Planting a Demigod

In this article the namesake of the WLC series, William Lane Craig, is only obliquely involved because he seems to have "borrowed" more than one idea from Alvin Plantinga without attribution.  However, the core concepts of the WLC series (the misuse of logic and conflation) are very much involved.  Plantinga’s speciality, however, is the misuse of probability.

In a debate with Lawrence Krauss, Craig indicates that he is setting out to show that the likelihood of god (given specific evidence and background evidence) is greater than 50%, implying that when any statement is more than 50% probable then it is somehow equivalent to a truth statement.  (Note that he immediately says that he will leave it up to the listener to determine the actual probability involved.)

More than 50% likelihood is sufficient to prove a thing to be true?  Really?

If Craig seriously believes the argument he is presenting here, an argument which is taken wholesale from Plantinga, we should all breathe a sigh of relief that the two of them are Christian apologists and not working in the area of medicine, or financial management, or road crossing.

Let’s look at how scientists manage likelihood.

Recently there was a flurry of excitement because physicists had announced that they had found evidence for the Higgs boson.  The excitement was not so much that they had something that they considered to be cast iron "end of argument" proof, but that they had a five sigma confidence level (equating to only slightly higher than a 99.9999% likelihood).  Earlier that month, July 2012, they had an even lower four sigma confidence level (equating to about a measly 99.9967% likelihood) which was naturally not enough to go public with, so they kept working releasing the five sigma data on 31 July.

A 50% likelihood is equivalent to a zero sigma confidence level.  In other words, no confidence whatsoever.

Let’s look at it another way.  Scientists, when reporting that a scientific claim is probably true, mean there is less than one chance in a million that the data they are reporting is bad.  Theists (of the Craig and Plantinga variety), when reporting that a religious claim is true, mean there is less than one chance in two (not two million, just two) that the data they are reporting is bad.

I’m not totally certain that Craig and Plantinga use this low standard in all parts of their lives but if they did, imagine having Dr Craig and Dr Plantinga as surgeons offering advice as to whether to go ahead with a procedure.

You: “Is it safe?”

Dr C and Dr P: “Yes, certainly!”

You: “So what are the chances that I might die from this procedure?”

Dr C and Dr P: “No more than 50%.”

You: “50%!!!!”

Dr C and Dr P: “Of course, either you’ll live or you’ll die, so 50-50.”

I strongly suggest seeking confirmation from your surgeon – or investment manager, or school crossing attendant – as to what qualifies as a certainty.  If they say “anything over a 50% likelihood”, get yourself a new surgeon – or investment manager.  If it’s a school crossing attendant, make sure that they are obliged to be first to walk out across the road after declaring that it is “likely” that it is clear of traffic.

That brings us nicely to evolution (via the natural selection of school crossing attendants).  Plantinga’s take on evolution will be the topic of a later article.

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For those of you wondering about the title, a demigod is a half-god.  If you only have a 50% confidence in your god …

In another sense, Jesus was a demigod too, if genetically related to Mary.  Although, the child of a demigod might be better described as a quadgod.

WLC5: Fine-Tuning Towards Ignorance

In earlier articles, I looked at William Lane Craig’s debating style (in Debatable Theism) and the logic in his “logical” arguments (in The Logic of an Apologist). In the latter, I said that I would address the content of Craig’s arguments, please check that article if you are not already familiar with the logical forms. This article addresses what I have numbered as Craig’s Fifth Argument. First a quick recap:


Craig’s Fifth Argument – Argument from Fine-Tuning for Intelligent Life
(argued during Craig-Smith – wording taken from Craig-Krauss)

1. The fine-tuning of the universe is due to either (sic) physical necessity, chance, or design.
2. It is not due to physical necessity or chance.
3. Therefore, it is due to design.

While analysing the logic, I split the argument into two stages because there is an implicit presumption regarding fine-tuning, in other words, Craig makes three assertions: that the universe is “fine-tuned”, that this fine-tuning has only three possible explanations and that two of those possible explanations are false.  By fine-tuning, Craig specifically means “fine-tuning for intelligent life” (as claimed in Craig-Krauss) and maybe even more specifically “fine-tuning for human beings” (consistent with standard theological anthropocentricism):

In recent decades scientists have been stunned by the discovery that the initial conditions of our universe were fine-tuned for the existence of intelligent agents with a precision and delicacy that literally defy human comprehension. This fine-tuning is of two sorts. First, when the laws of nature are given mathematical expression, you find appearing in them certain constants, like the gravitational constant. These constants are not determined by the laws of nature. Second, in addition to these constants there are certain arbitrary quantities which are just put in as initial conditions on which the laws of nature operate, for example, the amount of entropy in the very early universe.

Now all of these constants and quantities fall into an extraordinarily narrow range of life-permitting values. Were these constants or quantities to be altered by even a hair’s breadth, the life-permitting balance would be destroyed and life would not exist. We now know that life-prohibiting universes are incomprehensibly more probable than any life-permitting universe.

A leap in reasoning can be identified in Craig’s words here.  Even if one were to accept his argument, he doesn’t argue for “intelligent life”, he argues for “life”.  One could, however, accept that “life” is a necessary prerequisite for “intelligent life”.  Perhaps Craig should add to his argument:

Part 1

1. Premise – If life does not exist (not B), then intelligent life does not exist (not A)
2. Assertion – Intelligent life exists (A)
3. Conclusion – Therefore, life exists (B)

Part 2

1. Premise – If the universe is not fine-tuned for life (not C), then life cannot exist (not B)
2. Assertion – Life exists (B)
3. Conclusion – Therefore, the universe is fine-tuned for life (C)

Part 3

1. Premise – If the universe is fine-tuned for life (C1) then this fine-tuning is due to physical necessity, chance or design (D1)
2. Assertion – The universe is fine-tuned for life (C1)
3. Conclusion – Therefore, the fine-tuning of the universe is due to physical necessity, chance or design (D1)

