Putting
out a Warrant for Plantinga
If William
Lane Craig were the Crown Prince of Christian Apologists then Alvin Plantinga would be one of his key advisors. A couple of times now I have found that
arguments coming out of WLC’s mouth had actually originated in the brain of
Plantinga. Given the damage that could
be wrought by an apologist with some intelligence and formal training, I thought
that Plantinga might be worth a closer look.
This
led directly to me listening to a couple of longer presentations by Plantinga,
for example an Unbelievable interview hosted by Justin Brierly in which Stephen
Law also took part and a “debate” between Plantinga and Daniel Dennett. This article draws quite heavily on the
latter.
The
engagement between Plantinga and Dennett was titled “Debate: Science and
Religion: Are they compatible?” but it was not really a debate. It was structured like this:
·
Dennett (35 minutes) – attack on the proposal
that science and religion are compatible, basically by indicating that religion
can only be considered compatible with science if one accepts gratuitous claims
and that any compatibility that religion has with science exists only to the
extent that the claims of religion are not testable
·
Plantinga (10 minutes) – response to Dennett
·
Question and Answer session (17 minutes)
Plantinga
spent a lot of time going over his probability theory, a version of which I
have already addressed elsewhere, but I want to focus on two things he
said. The first is this little chunk of Christian goodness:
…if theistic belief is true
then it probably doesn’t require propositional evidence for its rational
acceptability. As I argued in this book,
Warranted Christian Belief, if theistic belief is true, then very likely it has
both rationality and warrant in the basic way; that is not on the basis of
propositional evidence. If theistic
belief is true then very likely there is a cognitive structure something like John
Calvin’s sensus divinitatus, an original warranted source of theistic
belief. This way, belief in God, like
belief in other minds, has its own source of rationality and warrant and
doesn’t rely on arguments from other sources for these estimable
qualities. The demise of the theological
argument, if indeed evolution has compromised it, is perhaps little more of a
threat to rational belief in God than the demise of the argument from analogy
for other minds is to rational belief in other minds.
To
put this in context, you might want to know what Plantinga means by “warrant”:
According to Plantinga,
warrant involves four factors:
·
the mechanisms producing the belief must be
functioning properly;
·
they must be operating in a cognitive
environment for which they are suited;
·
they must be operating according to a design
plan or aspects of a design plan aimed at arriving at the truth; and
·
the objective probability must be high that operating
in this manner will reach the truth.
Plantinga
has argued for a new definition of knowledge, being warranted true belief as
opposed to justified true belief (although it could be argued that Plantinga is
merely arguing that “warrant” is a better form of justification to those in
traditional theories of justification). I touched on “justified true belief” when
discussing my world view (when I did so, I was describing an empirical variant
of coherentism,
not that I would necessarily consider myself an “empirical coherentist”). Because Plantinga wants to replace standard
forms of justification with warrant, we might be justified in looking more
closely at what both mean.
KNOWLEDGE
|
Warranted
True Belief
|
Justified
True Belief
|
That which is known is believed
|
That which is known is believed
|
That which is known is true
|
That which is known is true
|
The belief in that which is known is warranted
|
The belief in that which is known is justified
|
Comparing
warrant and justification:
Warrant
|
Justification
|
Belief is generated correctly
|
The believer is not deluded
|
Belief is generated in a suitable
environment
|
The believer is using suitably collated
data
|
Belief generation must be operating
according to a “design plan” aimed at arriving at the truth
|
The believer is using an appropriate method
for processing available data to reach a conclusion
|
Objective probability that the truth will
be arrived at via the belief generation mechanism is high
|
If the believer is not deluded, is using suitably
collated data and is using an appropriate method to process available data,
then the probability of the believer arriving at the truth will be high
|
Plantinga doesn’t really seem to be adding
anything to justification, unless his use of the term “design plan” is meant to
be literal (which he denies) or if his fourth point is intended to be more than
a summation of the previous three. He
does, however, seem to be taking two things away.
It’s
difficult to take Plantinga at his word when he writes:
it is perhaps possible that
evolution (undirected by God or anyone else) has somehow furnished us with our
design plans
and
also refers to “belief-forming and belief-maintaining apparatus of powers …
working the way it ought to work”. He
could mean this usage to be figurative, in the sense that a materialist atheist
with cancer might say “my body isn’t dealing with this problem the way it ought
to” meaning “certain cells in my body are reproducing without limitation,
leading to the growth of tumors which are not recognised as alien and thus not
removed by my body’s defences and this state of affairs will lead to my dying
earlier than otherwise would be the case – an outcome which I consider to be suboptimal”. However, I don’t think so. I think Plantinga means for the four factors underlying
warrant to be understood (by the right audience) approximately as follows:
·
Warranted true belief is generated using a
design plan which is intended to arrive at the truth, if
·
the design plan was well crafted so as to
lead to a high probability that truth will be arrived at, when
·
the belief is generated according to that
design plan, and
·
the belief is generated in an environment which
is appropriate for the design plan
If I
am correct, Plantinga’s warrant can be summed up as “Warranted true belief is a
belief that God expressly designed humans to have”. Now, iff knowledge (which is defined as
warranted true belief) is defined as God given, then the existence of God is a
fundamental fact, a basic truth, because without God there is no knowledge.
