mystic, or TM) – So you are a moral relativist.

neo – Well it depends on what you mean by “a moral relativist” …

dyster – What do you think “a moral relativist” is?

neo – I’m guessing you mean someone who is not a moral absolutist.

dyster – Are you trying to tell me that you don’t believe in absolute morality?  What about rape, is that not always wrong?

neo – We-ell, rape is clearly not always wrong to the person perpetrating rape.

dyster – So rape is ok in your world, what about killing children or torturing puppies?

neo – I didn’t say that rape is right, I ...

dyster – Yes you did, you condoned it.

neo – No, no, I didn’t.  Look, you seem to say that there is an absolute morality.  On what do you base this absolute morality?

dyster – Logic.

neo – Logic?  But what are your premises?

dyster – Look … some things are true, ok, and some things are false.

neo – Ye-es, but what are your premises?

dyster – Are you now trying to say that nothing is true?

neo – What? No, I’m …

dyster – So some things are true, some things are wrong and some things are right.

neo – But if you are going to say some things are right and some things are wrong, you are going to have to have some basis on which you make the determination.

dyster – Aren’t you listening?  I just told you the basis, logic.

neo – You still haven’t given me any of your premises.

dyster – You clearly don’t understand logic, you need to go away and do some study.

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This was pretty much how a real conversation went, although it was longer and a little more heated.

As you can (hopefully) see, the logic of a mystic is on a whole different level to that of an apologist.  You know what the TM is claiming, but it is never clearly articulated.  This may tempt you to try to short circuit it thus:

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neo – Look, you are just saying that things are right or wrong based on what your God thinks about it.

dyster – What do you mean by God?

neo – It’s your God, not mine, you’d need to define it.

dyster – I didn’t bring God into the discussion, you did.  You need to define your terms.

neo – Hang on, you didn’t define your terms before.  What do you mean by a “moral relativist”?

dyster – Really?  You just want to run away from the discussion now and go back to an earlier point that we’ve already discussed at length?

neo – Alright, have it your way.  The God I think you mean is the omnipotent, omniscient, benevolent God one of the Bible.

dyster – Your dismissive tone just indicates that you need to go study some theology.  How can we have a profitable conversation if you don’t understand what you are talking about?

(neo ducks off to spend 4 years in seminary college)

neo – Right, here is the definition of the God that I think you meant ...

(neo downloads 4 years’ worth of theology)

dyster – Oh, that’s not the understanding of God that I have, you have to study more widely …

(Early the next morning, the mystical Mr dyster is found nailed to a tree with a little sign saying “Is this the sort of God you meant?”)

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All you can really do with a TM is remain politely sceptical as long as humanly possible and be dogged in your demands for clarification and evidence.

Then, if the TM doesn’t crack, you buy a hammer.

Saturday, 25 August 2012

Creeping Theism

I’ve observed an interesting phenomenon recently, which I call “creeping theism”.  It might not have started with William Lane Craig, and he doesn’t seem to be the only one exhibiting it, but I noticed it first with his debates.

I have spoken to many Christians about religion in my time: at beach mission, at Sunday school, at High School, at university and in day-to-day interactions.  Until only quite recently, I had never heard any of them describe themselves as a theist.  They never talked about theism.  It was Christianity all the way.

In recent years, however, Christians seem to have introduced this new usage of “theism” wherein theism is cast as being directly opposed to atheism.  While this is consistent with the original usage of the term – that is in opposition to emerging deism in the 1700s – it’s curious for a couple of reasons.

Firstly, the people who use the term “theist” do not consider themselves to be theists per se, they are Christian, or Jewish, or (potentially) Muslim or even some form of Hindu.  Theism is a collective term which includes beliefs that the individual “theist” almost certainly holds to be untrue.  Even a Universalist will hold the exclusivity of the individual faiths to be invalid.  A Christian doesn’t believe “theism”, but rather Christianity.

Secondly, atheism does not have to oppose “theism”, not even strong atheism (or “new atheism”).  Atheists are neither restricted nor inclined to address theism as a whole.

It is this latter point that I think is key.  Creeping theism appears to be an attempt to defend an individual faith by hiding among other similar, but apparently false, faiths.  The “one form of theism among many” argument goes a bit like this:

1.      While you might have some legitimate argument against my form of theism, you can’t possibly prove every single form of theism to be false.

