The
following is adapted from comments made on Josh the Searcher’s blog, in response to articles touching on the abortion issue.
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Abortion
is a difficult topic. It is much
polarised, in part because it evokes strong emotional responses, in part
because many of those arguing against the pro-choice stance do so because of
theological notions and in part because there is still some confusion and
uncertainty as to the precise meaning of “human”.
I
should clarify up-front that while I am intellectually pro-choice, I would not
be happy with having a (potential) child of my own aborted. You could say that I am pro-choice in
principle but pro-life in practice.
On
a practical level, there is something that I find particularly unconvincing in
the abortion debate, that being the idea that there is any benefit to be gained
by involving yourself, and your personal ideology, in another person’s decision
regarding such any issue as emotive as abortion. I doubt that many people faced with the
heart-wrenching decision to terminate a pregnancy take that decision lightly. Those who do take such a decision lightly are
highly unlikely to care one iota what you, or anybody else thinks about it. They are also unlikely to be suitable parents
to an unwanted child.
For
me the important discussion when it comes to abortion revolves around three
aspects:
·
is
it ever ok to kill a living thing, be it “human”, “potential human” or any
other living thing?
·
when
does transition between “potential human” and “human” take place?
·
how
should we go about developing social policy on an issue like this?
Is
it ever ok to kill a living thing?
This
is a tricky ethical question. The
obvious answer is “yes”, because if we never kill a living thing then we will
die, in effect killing ourselves. Our
bodies are constantly killing bacteria, with antibacterial agents in saliva and white blood cells
(these also destroy fungi, parasites, viruses, tumours and tiny submarines in
science fiction movies).
As
we move up in physical scale, begin to consider species that are more like
humans and apply “cuteness” as a factor, the answer becomes less obvious. It’s apparently less ok to kill a cute kitten
than it is to kill a rat: the idea that a kitten drowned in the recent flood in
New York is more affecting than the idea that a young rat died. There’s a good reason that the World Wildlife Fund
has a panda as its emblem instead of, say, a cockroach. We’re happy to eat dolphin if it’s a type of
fish, but less so if it’s a mammal (I’ve eaten dolphin, it’s quite nice) –
unless we are Japanese or Faroese and not worried about consuming high levels of mercury.
Since
humans are up towards the carnivorous end of the omnivore category
(particularly if the endurance running hypothesis is true), killing
larger animals is part of our natural heritage.
So, I’d argue that it is ok.
If
we restrict our considerations to humans, it’s still a bit tricky. There are still many exceptions to the “do
not kill” rule. Killing in the line of
duty is ok, as a soldier or law enforcement agent. Killing in self-defence is ok. Killing as justice is sometimes ok. Note that
not all countries have the death penalty – those that do are places like China,
Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the United States, Yemen, North Korea, Somalia, (North)
Sudan, Bangladesh, Vietnam and South Sudan.
(The death penalty nations are listed in decreasing
order of executions for 2011, so long as they executed 5 or more. If you include those who executed fewer or
have the death penalty on the books but didn’t get around to executing anyone
in 2011 you add such notables as Afghanistan, the Palestine Authority, Belarus,
Botswana, Mongolia, Cuba and Syria).
Fortunately
none of these are among the most modern and developed nations so we can hope
that this list becomes shorter as more and more nations are encouraged to
modernise.
Anyway,
without a very good reason, killing a human is generally not considered to be
ok. Hopefully this is not a particularly
contentious claim for most readers. We
turn now to the question of what it is to be human.
When
does the transition between “potential human” and “human” take place?
One
way of thinking about the question of what makes you human is in terms similar
to that of the fire triangle. A fire
requires fuel, oxygen and heat and all three are required to support continued
combustion.
The
“triangle of humanity” would be:
·
human
DNA
·
independent
actualised potential
·
experience
Without
all three of these elements, you aren't fully human. A zygote in a petri dish may
have the DNA required to become a human, but it has no
actualised potential because the petri dish will not support further
development. And a zygote, not having a brain, won't accumulate experiences.