Part 4

1. Premise – If the fine-tuning of the universe for life is due to physical necessity, chance or design (from D1) but is not due to physical necessity or chance (C2) then the fine-tuning of the universe for life is due to design (D2)
2. Assertion – The fine-tuning of the universe for life is not due to physical necessity or chance (C2)
3. Conclusion – Therefore, the fine-tuning of the universe is due to design (D2)

Some people will notice that this argument provides an explanation as to why the universe must necessarily be fine-tuned for life (A -> C, ie there is intelligent life, therefore the universe must be fine-tuned) and then goes on to assert that another explanation is the real one.  This is equivalent to the following argument:

Part 1

1. Premise – If “dormouse getting through a crevice”-ability does not exist (not B), then “fat dormouse getting through a crevice”-ability does not exist (not A)
2. Assertion – “Fat dormouse getting into a crevice”-ability exists (A)
3. Conclusion – Therefore, “dormouse getting into a crevice”-ability exists (B)

Part 2

1. Premise – If a barn wall crack is not fine-tuned for “dormouse getting through a crevice”-ability (not C), then “dormouse getting through a crevice”-ability cannot exist (not B)
2. Assertion – “Dormouse getting through a crevice”-ability exists (B)
3. Conclusion – Therefore, the barn wall crack is fine-tuned for “dormouse getting through a crevice”-ability (C)

Part 3                                                         

1. Premise – If a barn wall crack is fine-tuned for “dormouse getting through a crevice”-ability (C1) then this fine-tuning is due to something magical, something random or something physical (D1)
2. Assertion – The barn wall crack is fine-tuned for “dormouse getting through a crevice”-ability (C1)
3. Conclusion – Therefore, fine-tuning of the barn wall crack is due to something magical, something random or something physical (D1)

Part 4

1. Premise – If fine-tuning of the barn wall crack is due to something magical, something random or something physical (from D1) but is not due to something random or something physical (C2) then fine-tuning of the barn wall crack is due to something magical (D2)
2. Assertion – Fine-tuning of the barn wall crack is not due to something random or something physical (C2)
3. Conclusion – Therefore, fine-tuning of the barn wall crack is due to something magical (D2)

This might not be completely clear, especially for readers who are unfamiliar with fat dormice.

Part 1 is completely true, a fat dormouse is less likely to get through a crevice than a standard dormouse – but if a fat dormouse can get through, then some sort of dormouse can get through.

Part 2 is not necessarily true.  Barn walls are not “tuned”, let alone “finely-tuned” with dormouse entry requirements in mind.  Now we humans do make barn walls, this is true, but we don’t design the cracks with any intention at all – they just appear.  A fat dormouse, Chubby Loir, who passes through a barn wall crack to escape the attentions of Tiddles could pause a moment and ponder about the munificence of the being that had made that crack, perhaps reflecting on the fact that the crack appears to have been created just for him, indeed it appears "finely-tuned".

If the crack were smaller, then Chubby Loir would not have been able to squeeze his fat little dormouse body through. If the crack were larger, then Tiddles would have been able to squeeze through.  At this point, the rational among us realise that despite appearances, the crack was not designed to permit Chubby Loir's narrow escape (nor was it designed by an evil barn builder for the express purpose of frustrating Tiddles).  The existence of the crack was just a happy coincidence.  Note however, that if the crack did not exist, then Chubby Loir would not have been able to pause and consider, he’d be too busy pondering the whole being eaten experience.

The same applies to us: we could not be here, pondering how great it is that the universe seems to be finely-tuned for life, if it weren’t at least sufficiently well-tuned.  The fine-tuning of the universe (such as it is) is a prerequisite for us to be here pondering.  Even if there might be staggeringly huge odds against us being here (assessed well before life begins to develop), those odds no longer apply once we are here.  The probability of me having won the lottery, once I have won the lottery, is 100%.  The probability of Tiddles having being named Tiddles is 100%.  Similarly, the probability of the universe having been sufficiently well-tuned to produce me (given that am sitting here typing these words) is 100%.

Parts 3 and 4 are where Craig comes into his own, which is no surprise since together these constitute his explicit argument.  Let’s recap again, Craig’s argument here is (abbreviating it a little):

1. The fine-tuning of the universe is due to either something that isn’t design - or design
2. It is not due to something that isn’t design
3. Therefore, it is due to design

Honestly, that’s his argument.

He barely touches this argument in Craig-Smith and while he gives it a bit more attention in Craig-Krauss (see above), he doesn’t provide much in the way of support.  Oh well, I’ll just have to do his work for him (yet again).  Craig argues that there are two fine-tuning aspects: constants and initial conditions.

The first shall be last and the last shall be first, so let us look at initial conditions first.  Craig argues that “there are certain arbitrary quantities which are just put in as initial conditions on which the laws of nature operate, for example, the amount of entropy in the very early universe”.  This is just false.  The “quantities” aren’t arbitrary, they are the “quantities” that current theories suggest.  Since the question is not completely resolved yet, the quantities, arbitrary or otherwise, could be completely wrong.

The standard cosmological model could be wrong.  We keep finding that the models are not quite right, which is why things like dark matter, dark energy and dark flow keep getting added.  Pointing to a particular model that is in use today and saying “This might not be completely true” isn’t saying anything new.  We all know that current models are almost certainly wrong in some way.  Nobody really knows what the initial conditions were so Craig has nothing on which to base his argument.  It’s a complete non-starter (unlike the Big Bang).

And now … constants.  Craig picks on the gravitational constant.  I know, it's embarrassing.  This choice just highlights his ignorance.  The fine-tuning argument to the extent that it works, works with dimensionless fundamental constants, such as the fine structure constant α (note that this is linked explicitly to the elementary charge e, via α=e²/q_P², where q_P is the Planck charge).  It doesn't work with physical constants, all of which have dimensions, and which tend to resolve to a value of 1 when expressed in terms of natural units (for example Planck units).

In terms of Planck units, the gravitational constant is 1, the speed of light is 1, vacuum permeability is 1, vacuum permittivity is 1 and (perhaps unsurprisingly) Planck’s constant is 1.  The apparent values of these constants are merely the consequence of having unnatural units, they are the results of exchange mechanisms similar to the exchange rate between two currencies (see also Constants that Resolve to Unity).  So, perhaps we should just pretend that Craig didn't ignorantly choose the gravitational constant as an example.