2.      Therefore, it is possible that one form of theism is true.

3.      Insert Plantinga's Ontological Argument here to prove that one form of theism is true (while hoping that no-one notices the logical fallacies involved).

4.      If one form of theism is true, then it must be the best form of theism.

5.      My form of theism is the best form of theism.

6.      Therefore, my theism is true.

On the face of it, this doesn’t seem to make any difference since if you prove the theist’s individual form of theism to be false, then it’s false.  However, this ignores the mental gymnastics of the average Christian.  Say someone (an atheist or some alternate theist), knocks down a vital pillar of a Christian’s world view – for example by convincingly arguing that the errors and inconsistencies in the Bible show that the Bible is in error thus eliminating confidence in the prophesies foretelling the arrival of a messiah and indicating that the Gospels are likely to have been made up.

The Christian may be assailed by doubt, but she will not necessarily be crushed.  She activates the “one form of theism among many” argument, noting that it is unlikely that the specific Biblical errors and inconsistencies raised will affect all forms of theism equally.  Since there is no evidence which successfully addresses all forms of theism, there is therefore refuge in some hypothetical form(s) of theism.  Naturally, the Christian believes that if any form of theism is true then it has to be hers.  Not all forms of theism have been shown to be untrue and, therefore, her "best form of theism" must be true.

I know, it doesn’t make sense but the Greatest Living Christian Apologist regularly deploys equally weak and logically invalid arguments.

If anyone has any other theories regarding creeping theism, why the term "theism" has started to get so much traction in the Christian apologetics world, I’d be interested to hear them.

Saturday, 11 August 2012

An undercurrent

More empathic readers might have noticed a subtle shade of irritation and frustration in some of my posts.  I’ve tried to keep everything light, but occasionally despite all my best efforts an element of darkness has crept in – especially at those time when I have had to repeatedly listen to someone babble on while transcribing a tract from a podcast or a debate, or I’ve been struck by something that is sufficiently ridiculous as to interfere with my hackles.

These readers might have formed an opinion that I don’t like theists, christians in particular.  Sure, there are some I don’t like, but it would be inaccurate to say that I dislike all christians, let alone all theists.  It should also not be assumed that I like, or agree with, all other atheists.

I thought it would be helpful to identify just what it is about certain theists that really get my goat.  I should also point out that it is particularly irritating when they get, then slaughter, then burn and then offer up my goat.  If you want to sacrifice a goat … get your own goat for heaven’s sake!

Anyway, here are the qualities of theists that I like:

·         Mature
·         Beset by doubt
·         Thoughtful
·         Consistent
·         Humble
·         Pro-science
·         Tolerant

Mature

A mature (that is reserved, quiet and unassuming) theist is willing to discuss their faith if asked, but doesn’t impose that faith on others.

I can’t quite understand why some believers think that they have to convert others.  There is plenty of opportunity for me to check out the various religions in my own time and to arrive at the best one, if there is a “best one”.  If a theist’s personal religion is correct, then it should be abundantly clear that it’s correct.  With respect to the religion that I am most likely to be confronted with, christianity, there is plenty of evidence that a large number of the practitioners of this religion believe that it’s a personal relationship with their god that matters.

When people come knocking on my door trying to convert me this just seems like more evidence that the religion in question is a meme, an orally transmitted virus.

Beset by doubt

At least from my perspective, and that of Augustine, much of what a theist believes is impossible.  If these things were not impossible, or at least vanishingly unlikely, they would not be miraculous.  The scarce evidence that supports theistic belief is tenuous, generally inaccessible and inconsistent.  The vast majority of theists believe that their god is omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent, yet it allows the horrible suffering to continue day after day, year after year, century after century.  Their god is usually considered to be omnipresent, or immanent, yet the vast majority of them rarely, if ever, feel its presence.  Their god is inscrutable, or at the very least enigmatic, so even if it is there, a theist should have not the slightest clue as to what their god’s true intentions are.

A theist who isn’t struggling with doubts simply hasn’t thought it through.

Some of my best friends are christians who struggle mightily with their doubt.

Thoughtful

Being thoughtful is closely related to being beset by doubt.  Many people avoid ever having doubts by not thinking too hard.  There is even a term for it: “over-intellectualisation” (note, this is not the same as the psychoanalytical term “intellectualisation”).