A
side argument is that just as an acorn is not an oak tree, a zygote is not a human. I’m not sure that this is a valid argument per se, given that it seems to be based
on semantics (and a misunderstanding, an acorn is equivalent to an embryo
rather than to a zygote). Given the
opportunity, an acorn will become shoot which will, in turn, become an oak tree
just as a frog’s egg will become a tadpole which will, in turn, become a frog and
a (human) zygote will become a human. It
is true enough that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to visually
distinguish the human zygote from a chimpanzee zygote and that this difficulty
remains until a relatively short time before birth. It is true that a human embryo looks like a
fish for a while and a canine embryo looks like a proto-human for a while.
Nevertheless,
a human zygote fulfils one of the requirements for being human in a way that a
chimpanzee does not. (As another aside,
taking us almost into another room, the chimpanzee almost fulfils the
requirements of being a human by means of DNA, falling short by less than 5%. Not being a geneticist, I am not completely
sure why there seem to be two figures floating around “we share 99% of our
genes” and “the difference between the human and chimpanzee genome is about 4%”. I do note that there is a difference between
our genes and our genome and that there are also alleles which are variants of
genes. It could be that the chimpanzee
has all the basic parts that we have, so the genes are largely the same, but
the chimpanzee plays with a different set of alleles which means the genome
exhibits a greater variance from human than the selection of genes does. I’m not sure how one should interpret another
apparent fact, that the variation between genes of a human and the genes of a
chimpanzee is ten times that of the variation between genes of individual
humans.)
Common
to a zygote, a morula (strictly speaking a zygote is a single cell), a blastocyst,
and an embryo (for a human, the embryo becomes a foetus at 10 weeks) is the
lack of a functional brain.
If
one uses the “triangle of humanity” concept, until the brain develops beyond a
certain stage a foetus could be said to not be fully human, because it's unable
to accumulate any experience of any kind. Also, while the foetus is entirely
dependent on the mother for survival (up until about 20 weeks) it has no
independent actualised potential.
Therefore,
I would say that you could argue that terminating an embryo or a foetus could
be justified up until somewhere between 7 and 14 weeks, 16 weeks at most. It's
a bit fuzzy because of how the brain develops. Development of the brain really kicks off in
the embryo at about 7 weeks. The foetus starts breathing practice at about 14
weeks and at about 16 weeks it starts manipulating its environment (like
pulling on the umbilical cord).
Sometime
in that period of time, a normal foetus reaches a level of development which is
consistent with being human under the “triangle of humanity” concept.
Note
that miscarriage can happen up until about 20 weeks, but that's basically a
legal definition. A
"miscarriage" after that time is called a stillbirth. The youngest
surviving premature birth was at 21 weeks. Advances in medical science may allow us to save
some prematurely delivered infants at closer to 20 weeks, but not much earlier
than that because a foetus is simply not sufficiently well developed by that
time.
In
the absence of extreme circumstances, I do not support the idea of the form of
late-term abortion which is, really, an induced premature delivery followed by
killing of the infant. (Normalising
early abortion, and those who seek one, will go some way to reducing the number
of late term abortions.)
None
of these arguments about when an embryo or a foetus becomes human such that
abortion is no longer justified (except in
extremis) has any bearing if your argument against abortion is theological
in nature. If your god says “Thou shalt
not abort, at all, ever” then you should not abort. However, if your god is a bit vague about it
saying “Thou shalt not kill, but there are plenty of exceptions and I cause spontaneous abortions at a much higher
rate than humans cause abortions and I am a paragon of goodness, so read
between the lines”, then you have a bit of wriggle room. In either case, this is your god speaking to you. In order for your god’s view on abortion to
have any influence over another person you have to first prove that your god
exists, which unfortunately you are unlikely to be able to do, and then prove
that your god’s injunctions apply to people who are not his followers. I’ve no real problem with anyone refusing to
carry out an abortion on the grounds of their personal convictions. But these are personal convictions and I
cannot see why one’s personal convictions should be applied to another person
who has their own personal convictions.