Maybe we could grant him the fundamental dimensionless constant required by the standard cosmological model: the cosmological constant – which is currently accepted as the simplest solution to a problem with the model.  The problem here, again, is that this is a simple solution to the problem, but might not actually be the actual solution.  It's entirely possible that this constant will not be necessary once the theory is developed further, making it another bad choice.  We won't force poor choices on Craig.

Perhaps we could use one of the 23 fundamental dimensionless constants required by the complete standard model of particle physics.  However, yet again, if the standard model of particle physics is wrong (or rather incomplete) and replaced by string theory, or something else, then the requirement for some of the constants disappears and the remainder are merely consequences of something else.  These would also be poor choices.

Leaving aside theoretical physics and cosmology which could quite possibly be wrong and therefore can’t be used in a fine-tuning argument, or at least not with any validity, we have (at least) two constants remaining.

The best known dimensionless constant is the fine structure constant.  This is an exciting one for “fine-tunists” because firstly, it is close enough to 1/137 to get numerologists into a bit of a dither (Eddington argued that it was precisely 1/136, then precisely 1/137 once a better value of the constant was calculated), and secondly, if this value was different by 4%, then stellar fusion would not produce carbon.  The problems are as follows:

•  The fine structure constant might not actually be constant (I suspect that it probably is, because otherwise the elementary charge would vary as well).
•  The fine structure constant is close to 1/137, but not actually 1/137.
•  A permissible variation of 4% is not “fine-tuning”, it could be argued to be “coarse-tuning” but even that is dependent on the range of possible values available to you if you are constructing a universe from scratch, a range about which we have absolutely no information.

The fine structure constant is related to the electric charge carried by a proton, which is a fundamental physical constant – α = e² / (4πε₀ħc).  In natural units, the divisor term (4πε₀ħc) resolves to unity (that is a value of 1) as it consists of three elements that resolve to unity: 4πε₀, ħ and c.  In other words, the fine structure constant is just a reflection of how much charge a electron/proton can carry (e).   Sure, there are consequences if it were different, but it’s just the nature of an electron and a proton that they carry that much charge.

Even if Craig’s arguments worked and he could support the idea that the universe looks like it could, possibly, have been designed, he still has failed to show why chance and physical necessity aren’t options.  His assertion is completely unsupported and should be watered down accordingly.

At bottom, Craig has here another variation of the Cosmological Argument from “God Did It”, which is fundamentally a variation of the Cosmological Argument from First Cause, both of which we can safely dismiss.  The fine-tuning argument certainly sounds more impressive and dimensionless constants are sufficiently poorly understood to provide enough space to hide a small to medium god, but the lack of knowledge and understanding is far better addressed by saying “We simply don’t know why certain characteristics of the universe are just the way they are, but that they are the way they are is obviously the case because … well, they are the way they are!”

I almost forgot to reword Craig’s argument!

1. The coarse-tuning of the universe is due to either (sic) physical necessity, chance, or design, or something that we haven’t thought about yet.
2. It might not be due to physical necessity or chance.
3. Therefore, coarse-tuning of the universe might be due to design, or something that we haven’t thought about yet – or, alternatively, it might be due to physical necessity or chance.

The upshot of this seems to be that via Craig’s argument we arrive at a point where we know less than when we started.

WLC2: Cosmological Argument ("God Did It") - FAIL

In earlier articles, I looked at William Lane Craig’s debating style (in Debatable Theism) and the logic in his “logical” arguments (in The Logic of an Apologist).  In the latter, I said that I would address the content of Craig’s arguments, please check that article if you are not already familiar with the logical forms.  This article addresses what I have numbered as Craig’s Second Argument – note that in presenting this argument Craig did not claim the he was proving the Christian God (but it is clearly something compatible).  First a quick recap:

Craig's Second Argument – Cosmological Argument from First Cause
(argued during Craig-Law – wording taken from Craig-Krauss)

1.    Everything that begins to exist has a cause.

2.    The universe began to exist.

3.    Therefore, the universe has a cause.

This is a simple syllogism.

1.    Major Premise – Everything that begins to exist (All M) has a cause (P).

2.    Minor Premise – The universe (S) falls into the category of “Everything that begins to exist” (All M).

3.    Conclusion – Therefore, the universe (S) has a cause (P).

Note that this is not the entirety of Craig’s argument, since he doesn’t tend to stop with “a cause” but rather extends it out to an “uncaused, changeless, timeless, and immaterial being which created the universe”.  This is Craig’s argument in his words:

Now from the very nature of the case, this cause must be an uncaused, changeless, timeless, and immaterial being which created the universe. It must be uncaused because we’ve seen that there cannot be an infinite regress of causes. It must be timeless and therefore changeless, at least without the universe, because it created time. Because it also created space, it must transcend space as well and therefore be immaterial, not physical.

Now there are only two possible candidates that could fit such a description: either an abstract object, like a number, or an unembodied mind or consciousness. But abstract objects don’t stand in causal relations. The number seven, for example, can’t cause anything! Therefore, it follows that the transcendent cause of the universe is an unembodied mind. And thus we are brought, not merely to an Uncaused Cause of the universe, but to its Personal Creator.

Here is my attempt to eke out the logic involved:

1.     Premise 1 – If something created the universe (A) then whatever created the universe must have created time and space (B).

2.     Premise 2 – If something created time and space (B) then that something must have existed before the existence of time (C1) and outside space (C2).

3.     Premise 3– If anything existed before the existence of time (C1) then that thing must be timeless (D).

4.     Premise 4 – If something is timeless (D) then it must be changeless as well as timeless (E)

5.     Premise 5 – If something is outside space (C2) then it must be immaterial (F).

6.     Premise 6 – If something is immaterial (F) then it must be an abstract object (G1) or an unembodied mind or consciousness (G2).

7.     Premise 7 – If something is able to create something (a generalisation of A) then that something cannot be an abstract object (not G1).