The bar for some people is set very, very low so that if their train of though is approaching a problem, they simply shut down intellectually.

Consistent

Avoiding hypocrisy is one aspect of consistency, but I do think you can be inconsistent without being hypocritical.  An inconsistent, but not quite hypocritical, theist is one who espouses a belief but it really only manifests on Sunday mornings.  While there are clearly issues with fundamentalists of whatever stripe, I can’t personally get my head around the concept of Sunday theists.  If someone believes in a god with all the omni-attributes, how can they reconcile that belief with their weekday behaviour?  To me, a fundamentalist is a little more consistent on one level – especially if they live and breathe their faith.  To have belief in a god and to spend most of your time ignoring that god just doesn’t make any sense to me.

Hypocrisy applies to those who are stronger, more consistent believers but who do things which are inconsistent with the teachings of their religion.  Those who believe their bible is inerrant but still cherry pick from it, ignoring the inconvenient parts.  Those who ignore the words of their messiah while steadfastly refusing to turn the other cheek.  Those who fail the humility challenge.

I guess it also applies to those who fail to stone unwed mothers, but I’ll give them a pass on that if they struggle with doubts over some of the more difficult parts of their bible.

Humble

As I understand it, included in the set of requirements to qualify for heaven is humility.  You only get into heaven if you are humble.  Being a theist who believes this but does so arrogantly is somewhat incautious, isn’t it? 

Note that as an atheist I am allowed to be arrogant since there is no punishment lined up for me.  If I get punished eternally, it will be for failing to believe.

Pro-science

As I understand it, theists do not claim to know the mind of their god, or have a thorough understanding on the grand plan.  Therefore, a theist doesn’t really know what a universe that was made by God would look like.  I know that theists are pretty sure that such a universe would look like our universe.

They have no reason to be anti-science because science just works out how the universe operates.  They should see it as a glorious vindication of their god.  If they ignore how the universe operates, they are ignoring the wonder of their god’s creation.  That’s surely got to be bad, right?

Perhaps being too focused on things of the flesh, or worldly things, might be bad.  Nevertheless, if such a fabulously intelligent being as a theist’s god made this universe, then that god put a lot of intellectual effort into the enterprise and theists should be appreciating it!  Implying that the creation methods brought to bear must have be simple enough for the average layperson to understand is seriously underselling their god.

Tolerant

If some sort of god exists then, for some reason unbeknownst to anyone else, that god put some effort into not making that fact inaccessible to us via the deductive capabilities that were (hypothetically) granted us. While the evidence for evolution is not 100% complete, it is more than sufficient to indicate that it is not necessary to have a supernatural creator of the life that teems on our planet. Our current understanding of the “natural laws” – meteorology, chemistry, physics, astrophysics, biology, and so on – is such that intervention by that (hypothetical) creator is not necessary to explain any of the multitude of mysteries that confounded our ancestors. Focusing on christianity for a moment, it is a curious fact that throughout the first gospel (Mark, which the rest draw on) Jesus repeatedly compelled his followers, and others, to not speak of who he was or of the miracles he performed.

It seems pretty clear, at least to me, that if a god created the universe then that creator planted a lot of evidence during the creation process in order to lead us to think that the universe occurred naturally and therefore does not want us to know that the universe was created.  If a hypothetical creator wanted us to know, we could have been created with that certain knowledge pre-inserted into our brains – a sort of theological homing instinct like a salmon or a pigeon allowing us to home in on precisely the right form of divinity.  The theist generally argues for an omnipotent god, an omniscient god, who therefore not only can install a theological homing instinct but also knows that it’s possible.  But apparently the god chose not to.

An omniscient god must also realise that some people won’t go along with the cosmic plan and it stands to reason that that must be acceptable.  If it wasn’t, being omnipotent and omniscient, the god could easily fix it.

But, ok – granted, there might be some inscrutable reason as to why fixing what should be a minor issue for an omnipotent and omniscient god isn’t high on the agenda.  And it might be true that a creator might be somewhat annoyed that creation is filled with people who are, generally, quite naughty.  And it further might be true that certain types of naughty people (the disbelievers, apostates, blasphemers and so on who never get around to apologising in the right way to the correct god) are going to be rather uncomfortable for eternity in a hell of some sort.