Adopting
a “triangle of humanity” concept could also have application in later life.
Many
people, me included, consider that continued animation of their body beyond the
effective death of their brain does not constitute a continuation of their self
in any meaningful way. By “effective”
death of the brain I mean either literal brain death (as in total and
irreversible lack of higher level neural activity) or the dissolution of self
that neurological degeneration brings. I
certainly don’t have any wish whatsoever for my body to be kept alive beyond
the time when the sense of being me is manifesting in it. If I’ve lost my experiences and the ability
to develop new experiences, or my actualised potential is gone (for example if
disconnecting me from a machine will lead to my death), then please let me go.
How
should we go about developing social policy on issues like abortion and
euthanasia?
I
need to make perfectly clear that by euthanasia, I really mean assisted suicide
of a person who is suffering physically or disintegrating intellectually. I’m only talking about voluntary euthanasia. I’m not recommending that we start killing
old people because they are inconvenient but rather suggesting that if someone
has written a living will which includes an instruction to let them die with
dignity, then their wishes should be respected.
Involuntary euthanasia of a human is murder. I recognise that there is a grey area for
people who have disintegrated intellectually and are thus unable to request
euthanasia but are also unable to express an unwillingness to die.
My
opinion expressed above, that I’d prefer not to have my body kept alive once
the experience of being in it is no longer generated (or if I am totally
dependent on machinery to continue breathing), relates only to me. I’m not advocating that the bodies of other
people, once their intellect is extinguished or their ability to survive
unassisted is gone, should necessarily be treated the way I’d prefer mine to be
treated.
When
I pondered the issues of abortion and euthanasia, it struck me that these are
not just ethical or moral issues, but also very emotive issues. I have had the emotional aspect of certain decisions
and considerations highlighted to me, while being criticised for appearing too
Darwinian (for example in relation to an early draft of Morality Behind the Wheel, which I
subsequently edited).
I
don’t think that I was totally ignoring emotional dimensions – what I think I was
doing was not letting them dominate the entire consideration.
It
is true that emotion is involved when humans make decisions and we should certainly
not ignore their influence.
However,
the importance of emotion in decision making applies to decisions made by individual
humans. The fact that we, as
individuals, are swayed by emotion does not mean that we, as a society,
should be swayed by emotion – and certainly not by the emotions of a noisy
minority.
If
you yourself are unwillingly pregnant, then as an individual you should
certainly engage your emotions when deciding whether to terminate the
pregnancy. You need to be aware of both the
fact that your emotions will affect the decision you make and the fact that the
decision you make (or don’t make) will affect your emotional state in the
future.
However,
if you are responsible for drafting legislation as to whether an option to
safely terminate pregnancies should be available, you should not be engaging
your personal emotions or indulging your personal convictions. If a totally rational, non-emotive discussion
of the issue of abortion arrives at a conclusion that it is so harmful that it
should be banned, then ban it. But if
your argument is based on little more than the fact that, if you were pregnant,
you yourself would not want to go through with an abortion or your personal
theology tells you that you are not to abort your child, then you do not have
grounds to ban the availability of safe abortions to others.
The
same applies to questions of euthanasia and, perhaps less controversially, the
recognition of same-sex civil union (and marriage – but only if a church is
happy with conducting a same-sex marriage.
Don’t go forcing a reluctant church which has a theological objection to
the whole homosexual thing to carry out gay weddings simply because you
personally think they are a good idea).
You
might be opposed to the idea of euthanasia and gay weddings, but no-one is suggesting
that you should be euthanized against your will. Not even the most fervent supporter of
same-sex union plans to force you to become gay and get married, or even to
attend a gay wedding.
I
personally think that Turkish vomit is disgusting (some people humorously and
incorrectly refer to it as “Turkish delight”) but I accept that, bizarre as it
sounds, some people actually like eating it.