8.     Assertion 1 – Something created the universe (A).

9.     Conclusion 1 – Therefore, the something that created the universe is changeless as well as timeless (E), immaterial (F) and an unembodied mind or consciousness (G2).

10. Premise 8 – If there cannot be an infinite regress of causes (X) then there must be an initial uncaused cause (Y).

11. Assertion 2 – There cannot be an infinite regress of causes (Z).

12. Conclusion 2 – Therefore, there must be an initial uncaused cause (Y).

13. Bonus Conclusion – Therefore, the uncaused, changeless, timeless, immaterial and unembodied mind or consciousness (from Conclusion 1 and Conclusion 2) is a Personal Creator (Bonus).

This might not be accurate, because I cannot claim to know the mind of William Lane Craig.  Premise 6 is a problem, but we have seen it before (addressed in the article about the Cosmological Argument from Contingency).  Assertion 1 is a problem too, since it begs the question somewhat but it's really just part of the same problem exhibited in Premise 6 (the cause of the universe must be a thing, or a being, or a mind).

(Also, please note carefully that the Bonus Conclusion is not a logically valid conclusion since there are no premises which mention a Personal Creator from which the statement can be concluded.)

Fundamentally, this whole argument is just the Cosmological Argument from Contingency reworded for a specific purpose:

1.    Everything that exists has an explanation.

2.    The universe exists.

3.    Therefore, the universe has an explanation.

and for completeness, here is the Contingency argument as a First Cause argument

1.    Everything that begins to exist has a cause.

2.    If the universe has a cause, that cause has certain characteristics.

3.    The universe exists.

4.    Therefore, the cause of the universe has certain characteristics.

So why have this separate argument, which is basically the same argument?

One reason is that Craig is trying to provide a cumulative argument for God.   Each argument, he thinks, provides an extra bit of support to his case.  So two arguments which are really the same argument worded differently appears like twice as much support.  Well, yes, but two times zero support remains zero support.

Another reason is that the cause of the universe remains firmly behind the curtain.  There is no further you can push a God of the Gaps argument.

But the actual reason for this rewording of the argument, from what I can determine, is that Craig hopes to circumvent the anthropic principle.  While this principle can be easily misunderstood, it simply points out that if the universe wasn't the way it is, then we'd not be here pondering why it is the way it is.  (We'd either be here wondering why it is the way it is, where the "way it is" would be different from the way it is, or we'd not be here at all.)  No matter how unlikely it might be that we are here, we are.  The universe is required for us to be here to be pondering at all.  Now, for the universe to be here, it is (as far as we can tell) also required to have had a beginning.

This is where Craig, yet again, uses conflation to confuse and distract. There is a logical, philosophical argument regarding requirement.  In this argument there is a logical requirement for the universe to exist so that we can be here to ponder why the universe exists and a philosophical requirement for the universe to have some sort of beginning at some time in the past in order to exist now.  Then there is a scientific, physics requirement for all effects to have a cause (or, more strictly, effects are required to have a nexus of causes and necessary conditions, but the shorthand "cause" is often used).

So, Craig uses these two ambiguities - is the requirement a philosophical requirement or a physics requirement and what is meant by "cause"?  Physics does not necessarily preclude a "causeless" universe - in so much as there may not be a single pre-existing point of causation, but rather only a cause or nexus of causes and necessary conditions which could only be identified retrospectively (if at all).  A scientifically minded person will agree, therefore, with the statement "Everything that begins to exist has a cause" within very narrow parameters.  What they will not agree with is "Everything that begins to exist must necessarily have a single point of consciously directed causation".

We need to reword the argument again to make it clear:

1.    Everything that begins to exist does so due to an event triggered by a nexus of causes and/or retrospectively necessary conditions.

2.    The universe began to exist.

3.    Therefore, the event which caused the beginning of the universe was triggered by a nexus of causes and/or retrospectively necessary conditions.

4.    (Bonus Conclusion) Therefore, God did it. 

WLC1: Cosmological Argument (Contingency) - FAIL

In earlier articles, I looked at William Lane Craig’s debating style (in Debatable Theism) and the logic in his “logical” arguments (in The Logic of an Apologist).  In the latter, I said that I would address the content of Craig’s arguments, please check that article if you are not already familiar with the logical forms.  This article addresses what I have numbered as Craig’s First Argument – note that in presenting this argument Craig did not specify with respect to which God was being posited, but he certainly spoke about the being as “God”, not “a God”, so one can reasonably presume that he was talking about the God he believes in.  First a quick recap:

Craig’s First Argument – Cosmological Argument from Contingency
(argued inductively, then presented deductively during Craig-Krauss)

1. Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence (either in its own nature or in an external cause).
2. If the universe has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is God.
3. The universe exists.
4. Therefore, the explanation of the universe is God.

I had to reword this argument to get it into a logical format, as mentioned elsewhere I don’t think I’ve damaged the argument by doing so, but if I did, let me know.  I don’t think I strengthened it by rewording either, but if I did then I am happy to let that pass.  Craig’s argument is, logically:

Part 1

1. Major Premise – Everything that exists (All M) has an explanation of its existence (P).
2. Minor Premise – The universe (S) falls into the category of “Everything that exists” (All M).
3. Conclusion – The universe (S) has an explanation of its existence (P).

Part 2

1. Premise – If the universe has an explanation of its existence (A) then that explanation is God (B).
2. Assertion – The universe has an explanation of its existence (A from the introductory syllogism).
3. Conclusion – Therefore, the explanation for the existence of the universe is God (B).

At this point, all that the argument can logically conclude (as much as it does) is that the explanation for the existence of the universe is God – if one accepts the premises and the assertion.  However, there is an additional argument that is only implied (shown as a modus ponens):

Part 3

1. Premise – If an explanation is strong (A2) then any agents called upon in that explanation must exist (B2).
2. Assertion – The explanation for the existence of the universe is strong (A2).
3. Conclusion – Therefore, the agent called upon in that explanation, namely God, must exist (B2).