If this is the case, then the theist’s god already has everything carefully planned out and does not need help.

Is there really a need to make the short period of not being tortured worse than it has to be?  In the view of a theist, non-believers suffer even during their time on Earth due to their disconnect with god and have nothing to look forward to other than an eternity of knowing that they screwed up big-time.

The only logical conclusion I can draw about people who want to victimise other people who don’t believe in their god correctly is that they don’t believe in their god either (and hence cannot rely on their god adequately punishing people in the afterlife).

Focusing briefly on christianity again, Jesus gave sage advice a few times about the need to avoid intolerance: something along the lines of “Judge not, lest thee be judged” and “Let he who is without sin cast the first stone”.  As I understand it, it is up to god to judge, not humans.  If a theist presumes to judge in the stead of god, then that is considered to be a sin.

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Theists who manage, or even just aspire, to have these characteristics are fine by me.


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Oh, and I have a special place in whatever organ is supposed to be the repository of contempt for Pascalian Gamblers. If you honestly believe purely because you think that it’s the best return on your investment, then may the Grand Pixie have mercy on your soul.

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And another thing ... Josh the Honest Searcher did have a thing about why being told that you are going to hell is not as bad as it might immediately appear.  After all, if a guy in a white coat tells you that you are killing yourself with cheap scotch and cigarettes, you should not get upset - you should engage with that person to work out if they are a doctor, if so and if they are a doctor in a relevant field and you can then work out if there is some good hard evidence to support the argument that you should move to more expensive scotch and cigars.  This is fair enough, and the first time someone tells you that you are going to hell, you should perhaps engage with that person to see if they have evidence to back it up.  And maybe even the second time.  The third time, when the sum total of the evidence is "this ancient book which is riddled with inconsistencies tells me it's so", then you perhaps should be slightly less accommodating.

When you get to the tenth time, or twentieth time, you are more than justified in gently shutting the door in their face with a quiet "thanks but I'm not interested".

Friday, 3 August 2012

Where did I come from?

Unlike many atheists, I am not an apostate.  I have never been anything other than an atheist.  For as long as I remember, I have had a total lack of belief in anything spiritual, or magical, or paranormal, or supernatural.  Even in my earliest coherent memories, from when I was five, I was well aware that Santa and the Tooth Fairy were made up.  I simply don’t recall ever believing in them, although I do accept that I may have when I was very little.  I have no recollection of the experience of belief in anything magical or supernatural. 


When I was still quite young, again about five, we lost a few cats to local traffic.  I held no belief, even at that time, that death was anything other than final.  This lack of belief wasn’t restricted to cats since I had the same sense of finality when my grandfather died a year or so later.

(This is not to say that there hasn’t been some wishful thinking on my part from time to time.  I recall that when I was a teenager, I did want to have paranormal powers, such as telekinesis and the ability to teleport at will.  However, this was on a par with wanting to have my own fire lizard [see Dragonriders of Pern] or my own light sabre.  I knew it wasn’t possible, but I thought it would have been so cool if it were.  To be honest, I’d still like to have a fire lizard.)

I was not totally ignorant of Christianity, which is the religion generally held by people who were into that sort of thing where I lived as a child.  For a while, when I was perhaps seven or eight, I even attended Sunday School (although I have absolutely no idea who made that decision).  My father did some work at a tourist beach from when I was about seven until I was about nine, so I spent whole summers – every single day – taking advantage of the only free entertainment on offer, something known today as “Beach Mission”.

During that time, I learnt the Bible stories inside out.  I was the most knowledgeable atheist on the beach, even winning Bibles during the quiz competitions. (I still keep the best of those prizes together with the rest of my science fiction and fantasy books, although it has the first page of Genesis ripped out which is a bit sad and, I’d have thought, totally unnecessary – there are no nut-hatches in Genesis are there?)

I do not recall my state of belief ever coming up as a topic of conversation.  The young beach crusaders seemed to be happy enough that I was a keen and involved listener and they probably assumed that since I was absorbing their lore, I was also absorbing their message.  The issue of atheism simply never came up.