Certainly, until someone can produce a rational, evidence-based argument
showing that eating Turkish vomit represents a significant risk to society, I
have no grounds for seeking a comprehensive ban of what I consider to be an
affront to all that is pure, wholesome and good.
Of
course some people disagree, and not only about Turkish vomit. They might argue that of course you should
agitate for your personal views to be reflected in society because that’s how
democracy works.
This
is a particularly naïve view of democracy.
It’s also a dangerous view.
Imagine
that your society decided that if a sufficient proportion of the population
don’t want something then it will be banned.
They count up those in favour of safe abortions being available, those
against the idea of abortion and those who don’t really care one way or the
other. Those against abortion prevail
and abortion is banned. Sounds good,
right?
Say
then that, after a heavy advertising campaign, Jehovah’s Witnesses obtain a
majority and the issue of blood transfusions arises. Do you really want their personal theological
convictions to hold sway over you when about one in three people need a blood
transfusion at some point in their life?
How about an unholy alliance between fundamentalist Pauline Christians
and Muslims who demand that women not be allowed to be educated, to work or to
go about in public without a veil? Or a
majority of atheists who don’t like going to church themselves and therefore
instigate a ban on churches altogether? Or drivers combine in their dislike of
electric cars to drive them (quietly) off the roads?
What
else could we ban? How about Persian
cats, little yappy dogs, salads, expatriates, anyone under five who can ski, the
pierced belly-button/muffin-top combo, misuse of the word “like”, comb-overs,
Boston MA, Tampa FL, hot-dog “sausages” and old people driving while wearing a
hat. (By the way, I actually like
salad.)
I
doubt that any of us are particularly keen on having our freedoms curtailed by
a majority of others. If you think that
way, then you should logically extend the same courtesy to others and not try
to impose your preferences on them, even if those preferences are in the
majority.
Personally,
I think you should agree with me, but I’m not going to force you to.
Great article! I enjoyed reading this. My thoughts on this subject have changed quite a bit over the past few years.
ReplyDeleteI like your "triangle" definition for human life. Human DNA, independent actualized potential, and experience. Defining human life seems to be the key issue.
It seems to me that human genetics plus a central nervous system are the primary biological requirements. It is fuzzy how developed the central nervous system needs to be--at the earliest stages experience probably doesn't take place--that would emerge somewhere along the long path of development.
Could you explain what you mean by "independent actualized potential" further?
Josh
Hi Josh,
ReplyDeleteWhen I say "independent actualised potential", I mean to distinguish between the unactualised potential inherent in a human sperm and a human ovum that have not yet fused (because they could be considered to be, collectively, a potential human) and a child that, if removed from its mother's womb, could survive independently. In between there are a number of states, including the actualised potential of a zygote that has plenty of developing to do before it can survive independently (and before it develops a brain).
An exception to the later discussion about euthanasia is, of course, one in which a female has a living will which asks for life support to be turned off or a more active termination under certain circumstances but overlooks a possible pregnancy. A foetus could develop in the body of a mother who is brain-dead or otherwise has an extinguished intellect, in this case a young foetus could be considered to have dependent actualised potential. This is an issue with its own ethical implications, for example the foetus could be disturbed as a consequence due to a lack of in-uterine interaction with its mother, the event leading to the brain-death of the mother may well have damaged the foetus and some argue for the mother's "right to die". Some argue along lines that would match mine, making a distinction between this "dependent actualised potential" and "independent actualised potential", suggesting that the mother should not be kept alive for the sake of a foetus under 24 weeks (about the time when a premature delivery is likely to result in survival of the infant). However, I think this should be a decision made in conjunction with the father (presuming there is one who is actively involved and not intentionally responsible for the brain death of the mother) and maybe even grandparents or siblings.
Fortunately it's a rare occurrence, so there's little point in developing exhaustive legislation - meaning that each case can be considered on its own merits.
Hopefully this clarifies what I meant.