While I used the term “strong” with respect to an explanation, characterisation of the argument can be “sufficient”, “necessary”, “comprehensive” or whatever Craig likes.  It’s up to him to present his argument clearly, if he wants us to know what he means.

--------------------------------

This argument from contingency, while Craig seems to like it, is one of his lighter arguments.  In part 1, he conflates “cause” with “explanation” which is a common failure on the part of theists.  The reason for this is that the question “why?” can be answered with a cause or an explanation.  For example:

Why are the Himalayas so high?

Because since 70 million years ago, the Indian subcontinent has been colliding into the Asian continent, causing ancient limestone seabed to thrust upwards.

Or

Why are the Himalayas so high?

Because it’s the abode of Shiva, Shiva is an important god who needs an important place to live.

The latter is an explanation, while the former is a description of the cause.  The cause, irrespective of how you describe it won’t change.  Explanations are legion (it could have been planted by Buddha, God might have built it to kill mountaineers, aliens might have built it to hide their secret observation facility, proto-Masons might have built it while they were waiting for average humans to work out that they want to build cathedrals, Ra formed it to embarrass the puny Egyptians with their relatively minuscule pyramids, etc etc).  Most of the explanations are false, the cause is true irrespective of whether we know what it is or not.

Part 1 needs to be reworded thus:

1. Major Premise – Everything that exists (All M) has a cause of its existence (P).
2. Minor Premise – The universe (S) falls into the category of “Everything that exists” (All M).
3. Conclusion – The universe (S) has a cause of its existence (P).

Remember we have clarified that "cause" and "explanation" are not the same thing.  Plenty of things happen for which we have no explanation, but we can be quite certain that they had causes.

Purely by fixing part 1 of Craig's argument, the argument as a whole fails, since part 2 no longer follows (we have shown the necessity of a cause, but not an explanation).  But let’s have a look at it anyway.

Part 2 has a major stumbling block in the Premise (which is Craig's line 2):

 Premise – If the universe has an explanation of its existence (A) then that explanation is God (B).

This is a rather bold statement which doesn't seem to have sufficient support.  Disproving it is reasonably easy using the Black Swan approach.  Until a Black Swan was seen in Western Australia in 1697, the following premise was valid, or "apparently true":

  Premise – If a bird is a swan (A) then that bird is white (B).

Proving it invalid required precisely one example of a swan which is not white.  This is because the "white swan" premise is implicitly equivalent to an absolute assertion like "All swans are white", it can be disproved by one example, because if "Not all swans are white" is true, then the assertion "All swans are white" is false.  (Equally, the assertion "The only colour that swans have is white" can be shown to be false by the presentation of a single non-white swan.)  To make a swan premise valid, we need to reword: 

Premise – If a bird is a swan (A) then that bird might be white (B).

To prove Craig's premise to be invalid then, we must first look closely at its nature - does it contain an absolute statement?

Well, yes, it does.  Craig hasn't stated it explicitly, but what he means is:

 Premise – If the universe has an explanation for its existence (A) then the only rational explanation can be God (B).

The premise rests on the assertion that there is only one rational explanation for the existence of the universe. We differ on the interpretation of rationality, but there are plenty of explanations out there for the beginning of the universe. Remember that there is only one explanation required, and there is no requirement for Craig to understand the explanation.  Craig's premise can be shown to be invalid here - in one of the first links that Google gave me. Alternatively, we have other possible mythological explanations: Ra creating everything with his seed, or Nyx laying a golden egg out of which everything hatched, or a Japanese germ, and so on. Of course the creation myths don't seem overly rational, but then again, the Biblical account is clearly wrong (compare the account of Adam and Eve in the first two books of Genesis).

But Craig isn't a Fundamentalist or a literalist. He doesn't believe that Genesis provides an accurate account of creation. So, the literal lack of rationality in the Ra story, and the Nyx story, and the Japanese germ story doesn't prevent them from being equally valid explanations for the universe. Therefore, rewording accordingly:

Premise – If the universe has an explanation for its existence (A) then the rational explanation might be God (B).

Or, it might not.  

Keen eyed readers will have noted that I've changed "explanation of its existence" to "explanation for its existence".  It's a minor thing, but possibly part of Craig's effort to muddy the water.  An explanation of the universe's existence would include descriptions of general relativity, particle physics and so on.  It would be about how the universe works.  An explanation for the universe's existence is more about how the universe came about.  I suspect that Craig really means "for" rather than "of".  If he truly is arguing that physics and chemistry and astronomy and biology, etc etc, are not explanations of the universe, and should be replaced by a one word answer, then he's a liar (he denies being a Young Earth creationist and argues that he is pro-science and pro-reason).  I don't think that Craig is a liar in this sense.

So we've now got:

Part 1

1. Major Premise – Everything that exists (All M) has a cause of its existence (P).
2. Minor Premise – The universe (S) falls into the category of “Everything that exists” (All M).
3. Conclusion – The universe (S) has a cause of its existence (P).

Part 2

1.  If the universe has an explanation for its existence (A) then the rational explanation might be God (B).
2. Assertion – The universe has a large number of explanations for its existence, both mythological and scientific (A).
3. Conclusion – Therefore, the explanation for the existence for the universe might be God or any of the multitude of other explanations, mythological and scientific or something we haven't thought of yet (B). 
4. Corollary – Therefore, we just don't know (C).

Finally we turn to part 3, looking at the Premise :

Premise – If an explanation is strong (A2) then any agents called upon in that explanation must exist (B2).

Well, in context this premise fails because there is insufficient support for the contention that the argument is strong (or whatever adjective Craig wishes to apply) in part because this part of the argument was not stated explicitly.  Even so, the premise itself is faulty.  Luminiferous aether is an agent in what was a strong explanation for transmission of light, some people still believe that a form of it exists - but the point is that in Einstein's relativity, it is shown that luminiferous aether is unnecessary.

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Am I being unfair?  Craig surely provided some evidence to support the claims that I have so quickly dismissed, right?  OK, let's look at the evidence he provided during the Craig-Krauss argument.