Note
that I used “iff” deliberately, rather than “if”. The term “iff” means “if and only if”.
This
is what we atheists call a theological argument. Plantinga, on the other hand, calls this a
“philosophical” argument.
Try
reading through the extract from Plantinga’s presentation again. I’ll help by converting the phrase “if
theistic belief is true” to “if God exists” (see
Plantinga’s definition of naturalism as discussed in Planting a Tiger for a
justification). The word “it” becomes “belief in God” in two instances.
…if God
exists then belief in God probably
doesn’t require propositional evidence for its rational acceptability. As I argued in this book, Warranted Christian
Belief, if God exists, then very likely belief in God has both rationality and warrant the
basic way; that is not on the basis of propositional evidence. If God exists then
very likely there is a cognitive structure something like John Calvin’s sensus
divinitatus, an original warranted source of belief in
God. This way, belief in God,
like belief in other minds, has its own source of rationality and warrant
and doesn’t rely on arguments from other sources for these estimable
qualities. The demise of the ontological
argument, if indeed evolution has compromised it, is perhaps little more of a
threat to rational belief in God than the demise of the argument from analogy
for other minds is to rational belief in other minds.
Now
some readers might divine from this that Plantinga is saying that you don’t
need evidence to believe in God and that believing in God, even in the absence
of evidence, would be “very likely” rational.
Some might just read it as saying that logical arguments (resulting in propositional
evidence) don’t affect the existence or non-existence of God. The latter is of course true.
I
might have a very good argument that Kim Kardashian does not exist, for example,
no-one I know has ever met her. The
brilliance of this argument, however, has no effect whatsoever on the existence
or otherwise of Kim (or indeed any other possible form of Kardashian).
However,
I suggest that Plantinga really means the former – the very weak claim that iff
God exists, then believing in such a God would be rational even in the absence
of evidence. But he goes further. Time for the second chunk of Christian goodness from that “debate”:
And even if contrary to
fact, there were scientific evidence for unguided evolution and hence for
atheism, that would by no means settle the issue. Suppose there is scientific evidence against
theism, it doesn’t follow that theism is false or that theists have a defeater
for their beliefs, or that theistic belief is irrational, or in some other way
problematic. Perhaps there is also
scientific evidence or otherwise for theism. But second and more important, as I
mentioned, if theism is true, it is likely that it has its own intrinsic and
basic source of warrant …
Yes,
ladies and gentlemen, Plantinga said, in a “debate” in which he was arguing
that religion and science are compatible, that if there is scientific evidence
against theism (noting that evidence against a hypothesis is the only scientific
evidence worth having, since hypotheses only survive in their original form as
long as there is no evidence against them), then the theist can just ignore
that inconvenient scientific evidence and instead rely on the possibility that
there might possibly be some evidence for theism or, alternatively, rely
on a completely hypothetical sense (sensus divinitatis), for which there is absolutely
no scientific evidence at all, as your basic source of “warrant”. Remembering of course that a warranted true
belief looks like this:
“I
believe that God made me in such a way that I will believe that God exists,
therefore God exists”.
This
is, in context, an admission that religion is fully compatible with
pseudoscience, but not actual science.
-----------------------------------
Just
in case anyone is in any doubt, in science if you have evidence against your
hypothesis (and by that I mean proper evidence, not false evidence), then your
hypothesis is false. End of story.
You
can have evidence which does not support your hypothesis which might not
necessarily be a hypothesis killer, but this is usually due to poor framing of
the hypothesis or difficulty with obtaining experimental data. Years of not finding evidence for the Higgs
Boson did not disprove the hypothesis that it exists because no evidence
against existence of the boson was obtained either.
If
you only accept evidence which supports your hypothesis and you ignore any
other sort of evidence, then you have pseudoscience. That approach puts you in the same category
as the 9/11 Truthers, Alien Abduction enthusiasts, Loch Ness Monster spotters,
astrologers, mediums, water dowsers, shamans, homeopathy practitioners,
homotoxicologists, quantum healers, moon landing hoaxers, Holocaust deniers,
millenarianists, flat earthers, Nibiru cataclysmists, rumpologists and theists.
Many
of the claims of a pseudoscience are not strictly testable but sometimes
theists, like the Intelligent Design crowd, make outlandish claims and these
can be shown to be false:
God
must exist because irreducible complexity is impossible via evolution – shown to be false
God
must exist because evolution is false since it’s ridiculous to imagine that humans
evolved from monkeys – shown to be false
(the subordinate claim about human descent from monkeys being ridiculous is agreed
but it’s irrelevant to the evolution argument since monkeys and humans have a
common ancestor – the link isn’t actually proof, per se, but an explanation)
What
science can do, and does, is chip away at all the “God must exist because ...”
arguments. Eventually, the theist is
left with no undefeated claim for the necessity of God.
What the average theist can then do, and obviously does, is retreat into a form of special pleading (“my hypothesis is special and has God in it, therefore it doesn’t need evidence”).