Not terribly much later, von Däniken released a new book, which renewed interest in his first book “Chariots of the Gods” and also in Velikovsky’s “Worlds in Collision”.  I didn’t read any of their books, but I was aware of the contents in so much as both of them tried to explain Biblical (and other) events in terms of aliens and/or non-standard solar system cosmology.  It was at this time that I was struck for the first time by the thought that there are full-grown adults, who have not yet reached the point of senility who actually believe what is written in the Bible and, not only that, some of them believe it literally.

I need to keep a theist (or apostate) reader in mind here and explain some things which may seem obvious to other readers.

I was aware of myth.  I knew about Greek mythology (and, to the extent that it was slightly modified, Roman mythology), Egyptian mythology, Norse mythology (and the variant introduced to the British Isles by Angles and Saxons), Irish mythology, a little Native American mythology and some Australian Aboriginal and Maori mythology, plus I was vaguely aware that there were African and Asian mythologies.

I also knew a fair bit of Christian, Jewish and, to a lesser extent, Muslim mythology.  I was aware that these monotheistic religions were all quite similar to each other as well as being quite similar to some earlier religions from the region.  I was possibly a little better informed than the average child who would more easily fall prey to one form of indoctrination or another.

I remember a particularly loud thunderstorm from when I was about eight and recall knowing a story about how the ancients used to think about thunder in terms of giants moving their furniture around (there was a lot of rumbling thunder in this storm).  I didn’t believe that this was true: I just knew that I’d been told that people used to think that.  Note very carefully my use of words here.

I did not believe that “giants moving furniture caused the thunder” was true:

I just knew that I’d been told that people used to think that “giants moving furniture caused the thunder”.

There are four separate and distinct concepts there.

·         I didn’t mention believing anything was true.  All I had was an absence of belief.

·         I knew something (i.e. what I had been told).  This knowledge was based on some evidence (i.e. the recollection of being told something). 

·         I’d been told something, the fact that I am told something doesn’t necessarily mean I believe or, in fact, that I know it. 

·         People used to think something.  I’d been told, as far as I remember, that people used to think, not believe, that gods or giants or something magical and powerful controlled the weather, including storms.

It’s possible to say that I “believed” that the thunder was due to lightning activity, which might even be accurate since I did not fully understand the mechanism by which lightning produces thunder, nor did I understand the mechanism by which storm clouds generate lightning.  But I was most certainly not actively disbelieving that the thunder was due to giant activity, or Thor’s hammer, or any one of dozens of possible superstitious explanations.

If asked, I am pretty certain that I would have reported a considered opinion that none of the adults around me held superstitious beliefs about the thunderstorm.  I was quite used to the idea that there were many myths available to explain various phenomena and I was quite used to the idea that no-one really believed them (except possibly young, more gullible children and anyone old enough to have become senile – note that at eight, the term “old” had a lot more scope for me than it does now).

My default position then, and to a certain extent now, was to assume that unless there are indications to the contrary, a person probably won't be a believer in myth and superstition.  Yes, I realised that old people were more likely to go to church, but with the constant blathering on about things being great in heaven and the fact that death is looming, this was hardly surprising to me.  (If you are ever going to indulge in Pascal’s wager, do it when you are old and can blame it on senility.  Not that everyone will believe the senility claim, judging from the content of various blogs that crow about Antony Flew’s conversion to deism – more on that in another post.)

But when people started talking up Velikovsky and Däniken, it became apparent to me that even average people would seriously consider attempts to “scientifically” explain myth.  This was a bit of a shock.  Science, in my experience, had always served to replace myth with workable theories and this was, certainly as far as I was and remain concerned, the natural order of things.

It was probably at around this point that I became a true atheist, as a reaction to what I saw as a ludicrous situation in which people were taking selected myths seriously.  This is not to say that I was not already, to all intents and purposes, an atheist.  However, until this time, I thought that pretty much everybody else was as well.  You could say that I became a “harder” atheist, or a “newer” atheist.  If you like, you could say I was “born again” as an atheist.

Something else that might have been instrumental in my transition to a stronger stance was my introduction to Baptists.  They may well have been around before, but when I moved to a new High School I met a small group of Christians who were more overt, and more vocal, in their faith than any I had met previously.  Their tendency to challenge others on their faith meant that I had my first opportunity to publically identify as an atheist.