Now experience teaches that everything that exists has an explanation of its existence: either in its own nature, if it exists necessarily, or in an external cause, if it exists contingently. So what about the universe, where by “the universe” I mean all of spacetime reality, not just our observable portion of it? What is the explanation of its existence? Well, since the universe is contingent in its existence, the explanation of the universe must be found in an external cause which exists beyond time and space by a necessity of its own nature.

Now what could that be? There are only two kinds of things that could fit that description: either abstract objects, like numbers, or God. But abstract objects don’t stand in causal relations. The number 7, for example, has no effect upon anything. Therefore, it follows that the most plausible explanation of the universe is God. Hence, the existence of contingent beings makes God’s existence more probable than it would have been without them.

Craig's evidence that the explanation of the universe must be God is that he cannot think of any other "external cause which exists beyond time and space by a necessity of its own nature" other than God, or numbers - which is an appeal to ignorance. Fallacies are not evidence, therefore no evidence provided.

Craig doesn't really provide any evidence that the God explanation is rational and/or strong other than the contingent one - in that by providing the argument, Craig implies that by necessity he is stating that the argument is rational and strong, or rather that he thinks that the argument is rational and strong.

Craig also fails to provide any evidence that agents called upon in strong explanations must exist. To be honest I didn't expect to find any since he didn't explicitly make this argument.

If you think he did provide anything closely resembling "evidence" rather than just rhetoric and distraction, please let me know.

The Logic of an Apologist

I’ve recently listened to a quite a few debates between William Lane Craig and various notables (linked below). I’ve done this in order to understand a comment made by Sam Harris along the lines that Craig has put the fear of god into various atheists. Listening to multiple debates by any single person in a short period of time is painful, but it does allow one to identify some of the tricks that are used by that person and also the typical errors committed by opponents.

In my first article, I looked at the argument used by Craig – the argument from morality – that bothers me most, because I have an abiding interest in Ethics as a philosophical subject. In my second, I focussed more on Craig’s debating style.

What I want to do now is to look more closely at the logic of Craig’s arguments. I may not be the first person to do so and hopefully will not be the last, but I am sincerely hoping that the hours spent listening to William Lane Craig wax lyrical can be of some use to someone. I don't intend to comment in this article on the content of Craig's arguments or on what I think he tries to do with those arguments, I'll just address the logic. I intend to go through my objections to the content and so on in a later article.

So, let's do this.

There are six basic arguments that Craig uses (and a seventh which he doesn't usually trot out, but has defended as a prima facie argument to support his case – note that this might be yet another example of Craig’s conflations, since the term prima facie has different meanings depending on how it is used, in a legal argument it is indicative of strength, in a debate it just refers to the planks of an argument which under the rules of debating cannot be expanded upon once established and in a philosophical argument it is indicative of weakness). These are the arguments:

Argument 1 – Cosmological Argument from Contingency
(argued inductively, then presented deductively during Craig-Krauss)

1.    Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence (either in its own nature or in an external cause).

2.    If the universe has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is God.

3.    The universe exists.

4.    Therefore, the explanation of the universe is God.

Argument 2 – Cosmological Argument from First Cause
(argued during Craig-Law – wording taken from Craig-Krauss)

1.    Everything that begins to exist has a cause.

2.    The universe began to exist.

3.    Therefore, the universe has a cause.

Argument 3 – Argument from Morality
(argued during Craig-Law – strangely enough not in Craig-Harris)

1.    If God did not exist, objective moral values and duties would not exist.

2.    Objective moral values and duties do exist.

3.    Therefore, God exists. 

Argument 4 – Argument from Fine-Tuning for Intelligent Life
(argued during Craig-Smith – wording taken from Craig-Krauss)

1.    The fine-tuning of the universe is due to either (sic) physical necessity, chance, or design.

2.    It is not due to physical necessity or chance.

3.    Therefore, it is due to design.

Argument 5 – Argument from Resurrection
(a form was argued during Craig-Ehrman – wording taken from Craig-Krauss)

1.     There are three established facts about Jesus: his empty tomb, his post-mortem appearances, and the origin of the disciples’ belief in his resurrection.

2.    The hypothesis “God raised Jesus from the dead” is the best explanation of these facts.

3.    The hypothesis “God raised Jesus from the dead” entails that God exists.

4.    Therefore, God exists.

Argument 6 – Argument from Absurdity
(from one of Craig’s books – the specific chapter is here)

1.    If God does not exist, then life is futile.

2.    If the God of the Bible does exist, then life is meaningful.

3.    We may only live happily and consistently if life if meaningful.

4.    If the evidence for these two options (non-existence and existence of God) were absolutely equal, a rational person ought to choose biblical Christianity.

Argument 7 – Ontological Argument
(defended during a Book Fair starting at 07:57 and on Craig's website)

1.     It is possible that a maximally great being exists.

2.    If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.

3.    If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

4.    If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.

5.    If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.

6.    Therefore, a maximally great being exists.

Each of these arguments appears logically correct, with the exception of Argument 6. Note that this does not mean they are in any way related to truth, just that they consist of strings of syllogisms to form a polysyllogism (occasionally including a specific "rule of inference" or "transformation rule", known as a modus ponens).  

A syllogism takes the form: 

1.    Major Premise – All M are P

2.    Minor Premise – All S are M (or S falls into the category of “All M”)

3.    Conclusion – All S are P (or S is P)

An example is: 

1.    Major Premise – All standard cats are three-legged.

2.    Minor Premise – Tiddles is a standard cat.

3.    Conclusion – Tiddles is three-legged.

A modus ponens takes the form: 

1.    Premise – If A then B

2.    Assertion – A

3.    Conclusion – B

An example is: 

1.    Premise – If fish A is a standard cat, then fish A has three legs.

2.    Assertion – The fish Tiddles is a standard cat.

3.    Conclusion – The fish Tiddles has three legs.

A polysyllogism may take the form: 

1.    Premise 1 – If A then B

2.    Premise 2 – If B then C

3.    Assertion – A

4.    Conclusion – C

An example is: 

1.    Premise 1 – If a pet fish is called “Tiddles”, then that pet fish must be a standard cat.

2.    Premise 2 – If fish A is a standard cat, then fish A has three legs.

3.    Assertion – There is a pet fish called “Tiddles”.

4.    Conclusion – The pet fish called "Tiddles" has three legs.

Note that you can keep adding premises, so long as you link the “then” to the following “if”, and you maintain consistency of terms throughout. Note also that it is not generally accepted that standard cats have three legs, nor that cats are fish, nor that there are restrictions regarding the naming of pets (be they fish or otherwise). Logic works perfectly well with untrue premises, even with ridiculous premises. 

Now I will try to present Craig’s arguments in a more formal fashion (although not strictly formal). 

Argument 1 (which is actually three arguments)

I’ve had to reword this argument to get it into a logical format. I don’t think I’ve damaged the argument by doing so, but I’m open to constructive criticism. As stated the argument consists of a syllogism followed by a modus ponens. 

Part 1

1.    Major Premise – Everything that exists (All M) has an explanation of its existence (P).

2.    Minor Premise – The universe (S) falls into the category of “Everything that exists” (All M).

3.    Conclusion – The universe (S) has an explanation of its existence (P).

Part 2

1.    Premise – If the universe has an explanation of its existence (A) then that explanation is God (B).

2.    Assertion – The universe has an explanation of its existence (A from Part 1).

3.    Conclusion – Therefore, the explanation for the existence of the universe is God (B).

At this point, all that the argument can logically conclude (as much as it does) is that the explanation for the existence of the universe is God – if one accepts the premises and the assertion. However, there is an additional argument that is only implied (shown as a modus ponens): 

Part 3 

1.    Premise – If an explanation is strong (A2) then any agents called upon in that explanation must exist (B2).

2.    Assertion – The explanation for the existence of the universe is strong (A2).

3.    Conclusion – Therefore, the agent called upon in that explanation, namely God, must exist (B2).

Now I use the term “strong” with respect to an argument. This could be “sufficient”, “necessary”, “comprehensive” or whatever Craig likes. He’d have to argue this explicitly for us to know what he means.

(Argument addressed in detail here)

Argument 2 

This is a simple syllogism. 

1.    Major Premise – Everything that begins to exist (All M) has a cause (P).

2.    Minor Premise – The universe (S) falls into the category of “Everything that begins exist” (All M).

3.    Conclusion – Therefore, the universe (S) has a cause (P).

Note that this is not the entirety of Craig’s argument, since he doesn’t tend to stop with “a cause” but rather extends it out to an “uncaused, changeless, timeless, and immaterial being which created the universe”. This is Craig’s argument – it hurts my brain to try to put it into logical form, and quite possibly the argument will seem ridiculous unless hidden behind a “formal logic” smokescreen:

Now from the very nature of the case, this cause must be an uncaused, changeless, timeless, and immaterial being which created the universe. It must be uncaused because we’ve seen that there cannot be an infinite regress of causes. It must be timeless and therefore changeless, at least without the universe, because it created time. Because it also created space, it must transcend space as well and therefore be immaterial, not physical. Now there are only two possible candidates that could fit such a description: either an abstract object, like a number, or an unembodied mind or consciousness. But abstract objects don’t stand in causal relations. The number seven, for example, can’t cause anything! Therefore, it follows that the transcendent cause of the universe is an unembodied mind. And thus we are brought, not merely to an Uncaused Cause of the universe, but to its Personal Creator. 

Here goes:

1.    Premise 1 – If something created the universe (A) then whatever created the universe must have created time and space (B).

2.    Premise 2 – If something created time and space (B) then that something must have existed before the existence of time (C1) and outside space (C2).

3.    Premise 3– If anything existed before the existence of time (C1) then that thing must be timeless (D).

4.    Premise 4 – If something is timeless (D) then it must be changeless as well as timeless (E).

5.    Premise 5 – If something is outside space (C2) then it must be immaterial (F).

6.    Premise 6 – If something is immaterial (F) then it must be an abstract object (G1) or an unembodied mind or consciousness (G2).

7.    Premise 7 – If something is able to create something (a generalisation of A) then that something cannot be an abstract object (not G1).

8.    Assertion 1 – Something created the universe (A).

9.    Conclusion 1 – Therefore, the something that created the universe is changeless as well as timeless (E), immaterial (F) and an unembodied mind or consciousness (G2).

10.                  Premise 8 – If there cannot be an infinite regress of causes (X) then there must be an initial uncaused cause (Y).

11.                  Assertion 2 – There cannot be an infinite regress of causes (Z).

12.                  Conclusion 2 – Therefore, there must be an initial uncaused cause (Y).

13.                  Bonus Conclusion – Therefore, the uncaused, changeless, timeless, immaterial and unembodied mind or consciousness is a Personal Creator.

Please note that the Bonus Conclusion is not a logically valid conclusion since there are no premises which mention a Personal Creator from which the statement can be concluded. Craig also inserts "being" in as a Bonus Conclusion from time to time.

(Argument addressed in detail here)

Argument 3 

This appears to be a simple syllogism, note the use of "not": 

1.    Major Premise – If God does not exist (not A) then objective moral values and duties do not exist (not B).

2.    Minor Premise – Objective moral values and duties do exist (B).

3.    Conclusion – Therefore, God exists (A).

OK, hopefully you noticed the use of "not". Perhaps you didn't notice that this is not a normal syllogism. Look at the A and B and you might notice that they not where they usually are. This is isn't really a problem, because this is what the nots do - in other words, we could rewrite this argument like this:

1.    Major Premise – If objective moral values and duties exist (A) then God exists (B).

2.    Minor Premise – Objective moral values and duties do exist (A).

3.    Conclusion – Therefore, God exists (B).

This is not a similar argument - it is precisely the same argument, worded differently. The question is, why word it so oddly in the first place? Unless of course one wanted to deceive. How would you deceive? Well, if someone thought that Craig was arguing this:

1.    Major Premise – If God exists (A) then objective moral values and duties exist (B).

2.    Minor Premise – Objective moral values and duties exist (B).

3.    Conclusion – Therefore, God exists (A).

This is akin to:

1.    Major Premise – If Trevor is a vampire (A) then Trevor will sleep during the day (B).

2.    Minor Premise – Trevor sleeps during the day (B).

3.    Conclusion – Therefore, Trevor is a vampire (A).

Thus those on the night shift get shafted, yet again. This is clearly a fallacy (irrespective of whether Trevor is a vampire) because the conclusion does not follow from the premises. Craig's framing of the argument this way has the reader feeling that it's wrong somehow, but unsure of how, where or why. The fact is, the argument is a null argument for God in that even if the opponent argues successfully for the non-existence of moral values and duties, that won't touch Craig's God since, in the strict framing of the argument, the existence of God isn't contingent on the existence of moral values and duties - only the reverse. The argument is framed purely to trick the opponent into conceding what looks like an acceptable premise (like the Major Premise in the fallacious version), then bludgeoning them into accepting at least a single objective moral value or duty to obtain a technical victory.

(Argument addressed in detail here)

Argument 4 (in two parts)

Again I had to reword the argument slightly to present it in logical form. Again, this does nothing to the logic of the argument itself, which contains two concatenated modus ponens. 

Part 1

1.    Premise – If the universe is fine-tuned (A1) then this fine-tuning is due to physical necessity, chance or design (B1).

2.    Assertion – The universe is fine-tuned (A1).

3.    Conclusion – Therefore, the fine-tuning of the universe is due to physical necessity, chance or design (B1).

Part 2 

1.    Premise – If the fine-tuning of the universe is due to physical necessity, chance or design (from B1) but is not due to physical necessity or chance (A2) then the fine-tuning of the universe is due to design (B2).

2.    Assertion – The fine-tuning of the universe is not due to physical necessity or chance (A2).

3.    Conclusion – Therefore, the fine-tuning of the universe is due to design (B2).

This is the actual argument and, yes, it seems ridiculous. If it didn’t seem ridiculous, then you didn’t read it properly. Oh, alright, he does claim to have supporting arguments for why fine-tuning is not due to physical necessity or chance. I'll look at those in a later article.

(Argument addressed in detail here) 

Argument 5 (actually three arguments)

This is a mind bending argument, involving a syllogism followed by a modus ponens. 

Part 1 

1.    Major Premise – There is a set of special facts (All M) for which the hypothesis “God raised Jesus from the dead” is the best explanation (P)

2.    Minor Premise – There are three established facts about Jesus: his empty tomb, his post-mortem appearances, and the origin of the disciples’ belief in his resurrection (S) which fall into the category of special facts (M).

3.    Conclusion – The three established facts about Jesus (S) have the hypothesis “God raised Jesus from the dead” as the best explanation (P).

Part 2 

1.    Premise – The hypothesis “X raised someone from the dead” is the best explanation for anything (A, from P) then X exists (B).

2.    Assertion – The hypothesis “God raised Jesus from the dead” is the best explanation for the three established facts about Jesus (A).

3.    Conclusion – Therefore, God exists (B).

There’s an assumption here as well (shown as a modus ponens): 

1.    Premise – If an explanation is the best explanation one currently has to hand (A2) then that argument is true (B2).

2.    Assertion – The hypothesis “God raised Jesus from the dead” is the best explanation one currently has to hand (A2).

3.    Conclusion – Therefore, the hypothesis “God raised Jesus from the dead” is true (B2).

(Argument addressed in detail here)

Argument 6

This one is simply not logical. I’ve tried though:

1.    Sort of Major Premise 1 – The words “does exist” (All M) are interchangeable with the words “is believed in by a person” (P).

2.    Premise 2 – If God does not exist (not A), then life is futile in general (not B).

3.    Corollary 1 – If God is not believed in by a person (from not A1 and P), then life for that person is futile (not B1).

4.    Premise 3 – If life for a person is futile (not B1) then that person cannot live happily and consistently (not C).

5.    Premise 4 – If the God of the Bible exists (A), then life is meaningful in general (B).

6.    Corollary 2 – If the God of the Bible is believed in by a person (A1 from A and P), then that person may live happily and consistently (B1).

7.    Premise 5 – If life is meaningful for a person (B1) then that person will live happily and consistently (C).

8.    Premise 6 – If a person chooses to (D) they can believe what they want to (E).

9.    Premise 7 – If a person is rational (F), they will choose to live happily and consistently (G).

10.                  Random Assertion – People are more interested in living happily through belief than dealing with what is true (H, I think).

11.                  Premise 8 – If the evidence for these two options (non-existence and existence of God) were absolutely equal (I), a rational person ought to choose biblical Christianity (J).

12.                  Assertion – The evidence for these two options (non-existence and existence of God) were absolutely equal, or possibly (in the mind of William Lane Craig) leaning towards Biblical Christianity (I)

13.                  Conclusion – A rational person ought to choose Biblical Christianity (J).

 Yeah, I know. It’s a mess.

(Argument addressed in detail here) 

Argument 7 

This is a straightforward polysyllogism, possibly because it is derived from Anselm’s ontological argument (via Plantinga). 

1.    Premise 1 - If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.

2.    Premise 2 - If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

3.    Premise 3 - If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.

4.    Premise 4 - If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.

5.    Assertion – It is possible that a maximally great being exists.

6.    Conclusion – Therefore, a maximally great being exists.

This was the easiest one to phrase, other than Argument 3. Note that because I put the Assertion just before the Conclusion, the argument seems slightly more ridiculous than otherwise, but it shouldn't make any difference where the Assertion goes so long as you see it before the Conclusion, right? I mean, you don't put the Assertion up the front then have a string of premises simply to hide the fact that the whole argument is clearly wrong, right?

(Argument addressed in detail here)

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Check the works of the other debaters here:

Stephen Law

Lawrence Krauss

 Lewis Wolpert

Quentin Smith

Sam Harris

and to be scrupulously fair, the New Testament scholar (who believes that Jesus exists, that the New Testament stories about him were based in reality to some extent and that he was crucified, but that he was not divine and didn't get resurrected)

Bart Erhman