At the same time, I was developing a teenage interest in philosophy, which means I used to argue solipsism with people in order to annoy them.  I would be able to keep up these arguments for about as long as it took for them to punch me, which they would do in order to prove that they did, as a matter of fact, exist rather than being a figment of my imagination.  As far as I can tell, this is a standard rite of passage for a pubescent philosopher.

At some point I either challenged the Baptists on why they believed what they did, or they challenged me on why I didn’t, and a couple of years of heated debate followed.  I was probably a curious animal to them, firstly because they were used to talking to people who had a tepid, almost translucent, gossamer-like faith rather than people who had no faith whatsoever and, secondly, because my knowledge of the bible was in many cases superior to theirs despite my lack of belief in it.  I found them curious too, because they weren’t overly interested in learning more about what it was that they believed and what it was they were trying to proselytise.  They just seemed to move, as a group, from esoteric passage to esoteric passage and none of them appeared interested in understanding the whole of scripture in context.  (Later I realised that these theological herd migrations were the aftereffects of bible study sessions and sermons.)

At university, I fell into a social group which included a number of (initially tepid) Christians who were slowly ensnared in an evangelical campus group.  This experience highlighted to me the sect-like nature of these groups, with their pastor having a huge influence over their behaviour – for good or ill.  Again, there were many heated debates, but this time with a group who were increasingly interested in reading more and more of the scripture that they held to be infallibly true.  It was at this time that I became aware of the mental gymnastics required to integrate belief in the bible and an understanding of the real world – as an observer of these Campus Christians as they were being forced down the path of what I later came to know as apologetics.

I wasn’t overly concerned by these Christians; they were relatively few in number and they had little influence outside their own clique.  However, through having a privileged position among them (I was an accepted atheist who even attended the occasional Friday sermon as a precursor to a night out), I came to notice that more devout Christians can be intensely hypocritical and intolerant.  I was told more than once that I was heading to hell, when I was not being told that I was already there.

My understanding of faith and belief, such as it is, crystallised around this time.  I was talking to Dee (not his real name) about the nature of “grace”.  He explained to me that, in his conception of things, nothing he or anyone else could do would result in him being among the saved.  He would only be saved if his god so willed it.  The same, apparently, applied to me; nothing I could ever do would affect the outcome.  This was intriguing.  Is it possible that Dee, the believer, was not among the saved but I, the atheist, was?  Yes, Dee told me.  The same applied to people of other faiths.

However, Dee was unshakeable in his faith that he was saved through the grace of god.

He believed with utter conviction that he was saved.  He believed with equal conviction that I was not going to be, that Jews possibly could be saved due to a prior agreement with the man upstairs and that Muslims, who were deceived by the devil, were all going straight to hell – unless of course that god decided that he wanted us, in which case god would do what was required for us to be converted, irrespective of any ideas that we might have about it.  So much for converting me!

I’m not certain that this sort of unyielding, uncompromising faith is common to all Christians, or even to all born-again Christians.  What I can say is that while I have no personal experience of this sort of mind-set from the inside, I suspect that it is corresponds at some level with the way the majority of Christians think.

Atheism, or at least my atheism, is not similar to this mind-set at all.

Over the years I’ve ebbed and flowed on the atheism front.  I’ve discussed things theological with theist friends, been amazed that agnostic friends fanatically defend Christian culture against "invading cultures" and argued hotly with people who knock on my door to tell me that I am going to hell (no, not Mormon punks, I mean Jehovah’s Witnesses).  For the most part, so long as they are not on my doorstep taking up time that I could be wasting in some other way, being a theist is fine with me.  Sadly, theists have started to encroach on my life more over the past few years, with attempts to change how schools are run, to influence what can and can’t be taught at school, to define what is “good” in theistic terms and to corrupt science with creationist nonsense.  Theists are particularly annoyingly when misusing logic.

So that’s where I came from, and sort of where I am – standing up and pointing out where people like William Lane Craig and his ilk are wrong.

I should point out that I am totally aware that I don’t fully comprehend this whole faith thing and my take on it may well be completely wrong.  If anyone out there can go some way towards explaining what faith actually means to a Christian, I’d be very interested to hear about it.  Don't bother recounting biblical stories.  I've heard them.

Friday, 27 July 2012

My World View - Part 2

Being labelled Part 2, you might be assuming that this article should be preceded by a Part 1.  We don’t want anyone to be rushing around making any wild, unjustified assumptions so I’ll confirm up front that, yes, there was a Part 1.  Here.

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Recapping very briefly, there is a “Set of All Things” (where Thing is defined broadly) in which there are the subsets: the “Set of True Things”, the “Set of False Things” and the “Set of Neutral Things”.  The “Set of True Things” is far smaller than either of the other two sets.

True Things don’t conflict with other True Things.  False and Neutral Things can conflict with each other, and with True Things.

I also mentioned that I can’t necessarily know which Things are True and that my world view is an intellectual construct consisting of thoughts, ideas and concepts about Things.

As individuals we all divide the “Set of All Things” is into the “Set of Things Held to be True” and everything else (that is the “Set of Things Not Held to be True”), as illustrated below:





Over the years I have come to realise that some effort is necessary to make crystal clear something that should be reasonably obvious.  If I seem to be labouring the obvious, please accept my humble apologies.


Look carefully at the diagram.  You will see a yellow circle representing the “Set of Things Held to be True”.  Outside that circle, is the remainder of the “Set of All Things” which is labelled the “Set of Things Not Held to be True”.


There is no “Set of Things Held to be False”.


There is no “Set of Things Held to be Not True”.


A question that often comes up concerns default positions or presuppositions.  Let me try to make this as clear as possible:


Nothing ends up in my “Set of Things Held to be True” by default.  Before I add a Thing to this set, I need to be convinced that I am justified in holding this new Thing to be True.


Nothing that has wormed its way into my “Set of Things Held to be True” is sacrosanct.  If I am given reason to doubt that a Thing is True, then it gets removed.


Once I hold certain things to be True, I reach a situation as illustrated in the diagram below:







Note that I hold to be True (or “believe”) some Things that are True, some Things that are False and some Things that are Neutral.  The remainder of things I simply do not hold to be True (in other words, I don’t believe them).

Despite my efforts above, you may still be thinking to yourself … “Are you saying that you don’t hold some Things to be False?  Really, I mean, really?”


Well, yes, really, I don’t.  Let me explain by example.  Say that Trudy turns up and tells me that new research reveals that Napoleon Bonaparte was a monkey.  Now I think this assertion is a False Thing, but should I really go to the effort of actively believing that Napoleon Bonaparte was not a monkey?  I don’t think so.  I put as much effort into this claim as I would to the assertion that Napoleon Bonaparte was a tit-mouse, or a small piece of cheese, or a mortal avatar of the Grand Pixie.  I simply withhold belief.


Note that I don’t need justification to withhold belief (to not hold something to be True).  But let’s say Trudy is insistent and desperately wants me to accept her assertion, do I have any justification for such an acceptance?


When I look at her claim, and my existing “Set of Things Held to be True”, I find that I don’t.  An Emperor of France who was a monkey would conflict with many Things I hold to be True.


But let’s say I was particularly ignorant about history and not able to use the internet.  If all I held to be True about Napoleon Bonaparte was that he was hairy and short, that he lived in a tree, that he had a prehensile tail and that he was fond of bananas, then I might be willing to accept that he was a monkey.  The reason for this is that the new Thing presented by Trudy would correlate with all the other Things I hold to be True on this subject.


Correlation is the tool I use to work out whether I should hold a new Thing to be True.  Correlation is particularly useful as the number of Things you hold to be True increases.  If I know 100 Things pertaining (directly or indirectly) to Napoleon Bonaparte, and all of them correlated with the assertion that he was a monkey, then I would be justified in thinking that “Napoleon Bonaparte was a monkey” is a True Thing.  However, if only 96 of those Things correlated with that assertion and 4 of them conflicted with it, then I would need to reconsider.


The protection against erroneously holding False Things to be True is the fact that it is only True Things that always correlate.  If two Things do not correlate then, at most, only one of them can be True.  This allows me to “falsify” a Thing, to show that I should not hold that Thing to be True.


I have to be careful, of course, since if I held “Napoleon Bonaparte had a prehensile tail” to be True, this would correlate with “Napoleon Bonaparte was a monkey”.  I am aware that some of the Things I hold to be True are, in fact, not True.  I don’t know which they are, or I would do something about it, but experience tells me I occasionally trip over “facts” which conflict with new, more authoritative and well-supported “facts”.


Therefore, when I hold a Thing to be True, I only do so probatively.  This means I only hold the Thing to True tentatively, but when I am tentatively holding something to be True, I can use it as evidence in assessing whether other Things should be probatively held to be True.


When I do stumble over a more authoritative and well-supported fact (or set of facts) that shows that a Thing I am probatively holding to be True is not True then I consider this Thing to be falsified so, figuratively, I take that Thing out of the “Set of Things Held to be True” and toss it into the “Set of Things Not Held to be True”.  This could be a gallery of contemporary paintings of Napoleon Bonaparte, which cumulatively demonstrate that he did not have a prehensile tail – or perhaps an autopsy report, or a DNA sample.


Similarly, when I notice that a Thing in my “Set of Things Held to be True” is inconsistent with the majority of other Things in my “Set of Things Held to be True”, then I will remove it.  I might already know that a friend of mine is related to Napoleon Bonaparte (through an obscure cousin of the latter).  I also know that humans and other species can’t interbreed and that humans don’t have prehensile tails.  The idea Napoleon Bonaparte had a prehensile tail is not consistent with these facts, all of which I hold to be True.


I try not to assimilate new Things that are inconsistent with Things that are currently held to be True, but it does happen.  Generally, I’ll first perform the step of working out which Things are more reliable: those I currently hold to be True or the new ones.  I’ll clean up my “Set of Things Held to be True” accordingly, and then assimilate the new Things as appropriate.


So, in short, while I don’t put effort into actively holding False Things to be False, I do put effort into an attempt to align my “Set of Things Held to be True” more closely with the “Set of True Things”.  The picture below illustrates:

  

 

During discussions, I might take a position that “Assertion X is False”.  I take this to be rather different to realigning my world view to create a new set, the “Set of Things Held to be False”.  Instead, it is just adding a new probatively True Thing to the “Set of Things Held to be True” – in this case the notion that “Assertion X is False”.

When pushed frequently on a Thing I do not hold to be True, I might get a stronger sense of where that Thing is objectively, but even if I suspect a Thing is probably in the “Set of False Things”, I still don’t realign my world view.


As an atheist, my world view can be illustrated as in the following picture which should make clear how I categorise the following:

  • the Christian god
  • the Muslim god
  • the Jewish god
  • the Hindu gods
  • the divinity of the Buddha
  • Santa
  • ghosts
  • aliens that visit Earth to abduct and probe random humans
  • the Easter Bunny
  • pixies
  • faeries
  • satanic or Brothers Grimm variety witches 



I don't waste effort actively holding Things to be False unnecessarily.

My view on magical beings is an example of this in action.  I’ve put in Ganesh as a god I don’t hold to be True, but Ganesh is only one of an estimated 330 million gods associated with Hinduism.  It’d be far too much effort to hold each of these gods to be False, along with all of the various types of magical creatures.

You could say that I am eucamenical when it comes to the treatment of gods and other magical beings.  Including your god and any other magical beings you might hold to be True.

In my world view, it seems rather bizarre that one should pick a single icon from the limited range I have illustrated in the “Set of False Things Not Held to be True” and place it into the “Set of True Things” on the basis of a book that is internally inconsistent or the testimony of enthusiastic people who are extremely vague about exactly what it is they believe.

Penultimately, please don't expect special treatment for your pet icon unless you can bring me some evidence that fits in with all the existing facts to hand. If you can bring such evidence, I promise you that I will take you seriously. If you can't, you should seriously consider giving up kidding yourself.

To wrap things up, here are my “presuppositions” together with my process for rationalising my “Set of Things Held to be True”:

  • True Things do not conflict with other True Things
  • False and Neutral Things will conflict with each other and with True Things
  • the number of True Things is vastly outnumbered by the combined number of False and Neutral Things
  • All Things in my “Set of Things Held to be True” are held to be True probatively
  • I will remove a Thing from my “Set of Things Held to be True” if I discover that it conflicts with the majority of Things in my “Set of Things Held to be True”
  • I will remove a Thing from my “Set of Things Held to be True” if it conflicts with a new Thing, where that new Thing is authoritative, well-supported and well correlated with the Things in my “Set of Things Held to be True”
  • I will add a Thing to my “Set of Things Held to be True” if it does not conflict with Things already in that set